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ABSTRACT 
 
Watershed management is a practice that administers water and land resources 
within a watershed context for different users under spatial heterogeneity and temporal 
variability.  Meeting water demands for both human and ecosystem and maintaining the 
harmonic balance between those two is one of the ultimate challenges for watershed 
managers. This study quantitatively defines both human and natural water users as agents 
in a watershed and then uses a multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework to 
formulate the water allocation issue among the agents.  A decentralized optimization 
algorithm is developed to evaluate the complexity of the watershed level outcomes 
resulting from different agents’ decisions. 
The construction of ecology-hydrology quantitative connection is the very first 
step to incorporate the ecological concern into the watershed planning.  A data-mining 
approach: genetic programming (GP) is applied in this study to addressing this task. 
Using the Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs) to represent the environmental flow 
condition, genetic programming generated a quantitative relationship (equation) between 
natural flow regime metrics (hydrology) and fish community indices (ecology).  After a 
robustness test shows that each metrics in the equation had a consistent relationship with 
the ecological index, the GP generated equation is proofed as a direct linkage between 
hydrology and ecology and can reflect the ecosystem status under given flow situation. 
Meanwhile, the verification test shows a consistent outcome between GP, a traditional 
statistic method: principal component analysis (PCA) and an ecological approach: 
autecology matrix (AM).  This common outcome provides confidence in using existing 
and new approaches and observational data to build solid hydroecological relationships. 
This method is applied to a real world case study regarding using daily reservoir 
operation for ecosystem restoration purpose.  A multi-objectives optimization model is 
constructed for a case study reservoir in Illinois, USA to evaluate the tradeoff between 
human economic purpose and ecological conservation purpose.  In general, adding the 
ecological objective into case study reservoir operation will not jeopardize the original 
economic objective, which is the major concern of current reservoir operation. 
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Meanwhile, the result can also improve the downstream fish habitats by providing a flow 
regime that close to the natural condition. 
Due to the spatial heterogeneity involved in the management issue, dividing the 
watershed into interconnected subsystems (agents) should be a more realistic approach 
for analyzing water resources management problems.  Agent can be flexibly defined in 
any appropriate format to characterize the heterogeneous water usage.  Agents in the 
watershed are different types of water users that include offstream human land and water 
users and instream water “users,” such as riparian aquatic ecosystems.  Under the MAS 
framework, both individual agents’ objectives and the interconnection among these 
objectives would be addressed using mathematical format.  A penalty-based 
decentralized optimization algorithm is used to solve the formulated mathematical 
problem.  By introducing the local interest factor (βi), this algorithm allows agents to 
search for the solution in the infeasible solution space when system-wide constraints are 
violated.  The use of βi values enables the analysis of a water resource management 
problem to include the impact of the various agent behaviors that βi values reflect.   
Aggressive agents with large βi values affect other agents, particularly the reactive 
ecosystem agents, and even the entire system.  In the real world case study of the Yellow 
River Basin, China, the concept of βi has been translated into local water price (pi).  The 
local water price, served as an institutional arrangement, is used to guide the convergence 
of the decentralized management.  The results of different scenarios analysis shows that 
equilibrium local water prices can be achieved under physical constraints in the 
watershed that will result in lower water consumptions and higher economic benefits 
compare to the baseline scenario.  The subsidies from the government can not only 
guarantee the environmental flow requirement, but also increase the system GDP at the 
same time. 
Data limitation is always a major concern for watershed management modeling 
analysis.  The construction of quantitative hydroecological relationship using genetic 
programming requires long-term fish species data.  The utility function for the human 
water agent also needs actual water consumption and economic benefit data.  The 
modeling results can be further improved if more data become available.  Incorporating 
the concept of uncertainty into the MAS framework is the reasonable next step of this 
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study.  Agents' decisions will become dynamic and the results should be more close to 
the real world situation. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Motivation 
Water is one of the most limiting factors affecting living organism health and 
welfare throughout this planet [Loucks, 2003].  Watershed management administers 
water resources within a watershed for different water users.  The ultimate purpose of 
watershed management plan is to maximize the profits of different users meanwhile 
reducing the possible conflicts that might occur between them.  The goal of this study is 
to quantitatively define different water users as agents in a watershed context and then 
use a multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework to address the challenge of finding 
the harmonic balance between human and ecosystem water demands.  A data mining 
approach is applied to quantitatively defining ecosystem agents and a decentralized 
optimization method is applied to modeling the complexity of the watershed level 
outcomes resulting from different agents’ decisions.  
Conventional watershed management put the first priority to human water needs.  
It has been argued that watershed management should be an integrative way of thinking 
about the various human activities occurring in the watershed that have effects on, or 
affected by, water [NRC, 1999].  With growing population, it is a challenge to provide 
sufficient amount of high-quality water for all human beings [NRC, 2001].  Satisfying all 
water demands for human activities is already a difficult task for watershed managers and 
engineers. 
However, all other lives, besides human, also require water to survive.  
Conventional watershed management satisfied human water needs by mechanistic 
hydrotechnical approaches, such as building dams and reservoirs on rivers and diverting 
water off streams.  In the endeavor to manage water meeting the various human needs, 
the water requirements of freshwater species and ecosystems might be largely neglected 
[Richter et al., 2003].  Hydrotechnical approaches could disrupt the biogeochemical 
evolution of the river and cause the degradation of the biota, which is the most dynamic 
and vulnerable regulatory component of water cycle [Zalewski, 2000].  Including 
ecological or environmental concerns in the management practices and ensuring the 
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environmental sustainability has been recognized as one of the most important goals for 
next generation of watershed management [UN, 2008].  
 
Figure 1.1 The interactions between human, ecosystem, and environment within a 
watershed 
Due to water resources limits, the water needs of human and natural systems are 
commonly viewed as competing with each other, as shown in Figure 1.1 [Richter et al., 
2003].  How to ensure the spatial and temporal equity between economic, social and 
environmental sustainability becomes a major challenge [Wallace et al., 2003].  It is now 
accepted that water resources within a watershed should be managed as a whole, to 
minimize the potential conflicts between different users and activities in the watershed 
[Dunn and Ferrier, 1999].  The ultimate objective of ecological watershed management is 
to find a harmonic balance between human activities and the impacts on ecosystems 
[Falkenmark, 2004]. 
Meeting demands for human and ecosystem and finding balance between them 
require a comprehensive systems approach to implementing basin-wide management 
[Loucks, 2003].  Watershed systems consist of many interdependent components; what 
one does locally may have impacts throughout the entire watershed [Loucks, 2003].  The 
connections of all components within a watershed system are characterized by spatial 
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patterns and the environmental continuum [Steel and Weber 2001].  Clearly, this coupled 
human and natural system will reveal new and complex patterns which have not been 
well understood yet [Liu, et al. 2007].  The traditional methods address these patterns by 
a top-down process, which assumes that 1) all the water users within a watershed obey a 
management coordinator, 2) complete information exchange exists among the distributed 
users, and 3) perfect economic efficiency is realized. These assumptions are usually 
unrealistic in real-world watershed management situations. 
Realistic watershed management most likely takes a bottom-up process, driven 
largely by stakeholders’ concerns and guided by available data and information [NRC, 
1999].  MAS modeling framework is suitable for simulating such a bottom-up process, to 
handle the integration and coordination of watershed activities.  This method compiles 
relevant information about entities at the local level (defined as agents), tests theories on 
agents’ behavior, and examines the emergence of the system-level properties related to 
particular questions on watershed management [Grimm, et al., 2005]. 
The Yellow River Basin in China is used for a case study of this thesis research.  
The water management issues in the Yellow River have been discussed for more than two 
millenniums.  According to some local studies in China, surface runoff generation within 
Hebei Province has declined by 65 percent and inflow declined by 72 percent compared 
to the average in the 1950’s at the regional scale [Li and Wei, 2003].  The increasing 
population has resulted in a growing demand, which has caused larger water stress and 
made the water resource management more difficult.  The average annual water 
consumption was 41.3 km3 while the total renewable water was 53.2 km3 [Cai and 
Rosegrant, 2004]. 
Therefore, decreasing water supplies, increasing demands and a rapidly growing 
economy have added new challenges to the management agenda in the Yellow River 
[Giordano et al., 2004].  Meanwhile, ecological concerns in the Yellow River have also 
become a popular issue recently.  Local scientists recognized the value of maintaining dry 
season flows for biodiversity protection and natural resources preservation at the mouth 
of the river [Zhu et al., 2004].  However, increasing human activities like disruptive dams 
and water pollution had led to about 40% of the fish population going extinct while the 
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river used to host more than 150 species of fish [Coonan, 2007].  The water related issues 
described above makes the Yellow River Basin complex enough as a suitable subject to 
test the proposed MAS modeling framework. 
1.2. State of Knowledge  
The related research topics of this study are reviewed from different aspects, 
including agent identification, agent objective quantification (especially for the 
ecosystem agents), and solution methods of the MAS models. 
1.2.1. Multi-Agent System Modeling 
 
Figure 1.2 Watershed management with stakeholders involved [Loucks et al., 2005] 
Multi-agent system modeling (MAS) describes the dynamic network of many 
interacting agents; examples include ecosystems, financial markets, and cities [Grimm, et 
al., 2005].  The theory of MAS has emerged from the field of computer science 
associated with distributed artificial intelligence [Sycara, 1998].   Under the definition of 
MAS, an agent is an object that interacts with other agents and the environment, and the 
interactions are characterized by behavioral rules of individual agents.  The MAS 
approach takes a micro-to-macro view for problem solving, which allows deriving system 
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emergence.  With adequate and accurate data, the MAS framework can handle the spatial 
and temporal complexity at the same time.  
The MAS methods are increasingly used in the field of environmental and natural 
resource management issues [Barreteau et al, 2004; Chen et al., 2008], such as ecological 
modeling [Bousquet and Le Page, 2004], basin land use management [Izquierdo et al., 
2002; Parker et al., 2003; Jaziri and Paquet, 2006], and urban catchment problems [Pahl-
Wostl, 2005].  MAS can be a suitable approach to dealing the water resource planning 
and management issue.  It is widely accepted that water resource management demands 
an integrated assessment of resource use options, including local and regional impacts on 
the environment and stakeholders (Figure 1.2) [Loucks et al., 2005; Croke et al, 2007].  
Some researchers have recently begun to use MAS on water resource planning and 
management issues.     
Doran [2001] proposed an agent-based modeling for ecosystem management in a 
watershed and recommended in the conclusion that intervention strategies among agents 
should be related to ecosystem management literature.  However, there are still some 
technical difficulties.  Molina and Blasco [2003] used MAS to assist operators in decision 
making in the presence of flooding emergencies.  They used a stream flood problem as an 
example.  The MAS framework was applied to explaining real-time runoff data, 
predicting the pattern of the flood and recommending an effective control action.  They 
demonstrated the framework in the study area with the objective of minimizing the 
maximum risk.  Berger et al. [2007] also showed an application for MAS to evaluate the 
complexity of water uses and water users within sub-basins.  They described the different 
components of an MAS model developed for four sub-watersheds. Results showed the 
impact of technical change and of informal rental markets on household income and 
water use efficiency.  They also demonstrated how collective action problems in water 
markets and in large and small-scale infrastructure provision could be captured by the 
MAS framework. 
1.2.2. Ecosystem agents and the concept of natural flow regime 
To apply the MAS framework for the watershed (system) management, the first 
step might be to identify agents within the system.  A relatively novel concept that is 
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proposed by this study is to identify ecosystem as an active agent just like the human 
agents.  The objectives of agents are maximizing their benefits or satisfying their water 
requirements.  However, ecosystem is composed of all kinds of organisms.  It is almost 
impossible to address the water requirements for all of them.  Choosing an ecological 
representative should be a reasonable compromising solution.  In this study, fish 
community is chosen to represent the aquatic ecosystem and the river reaches, where fish 
is sampled, are identified as ecosystem agents. 
Fish can be used as indicators over wide temporal and spatial ranges.  They are 
sensitive to most human disturbances, cover all trophic levels of consumer ecology, and 
can effectively integrate the whole range of ecological processes in waterways [Harris, 
1995].  Fish data are widely used for assessing river health conditions and fish 
communities are assumed to effectively reflect the watershed conditions [Attrill and 
Depledge, 1997; Suen and Herricks, 2006].  Traditional watershed management might 
include stream water quantity and quality standards only based on the physical and 
chemical characteristics of rivers.  Identifying an ecosystem representative such as fish 
community as an agent can shift the management focus from mainly physical and 
chemical measures (on the assumption that acceptable river condition would be achieved 
if these were met) to the inclusion of more ecological measures [Norris and Thoms, 
1999].  The objective of ecosystem agents can be defined as to maximize the ecological 
targets, such as biodiversity, species abundance or species presence probability [Jowett 
and Richardson, 1996; Gopal and Chauhan, 2006; Humphries et al., 2008].  
Identifying the most relevant hydrological factors that affect ecosystem agents’ 
target becomes the next step.  Poff et al. [1997] defined five major streamflow 
characteristics that described the “natural flow regime:” 1) seasonal pattern of flows, 2) 
timing of extreme flows, 3) frequency and duration of floods and droughts, 4) seasonal 
and annual flow variability, and 5) rate of flow change.  This natural flow regime concept 
is recognized by many aquatic ecologists as one of the most important driving forces for 
riverine and floodplain wetland ecosystems [Richter et al., 1998; Landres et al., 1999; 
Harris et al., 2000; Baron et al., 2002]. It controls key habitat parameters such as flow 
depth, velocity, and habitat volume. 
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Bunn and Arthington [2002] summarized four different principles that illustrated 
how natural regime of a river affects the ecosystem.  Principle 1: the average flow 
condition determines the major physical habitats and biotic composition.  Principle 2: 
The life patterns of aquatic species have direct response to the various flow conditions.  
Principle 3: maintaining natural patterns of longitudinal and lateral connectivity is 
essential to the viability of populations of many riverine species.  Principle 4: the 
invasion and success of exotic and introduced species in rivers is facilitated by the 
alteration of flow regimes (Figure 1.3). 
 
Figure 1.3 The influences of natural regime on aquatic ecosystem [Bunn and Arthington, 
2002] 
This study uses the concept of natural flow regime to link ecosystem agents’ 
targets and the hydrological factors that affect these targets.  Similar approaches are 
broadly applied to research integrating the physical processes of hydrology with the 
biological processes of ecology [Palmer and Bernhardt, 2006].  
1.2.3. Ecological flow requirement and watershed management  
Although the concept is clear, translating the general hydrologic-ecological 
principles and knowledge into specific management rules as the objective of ecosystem 
agent remains a daunting challenge [Poff et al., 2003].  It is necessary to define the 
hydroecological concept and ecosystem water requirement more precisely [Harris et al., 
2000].  Halls and Welcomme [2004] suggested that a detailed simulation analysis was 
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needed to understand the processes resulting from the hydrological changes and to predict 
the outcomes of such changes through the scenario-based determination of ecological 
flows.  Early simulation studies focused more on the first principle of the natural flow 
regime concept: the average flow condition.  Therefore, the ideal of minimum instream 
flow requirement has been proposed and widely used as a constraint in the watershed 
management practice.  This approach has been discussed in several studies about how to 
determine the amount of minimum flow and its influences on the aquatic ecosystem [e.g, 
Cardwell et al., 1996; Petts, 1996; Jowett, 1997; and Sophocleous, 2000]. 
However, the average flow condition is insufficient to sustain a healthy ecosystem 
as shown in Fig 3. The natural range of variation in streamflow is critical to maintaining 
the integrity and dynamic potential of aquatic ecosystems; therefore, the ecological target 
of ecosystem agents should allow for dynamic change [Baron et al., 2002].  Some studies 
analyzed the long-term stream discharge record to create the flow duration curve and 
used the curve to determine the ecosystem water needs, for example, Jacobs and Vogel 
[1998] and Homa et al. (2005) proposed a concept of “ecodeficit” to quantify the impact 
of changes on the natural flow regime resulting from human withdrawals.  Other studies 
used multi-objective weighting method to incorporate the ecosystem water requirement 
change into the management practice, such as Lamy et al. [2002], Bekele and Nicklow 
[2005] and Schlüter et al. [2005].  
Using ecohrdrological metrics method to determine the ecosystem flow 
requirement for ecosystem agents has become more and more popular recently.  These 
metrics have been developed to describe some particular regions of ecologically relevant 
flow variables, to characterize the overall variability in hydrologic regimes, and to 
quantify flow attributes that are believed to be sensitive to various forms of human 
perturbation [Olden and Poff, 2003].  The studies such as Richter et al. [1996, 1997, and 
1988], Puckridge et al. [1998], Olden and Poff [2003], Nakamura [2006], Shiau and Wu 
[2006] and Yang et al. [2008] either created a set of ecohrdrological metrics for analysis, 
or applied and tested the exist metrics to demonstrate their practicability. 
Watershed management considering the ecosystem flow requirement should 
address the characteristics of natural flow regime to sustain ecosystem integrity by 
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protecting native biodiversity and the ecological processes which create and maintain this 
diversity [Richter et al., 1996].  Zalewski [2000] suggested that any proposed 
hydroecological approaches should consider the strategy that integrates the interactions 
among the ecosystem, climate, hydrological processes, and human society in attempting 
to enhance the resistance and resilience of freshwater ecosystems against stresses 
imposed by human development and environmental change.  Therefore, contemporary 
watershed management should focus not only on the stakeholders’ (human agents) water 
demands but also on the role of natural flow variation in generating and maintaining the 
ecological integrity [Strange et al., 1999]. Following the suggestion from Arthington et al. 
[2006] about considering river or the aquatic ecosystem as legitimate “users” of fresh 
water, identifying the ecosystem as an active agent in the MAS framework can be a 
suitable method to address these concerns. 
1.2.4. Genetic programming 
  A data mining approach: genetic programming (GP) is used to connect the 
ecosystem agent’s ecological target and the hydrological metrics that affect these targets.  
It’s expected that the outcomes of GP can provide a suitable objective function for 
ecosystem agent and then be used in the MAS modeling framework.  GP can identify 
relationships which may not be evident from other analytical techniques [Koza, 1992].  
The procedures of GP are similar to those of genetic algorithms (GA) which generate 
solutions based on parent population and improve solutions by selection, crossover, and 
mutation processes [Holland, 1975].  Several studies have applied GP in the hydrology 
and ecology research. Savic et al. [1999], Khu et al. [2001], Liong et al. [2002], and 
Babovic and Keijzer [2002] used GP to generate rainfall-runoff relationships.  These 
studies indicated that GP outcomes had a good agreement with the conceptual model 
results with optimized parameters.  Downing [1998] illustrated the applications of GP to 
the evolution of three different biological phenomena: 1) optimal foraging strategies, 2) 
temporal ideal free distributions of larval emergence dates, and 3) microscopic aquatic 
ecosystems.  The hybrid GP and environmental simulation technology could be used to 
explore evolutionary ecology.  Yang [2004] used GP to create a symbolic regression 
function between the abundance of an endangered fish species, formosan landlocked 
salmon (Oncorhynchus masou formosanum), and two environmental factors: air 
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temperature and streamflow discharge.  The result was used to assess the impact of 
climate change on the salmon population. 
1.2.5. Decentralized optimization method  
Decentralized optimization method is applied to solving the MAS problem in this 
study.  Complexity is an essential problem of the large scale system studies, both therical 
and practical [Šiljak, 1991].  There are two reasons that conventional (centralized) 
modeling techniques, control design and optimization may be inappropriate for complex 
systems such as MAS.  First it is difficult to solve the optimization model numerically 
due to the so-called Bellman’s “curse of dimensionality”.  Second, it is also difficult to 
implement policies derived from a perspective of central control when various 
compartments (subsystems) of the system are actually operated separately [Leitmann et 
al., 1987].  Examples of these systems include robust turbine control [Šiljak et al., 2002], 
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) formulation [Stipanović et al., 2004], power system 
management [Bunn and Oliveira, 2001] and multi-river reach water quality issues 
[Bottura and Torrico Cáceres, 2002].  Decentralized optimization methods have been 
demonstrated to be more effective to address system problems with a “well-organized 
complexity” [e.g., Šiljak, 1991; Boel et al., 1999; Cowie and Borrett, 2005]. 
Penalty-based methods [Luenberger, 1984] provide convenient ways to solve the 
decentralized problem such as MAS.  Sylla [1995] and Mousavi and Ramamurthy [2000] 
applied penalty methods for reservoirs operation research.  They formulated the 
mathematical problem in either linear or nonlinear format, and solved the multi-reservoir 
interconnection problem with minimum cost or maximum profit objective function.  
Penalty-based methods have also been used to optimize the operation of water 
distribution systems [Sakarya and Mays, 2000], groundwater pollution problems [Keshari 
and Datta, 2001], and water-level feedback controller issues [Clemmens and Schuurmans, 
2004]. 
The decentralized methods can be more effective for solving large-scale 
watershed management problems.  Centralized or top down water resources management 
might create unnecessary economic burdens upon different users because complete 
information communication might not exist.  Flexible decentralized controls through the 
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use of economic incentives have gained acceptance [Parker and Tsur, 1997].  The 
decentralized or bottom-up decision making could place water resource management 
decisions at different locations depending on water demand and supply.   
Following the state-of-art knowledge, further studies are necessary to address the 
existing gaps with respect to: 1) the lack of an effective solution algorithm which can 
simulate bottom-up watershed management processes; 2) the difficulty in quantifying the 
responses of fish community to long-term hydrologic or habitat variability [Freeman et 
al., 2001; Halls and Welcomme, 2004]; 3) the lack of a mechanism to involve 
stakeholders in a shared-vision modeling framework [Loucks et al., 2005]; 4) the need of 
a demonstration of the suitability of MAS modeling framework for real world watershed 
management.   
1.3. Research Objectives  
 This study promotes a method that could achieve better integration and 
coordination of watershed management activities in a way that is politically feasible 
[Loucks, 2003] through the MAS modeling framework.  The overall hypothesis of this 
study is to analyze the balance between the natural and human water demands in 
the watershed context both ecological and human communities should be 
represented as active agents.  To test this hypothesis, the study addresses three 
objectives associated with specific hypotheses as stated below: 
Objective 1: Quantifying ecosystem water demands by linking an ecosystem 
representative with natural flow condition using a data mining approach. 
The first objective is to construct a quantitative relationship between ecosystem 
representative and the environmental condition.  The hypothesis here is that there should 
be a statistical significant relationship exists between fish community indicators and 
hydrologic and water quality metrics.  A data mining approach, namely genetic 
programming (GP), is applied to completing this task.  The result of GP, which are 
symbolic regression functions between ecosystem representative and environmental 
conditions, can not only be used to incorporate the ecological concern into the reservoir 
operation but also as the objective functions of ecosystem agents.  In this study, the 
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Shannon Index (a fish community diversity index) and the number of individuals (total 
abundance) of a fish community are used as ecological targets. Environmental conditions 
are represented by 32 Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs) for the case study site.  
The results are further demonstrated in an optimal reservoir operation study.  
Objective 2: Testing the effectiveness of a decentralized optimization method to 
address the human and ecosystem water demands using a bottom-up procedure. 
The second objective is to construct a multi-agent system modeling framework 
for water management issue using a decentralized optimization method.  The hypothesis 
here is that the proposed method can be effectively used to model a MAS watershed 
problem including both human and ecosystem agents. This study applies the 
decentralized optimization method with penalty-based format to optimizing the agent’s 
objectives and to solve the entire MAS problem.  The penalty-based formula allows 
agents to negotiate on the local interest parameter (βi) using global information. This 
bottom-up problem-solving approach mimics real-world watershed management 
problems better than conventional “top-down” optimization methods in which it is 
assumed that individual agents will completely comply with any recommendations that 
the coordinator makes.  The method is applied to a steady state hypothetical watershed 
with three offstream human agents, one instream human agent and two ecological agents.  
Objective 3: Demonstrating the applicability of the method to a real watershed 
management problem. 
The third objective is to apply the multi-agent system modeling framework to a 
real world watershed.  The hypothesis here is that the developed method is applicable to 
real world, complex watershed management problems.  The management of large river 
basins such as the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China involves distributed, local 
decision processes, as well as mechanisms that coordinate individual decisions and 
manage basin-level issues.  This basin is a good example to demonstrate the effectiveness 
of multi-agent system modeling framework and the proposed decentralized algorithm.  
Different scenarios base on the concept of centralized control and decentralized 
negotiation has been set up for management purpose and the unmangement situation is 
used as the base line condition.  The result attempts to explore the socioeconomic and 
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environmental consequences of the regulation, and tests options to improve water 
allocation management in the basin.     
By addressing these objectives, this study is expected to: 1) represent ecosystem 
agents quantitatively; 2) evaluate the effect of individual decision maker’s actions on the 
entire watershed; 3) illustrate the practicability of the proposed MAS framework through 
a real world case study.  A schematic flowchart of the thesis is given in Figure 1.4.  The 
scope of the work is limited by the over all assumption of the study, which are: 
• Stationary in the hydrologic data is assumed to hold within the time period 
when genetic programming is applied to constructing the quantitative 
relationship between ecosystem and environment. 
• Every agent in the multi-agent system modeling framework are assumed to 
pursue the maximal local benefit.  
• The objective functions for each agent in the real world case study are 
assumed to be perfectly reflecting the purpose of every agent.  
• A qusai-dynamic situation is assumed in the real world multi-agent system 
modeling framework, which means that when agents making decision without 
any future information. 
 
Figure 1.4 Schematic flowchart of the thesis framework 
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1.4. Intellectual Merits 
This study promotes a novel way for watershed management includes ecological 
concern.  The result will demonstrate a bottom-up process for watershed management 
through the multi-agent system modeling framework.  This process is much more similar 
to the real world management issues and has a potential to increase the public 
engagement.  By working with the local community, the objective of each agent can be 
defined more precisely.  Meanwhile, quantitatively define ecosystem agents for 
ecological water demand concern allows watershed managers to evaluate the water 
resources balance between human and nature.  Through the multi-agent system modeling 
framework to study the coupled natural-human (CNH) system is a relatively newly 
developed approach. The studies of CNH issue have been promoted by National Science 
Foundation for almost a decade.  Finally, the application to a real world case study shows 
the practicability of the method and also set up a reference for future studies.  Broadly, 
this study will contribute with respect to 1) insights for coupled natural-human system 
and integrated watershed management; 2) hydroecological knowledge in watershed 
management and 3) decentralized optimization method.  
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 demonstrates the genetic 
programming procedure that quantifies the relationship between ecosystem and 
environment.  Using the fish diversity index as an ecosystem target, the GP identifies the 
most ecologically relevant hydrologic indicators (ERHIs) from 32 Indicators of 
Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs) as environmental metrics.  Some additional information 
such as the substitutional impact of ERHIs on ecosystem is also identified and 
demonstrated in the Indicator Impact Matrix (IIM).   
As an extension of the work in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 incorporates the result of 
genetic programming into a reservoir operation study.  The purpose is to identify a series 
of daily reservoir water releases which can maximize the annual fish diversity meanwhile 
minimize the flooding loss at the same time.  The multi-objective genetic algorithm is 
applied to solving the two objectives optimization problem.  The tradeoff effect between 
ecological objective and the economic objective is demonstrated using the result of 
Monte Carlo simulations.  
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Chapter 4 develops a penalty-based decentralized optimization algorithm for 
multi-agent system modeling framework and using a hypocritical case study to illustrate 
the efficiency and practicality.  The procedure shows the bargaining process between 
agents through a local interest factor. The value of local interest factor represent the 
degree of selfness for a water user and the results present the bottom-up problem-solving 
approach which mimics real-world watershed management problems better than 
conventional “top-down” optimization methods.   
Chapter 5 applies the model and algorithm presented in Chapter 4 to a real world 
river basin: the Yellow River Basin in China. Sixty agents have been identified in the 
basin and the decentralized algorithm is used to solve the water resources allocation 
problem in the entire basin.  The concept of market-based management mechanism has 
been incorporate into the decentralized optimization and the local interest factor has been 
transfer into local water price.  The impact of water trading, through different local water 
price, on the system-wide economics and downstream ecosystem requirement are 
demonstrated.  Finally, Chapter 6 presents conclusions and a description of future work. 
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CHAPTER 2. IDENTIFICATION OF HYDROLOGIC 
INDICATORS RELATED TO FISH DIVERSITY AND 
ABUNDANCE – A DATA MINING APPROACH FOR FISH 
COMMUNITY ANALYSIS  
 
Summary  
This chapter develops a new approach to identify hydrologic indicators related to fish 
community and generate a quantitative function between an ecological target index and 
the identified hydrologic indicators.  The approach is based on genetic programming 
(GP), a data mining method.  Using the Shannon Index (a fish community diversity 
index) or the number of individuals (total abundance) of a fish community, as an 
ecological target, the GP identified the most ecologically relevant hydrologic indicators 
(ERHIs) from 32 Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs), for the case study site, the 
upper Illinois River.  Robustness analysis showed that different GP runs found a similar 
set of ERHIs; each of the identified ERHI from different GP runs had a consistent 
relationship with the target index.  By comparing the GP results with those from principal 
component analysis (PCA) and autecology matrix (AM), the three approaches identified a 
small number (six) of common ERHIs.  Particularly, the timing of low flow (Dmin) seems 
to be more relevant to the diversity of the fish community while the magnitude of the low 
flow (Qb) is more relevant to the total fish abundance; large rising rates result in a 
significant improvement of fish diversity, which is counterintuitive and against previous 
findings.  The quantitative function developed by GP was further used to construct an 
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Indicator Impact Matrix (IIM), which was demonstrated as a potentially useful tool for 
streamflow restoration design. 
2.1. Introduction 
Recent studies in water resources management have called for the implementation 
of management programs that add ecological objectives to existing water management 
goals [Vogel et al., 2007; Suen and Eheart, 2006; Palmer et al., 2005; Richter et al., 2003; 
Naiman et al., 2002].  The concept of “natural flow regime” proposed by Poff et al. 
[1997], which has been widely discussed in the literature [e.g., Landres et al., 1999; 
Richter et al., 2003; Allan, 2004], defined five major streamflow characteristics that are 
related to different aspects of fish habitat: 1) seasonal pattern of flows – high flows may 
maintain ecosystem productivity and diversity while low flows provide recruitment 
opportunities for riparian plant species; 2) timing of extreme flows – variable magnitudes 
may favor the life cycles of some aquatic and riparian species but not others; 3) 
frequency and duration of floods and droughts – different species have life histories that 
can accommodate changing flows, or have different tolerances to flood or drought 
conditions; 4) seasonal and annual flow variability – flow variability may create 
disturbances to benefit native species, which are often more robust under the historical 
natural flow regime; and 5) rate of change – the change rate of flow conditions influences 
species persistence and coexistence.  The premise adopted by this chapter is: An ideal 
status of fish diversity and abundance exists with the natural flow regime and any 
changes of the former are associated with the changes of the later. 
During the past decade, researchers have developed more than 170 hydrologic 
metrics in attempting to describe different components of flow regime and to capture the 
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ecologically relevant streamflow attributes [Olden and Poff, 2003].  The choice of the 
most ecologically relevant hydrologic indicators (ERHIs) has been a crucial issue.  The 
ERHIs represent the minimum subset of the numerous hydrologic metrics which reflect 
the most important flow characteristics for the target ecosystem.  Olden and Poff [2003] 
discussed the redundancy of 171 hydrologic metrics, examined those indicators from 13 
published papers and divided them into nine categories based on the characteristics of 
natural flow regime.  They applied principal component analysis (PCA), to the 
long-term flow records from 420 locations in the US.  The PCA conducted by Olden and 
Poff [2003] showed that the first four principal components (PC1-PC4) could represent 
76% of the recorded flow variability.  From those components, they selected 25 
hydrologic indicators that have higher absolute loading based on proportion rules to 
represent the principal-component axes of different stream types. 
Suen and Herricks [2006] argued that an ecosystem focused approach should 
effectively relate hydrology to the requirements of ecosystem sustainability based on 
known habitats and life history requirements of fish species.  The primary tool of their 
analysis was an autecology matrix (AM) that summarized environmental and ecological 
requirements of target taxa.  AM was a contribution to the Illinois Water Quality 
Management System [Herricks, 1977].  A fish AM assists in defining the relationship of 
a species to its environment and the interrelationships among fish species to individual 
environmental variable based on published/measured environmental or ecological data.  
The matrix can be used in two primary ways: 1) to identify species specific requirements 
and 2) to assess a fish community relationship against a single environmental or 
ecological factor.  In its present form, the AM divides factors into three major groups: 
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abiotic (largely physical habitat), biotic (largely known ecology and life history), and 
human such as water quality tolerance, species status (“endangered”, “threatened”, 
“restricted”, etc.), or other management focused factors (“commercial”, “sport”, etc.), 
which together include over 150 factors for each fish species.  There are environmental 
factors in AM that address stream flow statistics.  Suen [2005] and Suen and Herricks 
[2006] argued that flow regime alteration would affect the habitat conditions that were 
critical to organism migration, spawning, and other ecological functions.  Based on the 
review of a number of previous studies, Suen [2005] formed a tabular representation of 
the connection between hydrologic statistics and AM factors.  Suen and Herricks [2006] 
employed the AM to identify fish community-based eco-hydrological indicators, 
explicitly relating hydrologic metrics to environmental and ecological requirements of the 
fish community of a river in Taiwan. 
PCA and AM identify the ERHIs from different perspectives.  PCA uses a purely 
statistical technique and AM is based on species associations.  However, a quantitative 
relationship or even a qualitative trend description between the identified indicators and 
the fish community is beyond the scope of either approach.  This motivated the 
development of another approach to quantify the relationship between a target index of 
the fish community and the ERHIs.  The purpose of this chapter is to develop a new 
method to identify the ERHIs and generate a quantitative relation between an ecological 
target index and the identified ERHIs for a fish community.  This chapter will also 
demonstrate the utilization of the quantitative relationship for streamflow restoration.  
As Richter et al. [2003] argued, it is a challenge for scientists to provide exact estimates 
of flows required for a particular species or the whole river ecosystem, given that the 
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explicit linkage between hydrologic flow and the viability of a native species population 
or all populations of a native riverine system is difficult to identify.  This chapter will 
address such a challenge by a method based on a data mining technique, namely genetic 
programming (GP) [Koza, 1992].  Given a long-term record of streamflow and fish 
species data at a study site (more than 30 years), GP will be used to establish a regression 
function between an ecological target index, such as the biodiversity index or fish 
abundance, and the hydrologic metrics, using a case study river reach, the upper Illinois 
River.  To explain the GP output from an ecological perspective, the ERHIs identified by 
the GP are compared to, and verified by, those from PCA and AM, which have been 
applied for riverine ecological analysis as discussed above.  Finally the quantitative 
function between an ecological target index and the ERHIs will be applied to generate 
cost-effective management strategies for streamflow restoration towards particular 
ecological targets. 
2.2. Methodology - Genetic programming (GP) Approach 
GP can identify relationships that may not be evident from other analytical 
techniques.  It has been demonstrated as an efficient method to construct an equation 
with multiple independent variables [e.g., Downing, 1998; Savic et al., 1999; Dorado et 
al., 2002; Yang, 2004].  GP allows users to gain additional insight into how a system 
performs by providing information on the relationship between system input and output 
[Savic et al., 1999].  Following the rules of natural selection, GP is a symbolic learning 
technique that determines the best format and coefficients for the regression function.  
The format of the function is determined by selecting a given set of arithmetic and 
mathematical operators, such as “+”, “-”, “×”, “sin”, “exp”, etc. Moreover, Boolean 
 
 
21
operators (AND, OR, NOT), logical expressions (IF-THEN-ELSE), iterative functions 
(DO-UNTIL), or any other user-defined procedures can also be coded into GP structure. 
GP encodes a function as a tree composed of nodes and branches and then 
optimizes functions based on natural selection principles, i.e., Darwinian evolution - 
better solutions (analogy to “species”) will survive to next generation.  The procedures 
of GP are similar to those of genetic algorithms (GA) which generate solutions based on 
parent population and improve solutions by selection, crossover, and mutation processes 
[Holland, 1975].  Following Koza [1992], the general procedures and major components 
of GP are illustrated in Figure 2.1.  After random generation of the initial solutions, 
which are treated as the “parent population” for the first generation, the program evaluates 
the fitness of all solutions.  Then, two parents are selected for reproduction according to 
their fitness, and those of higher fitness are given greater probabilities to mate.  The 
resulting offspring solutions, with a predetermined size of population, are produced by 
two major procedures: crossover and mutation.  These two procedures are undertaken 
through iterations.  Then, the offspring solutions are treated as a new generation of the 
parent population for the subsequent computation iteration. The process repeats itself 
until a stop criterion is satisfied (e.g., the number of generations equals the prescribed 
maximum). 
The applications of GP in hydrology and ecology are still not frequent.  In 
hydrology, Savic et al. [1999], Khu et al. [2001], Liong et al. [2002], and Babovic and 
Keijzer [2002] used GP to generate rainfall-runoff relationships.  These studies indicated 
that GP outcomes had a very good agreement with the conceptual model results for which 
parameters were optimized.  In addition, Dorado et al. [2002] applied GP to the design of 
 
 
22
a real-time alarm system for flooding or subsidence in various urban basins using daily 
runoff data.  Their results indicated that GP performed well in identifying relationships 
among parameters. 
 
Figure 2.1 The flow chart of genetic programming. 
In ecology, Downing [1998] illustrated the applications of GP to the evolution of 
three different biological phenomena: (a) optimal foraging strategies, (b) temporal ideal 
free distributions of larval emergence dates, and (c) microscopic aquatic ecosystems.  The 
results showed that hybrid models of GP and environmental simulation could be useful 
tools for exploring evolutionary ecology.  Yang [2004] used GP to create a symbolic 
regression function between the abundance of an endangered fish species, Formosan 
landlocked salmon (Oncorhynchus masou formosanum), and two environmental factors: 
air temperature and streamflow discharge.  The regression function was used to assess 
the impact of climate change on the salmon population.  The result also assisted in 
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locating possible habitats for reintroduction of the salmon to increase the population of 
the endangered species. 
It is unlikely, if not impossible, that GP will yield an identical equation for 
ecological targets with the same set of selected hydrologic indicators in different 
simulations.  This can be attributed to the non-unique relationships between the data and 
the form of the function.  Besides, GP is not very powerful in finding coefficients or 
constants and is particularly computationally intensive and thus time consuming for 
complex problems [Davidson et al, 1999], due to the existence of the non-unique 
relationships.  One solution to this problem is to find the optimal formulae (independent 
variables and operators) by GP first and then use another regression algorithm such as the 
least square error method to estimate the coefficients for a given formulae.  Davidson et 
al. [1999] showed that this two-stage approach was more efficient than using GP to find 
both the formulae and coefficients.  Giustolisi and Savic [2006] recommended an 
“evolutionary polynomial regression” to avoid the over-fitting problem.  Such efforts to 
enhance GP will need further research and are beyond the purpose of this chapter.  In 
this chapter, I employed a frequency analysis procedure to address the non-uniqueness 
and randomness problem.  GP simulations were repeated for a number of times (e.g., 
100), which resulted in a similar fitness value (least square error) but the ecological target 
function form were different among the various runs.  The frequency at which a 
hydrologic metric appeared in those simulation outputs was recorded (e.g., if one 
hydrologic metric appears 15 times in 100 simulation results, its appearance frequency is 
0.15).  A threshold appearance frequency was defined to categorize the most relevant 
indicators, i.e., those with an appearance frequency higher than the threshold were 
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identified as the ERHIs for the fish community.  In this chapter, the threshold was set at 
10 of 100 so that the GP could identify about the same number of metrics which PCA and 
AM identified.  GP was run 100 times with each run identifying a potentially different 
set of ERHIs.  The frequency analysis method described in the methodology section was 
used to identify the ERHIs using the outputs from the 100 runs as samples. 
The first step to apply the GP for the problem of this chapter was to compute a set of 
candidate hydrologic metrics, which adopted the Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHA) 
proposed by Richter et al. [1996].  IHAs are commonly used for representing the 
streamflow conditions in riverine ecosystems and the metrics pre- and post- development 
are used to characterize human modification of flow regimes.  In total, the IHAs contain 
33 individual metrics and 33 associated measures of variation, many of which are 
intercorrelated.  These metrics can be used to characterize five hydrologic attributes: 
magnitude, duration, frequency, timing and rate of change.  Olden and Poff [2003] 
argued that the 33 IHAs could represent the major characteristics of the 171 hydrologic 
indicators suggested by many other studies.  In this chapter, the 33 IHAs of the upper 
Illinois River were computed for each of year from 1962 to 2005 using IHA 7.0 software 
(The Nature Conservancy, http://www.nature.org/initiatives/freshwater/). 
 The second step for GP application was the selection of the objective (fitness) 
function.  This chapter used GP to identify a set of ERHIs from the 33 hydrologic 
metrics (IHAs) and to develop a function for an ecological target using ERHIs as 
variables.  The GP objective was then based on the ecological target index that could 
represent the health of the overall community.  Many indices have been used to assess 
community conditions [Herricks and Cairns, 1983].  Community diversity is commonly 
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used to assess ecosystem condition and is an important target, because diversity provides 
a defined measure of community structure that can be related to the environmental 
conditions associated with the sampling location [Pielou, 1975].  An interpretation of 
diversity finds a higher score for natural communities and a diversity index will be higher 
for a community when: 1) the number of species in the community is larger; 2) the 
number of total individuals in the community is larger; and 3) the population of various 
species in the community is more evenly distributed [Pielou, 1975].  The most 
commonly used diversity index is the Shannon Index (SI) [Shannon and Weaver, 1949].  
The SI is expressed as: 
      ∑ ⋅−=
i
ii ppSI log       (2.1) 
where pi is the proportion of the community belonging to the ith species.  SI has been 
used widely in stream ecology studies.  Pettersson [1998] demonstrated that SI was a 
quick and reliable tool to detect important changes in community structure.  Kuo et al. 
[2001] showed that the seasonal patterns of SI and species richness and evenness were 
similar to an evaluation of seasonal changes in abundance, species composition and 
functional associations of the fish assemblage.  Cattaneo [2005] developed a linkage 
among flow statistics, abundances of species, species traits, and SI in order to assess the 
dynamics of a fish community. 
Another popular ecological target is the simple measurement of the total 
abundance of species in a fish community.  Overall community state is considered best 
when the Number of Individuals (NI) reaches the maximum in the community context.  
The importance of NI in defining the relationship between flow regime and fish 
community condition has been demonstrated by Joweet et al. [2005], Lamouroux, et al. 
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[2006], etc.  In this chapter, I used NI to provide an alternative measure that focuses on 
total abundance.  However, it should be noted that NI does not fully account for 
community structure because the relative abundance of different species is not assessed 
by NI.  The combination of SI and NI provides ecological targets for a fish community 
assessment that addresses both “quality” and “quantity” in commonly used assessment 
metrics.  GP was then used to establish a symbolic regression function between SI and 
IHAs to assess community diversity and between NI and IHAs to assess total abundance 
in the same community. 
After the GP objective was determined, the next step of the GP application was to 
test and determine some key parameters in the algorithm, which included the size of the 
initial parent populations (“P” in Figure 2.1, P=1000),; stop criterion (“G” in Figure 2.1, 
G=1000 generations), crossover probability (1.0), and both selection and mutation 
probability (0.1). The selected operators included “+”, “-”, “×”, and “/”.  To avoid the 
problem that can be caused by magnitude differences among hydrologic metrics, all 
metrics were normalized to the range of 0.0001 to 1.0. 
 The development and application of GP was conducted in the context of 
comparison to AM and PCA.  GP is a data mining approach and it has been used to 
discover the association between hydrology and ecology from data; PCA performs 
statistics on hydrologic variance of the flow regime; and AM identifies hydrological 
indicators according to some qualitative relationship between flow regimes and 
community environmental requirements such as substrate materials, habitats and 
spawning periods.  Thus comparing the results from these two methods to GP, one can 
not only verify the consistency of GP with other existing methods but also explain the GP 
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results from statistical (PCA) and ecological (AM) perspectives. 
The unique advantage of GP, compared to PCA and AM, is the generation of a 
quantitative function of an ecological target index (e.g., SI or NI) using the identified 
ERHIs as variables.  In this chapter, the SI–ERHIs or NI–ERHIs equations were further 
used to explore the co-effects of those ERHIs on the ecological target.  Different sets of 
ERHIs can result in the same value of SI or NI.  However, those different ERHI 
combinations may imply different engineering measures and costs.  For example, it is 
very difficult to control the hydrologic reversal or base flow because these conditions are 
dependent on stochastic processes.  In contrast, changing average monthly flow or flow 
within a period can be managed by common engineering facilities.  The question here is: 
Does a complimentary or substitutional relationship exist among different identified 
ERHIs regarding their effect on the fish community?  If such a relationship can be 
identified and verified, it will be possible to consider more flexible options for the 
restoration of flow regimes.  Using the SI–ERHIs equation produced from GP in this 
chapter, the co-effects among the selected ERHIs were explored within a matrix, defined 
as Indicators Impact Matrix (IIM).  
The IIM presents SI values calculated by the SI-ERHIs equation under various 
combinations of ERHIs statistical levels (25th percentile to 75th percentile of historical 
data).  The selection of ERHIs for the IIM can consider environmental, financial, and 
institutional factors, as well as the technical feasibility.  One element of the IIM is 
defined as the baseline ERHIs with the 50th percentile of the historical data for all 
selected ERHIs presented in the matrix and other elements represent various alternative 
ERHI combinations (e.g., 25th percentile of base flow and 75th percentile of maximum 
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seven-day flow, etc.)  For some elements of the IIM, the SI value is the same or close to 
one another; and thus comparing the ERHI combinations underlying these elements can 
show substitutional relations among the ERHIs.  A specific example of the IIM is given 
later in this chapter, and the ecological relevance and rational of some substitutions are 
further discussed using the knowledge from the AM. 
2.3. Case Study Area and Data 
The flow regime in the Upper Illinois River reaches above the Starved Rock Dam 
(Figure 2.2) has been extensively modified [Lerczak et al., 1994].  The structure of the 
fish community has also been changed.  In 1957, the Illinois Natural History Survey 
(INHS) started an annual electrofishing survey at 26 sites along the Illinois River in order 
to monitor environmental health.  The survey data support the analysis of the 
relationships between the change in fish community and environmental conditions.  
Several studies on the relationship between river hydrology and fish communities in the 
Illinois River have been conducted using the survey data collected by the INHS.  
Raibley et al. [1997] found that largemouth bass tended to concentrate in the floodplain 
areas in winter due to warmer water temperature and lower velocity flow condition.  
They also found that water level played a major role in the habitat of fish in winter.  
More recently, Koel and Sparks [2002] used canonical correspondence analysis with 
long-term records of daily river stage and the annual electrofishing data to identify 
eco-hydrological metrics.  The range of variability approach (RVA) [Richter et al., 1997] 
was used to relate hydrologic metrics to the fish abundance.  It was found that the 
minimum water stage levels with 1-day, 3-day, and 7-day rate-of-rise and rate-of-fall, 
30-day minimum stage, 90-day maximum stage and the annual number of water level 
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reversals were severely altered since 1957. Those alterations were related to the change 
of the fish abundance metrics for different ages of fish in the Illinois River. 
 
Figure 2.2 The location of fish sample sites and the stream discharge gage on the upper 
Illinois River. 
Data for this chapter were obtained from the long-term Illinois River fish 
population monitoring program, F-101-R, maintained by INHS [McClelland and Pegg, 
2001].  Five of the 26 Illinois River sampling sites located upstream of Starved Rock 
Dam were selected for the analysis (Figure 2.2).  Detail information about the sampling 
sites are in Table S1.  Fish samples were collected from late August through October 
over a 44-year period from 1962 to 2005 (with missing data over ten years).  In general, 
no major changes in physical habitat occurred at these stations during the sampling 
period although changes in water quality have been observed since the 1972 passage of 
the Clean Water Act.   An initial data processing grouped species in families, providing 
a hierarchical characterization of the fish community.  A total of 76 species from 14 fish 
families were present in the data set (see Table S2).  
There have been non-native fish problems for several generations in the Illinois 
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River, for example, major efforts have been directed to the Bighead Carp 
(Hypophthalmichthys nobilis) and Silver Carp (Hypophthalmichthys molitrix) in the river 
[Brooks et al., 1996; Lamer et al., 2006]; and there have been changes of the fisheries 
community over time.  However, the data set has such a long period of record that the 
issues of native, non-native interaction and community influence would be expected to be 
fully included during the study period.  The SI and NI were calculated for the fish 
sampling data.  Finally, the SIs and NIs for the fish community over the 34-year 
collection period were used as dependent variables in the GP. 
The streamflow data were obtained from the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) 
gaging station - USGS 05543500 Illinois River at Marseilles (Figure 2.2).  Although 
there are several dams in the upstream reach of the Illinois River, all were built prior to 
1940.  Therefore, these dams did not impose additional major changes to habitat during 
the sampling period (1962-2005).  Thus, the effect of dams was ignored in this chapter.  
In particular, the sampling locations are separated by the 24ft high Marseilles Dam (lock), 
which does not affect river flow at the high flow period.  Fish samples show that the 
annual average numbers of individuals by fish families appearing upstream and 
downstream of this dam are not significantly different (Figure 2.3, also see Table S3).  
Thus the upstream and downstream reaches of Marseilles Dam were combined to a single 
reach, which represents the fish community site for this chapter. 
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Figure 2.3 The fish family structure up and down stream of Marseilles Dam. 
The daily discharge data from 1962 to 2005 at the gage station were imported into 
IHA 7.0 software to calculate the 33 IHAs for 34 years.  The IHA approach [Richter et 
al., 1996] was originally designed to analyze the impact of dams, and IHAs were usually 
calculated for pre- and post-perturbation periods.  In the chapter river reach, as stated 
above, all the dams were built before the study period, so there was no basis to determine 
differences between a pre- and post-perturbation record.  Therefore, the IHAs were 
computed for the period of the sampling period (1962-2005) and used as independent 
variables in GP, as well as primary metrics in the PCA and AM analysis that were also 
conducted for the same study site.  For the study area, one of the IHAs named 
“zero-flow days” was not used since no zero-flow days were present in the hydrologic 
record.  Thus, 32 of the 33 IHAs were actually used as ERHI candidates in this chapter. 
2.4. Results 
The results of this chapter use the following nomenclatures: “Diversity Analysis” 
is the GP result used SI as the ecological target. “Fish Abundance” is also the GP result 
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but with NI as the ecological target. “Hierarchical Relationships” is the GP analysis for 
single fish family and species. 
2.4.1. Diversity Analysis 
A total of 11 ERHIs were identified from the 100 runs according to the prescribed 
appearance probability threshold (Table 2.1).  The appearance probability for Dmin 
(Julian date of annual minimum daily flow) was over 95 percent, Q11 (mean discharge in 
November) and Rrate (mean of all positive differences between consecutive daily values) 
over 30 percent and others over 10 percent.  Each of the GP runs resulted in an equation 
relating SI to the identified ERHIs.  The equation with the highest fitness value among 
the 100 runs is:  
   rate
daydayday
day R
QQQQ
QQDD
SI ++++
++=
max7min7min15
max33minmin )(     (2.2) 
where Q3 and Q5 are the average discharge in March and May, respectively; Q3daymax and 
Q7daymax are the annual maximum average 3-day and 7-day discharges; Q1daymin and 
Q7daymin are the annual minimum average 1-day and 7-day discharges; all other items are 
defined before.  Different GP runs resulted in different equation forms which included 
different indicators, operators, and/or coefficients.  However, the relationship between 
an identified indicator (as listed in Table 2.1) and the SI was consistent over all GP 
simulations.  As an example, Figure 2.4 provides the relationships that show the 
consistency of the results over different GP simulations.  The Y-axis is the score of SI 
and the X-axis is the percentile of ERHIs derived form the 34-year data.  Figure 2.4(a) 
and (b) respectively, plot Dmin and Rrate vs. SI using the results from 15 different GP 
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simulations with almost identical fitness values.  Figure 2.4(c) presents the same plot for 
Q5 using 13 different GP results.  The increase of Dmin and Rrate has a positive 
contribution to SI; whereas Q5 has a negative impact over all the GP simulation runs. 
Table 2.1 Hydrologic metrics identified by GP (with SI as ecological target) and 
frequency analysis with an appearance probability >10%. 
Hydrological Indicators Probability of GP result (%) 
Dmin 97 
Q11 43 
Rrate 33 
Rv 28 
Q9 23 
Q3daymin 22 
Q7daymin 21 
Q3 18 
Q8 17 
Q3daymax 15 
Q5 13 
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Figure 2.4 The trend of Shannon Index (Y-axis) vs. selected hydrologic indicators 
(X-axis), results from different GP runs with close objective value, (a) Dmin, (b) 
Rrate, and (c) Q5. Each curve represents one GP result (e.g., equations (2.2) or 
(2.3)). Panels (a) and (b) each show 15 different GP results, while panel (c) 
shows 13. 
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To further test the consistency of the relationships resulting from the different GP 
runs, I re-ran GP, using the 11 ERHIs (Table 2.1) chosen from the first GP analyses as the 
ERHI candidates, in place of the 32 IHAs.  Based on additional 25 GP runs, the SI 
equation with the highest fitness value is: 
  rate
dayday
day R
QQQQ
DQD
SI +⋅+++
+=
max3min353
minmin7min
2
      (2.3) 
which has a similar structure and contains almost the same hydrologic indicators as eq. 
(2.2) with the exception of Q1daymin. 
The plot of observed SI vs. simulated SI calculated by eq. (2.3) is given in Figure 
2.5.  The mean value and the standard deviation of the simulated SI are 2.11 and 0.27, 
respectively, which is comparable to those of the observed SI, 2.01 and 0.35, respectively.  
The root mean square error (RMSE) is 0.02.  The simulated SI can almost capture the 
same fluctuation of the observed SI during the 34 years (Figure 2.5a).  Most of the 
observed values fall within the 99% confidence interval (Figure 2.5b).  From Figure 
2.5c, the R2 between observed and simulated fish populations is 0.52. 
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Figure 2.5 The result of GP analysis (a) observed vs. simulated Shannon Index, (b) the 
99% confidence interval of simulated Shannon Index vs. observed Shannon 
Index, and (c) regression analysis. 
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2.4.2. Fish Abundance 
Following the same procedures applied to the analysis of fish community 
diversity, a regression relationship for the total abundance (NI, the number of individuals) 
was developed; and 11 ERHIs were identified (with the same frequency threshold of 10 
of 100).  The two GP analyses with SI and NI respectively, have five indicators in 
common (Table 2.1 and Table 2.2): Q3, Q8, Q11, Q3daymax, and Rv (the number of 
hydrologic reversals).  This might imply that those hydrologic indicators are important 
for both biodiversity and abundance.  The most significant hydrologic indicator switches 
from Dmin (appearance frequency of 97% with SI) to Qb (baseflow) (appearance 
frequency of 84% with NI). 
Table 2.2 Hydrologic metrics identified by GP (with NI as ecological target) and 
frequency analysis with an appearance probability >10%. 
Hydrological Indicators Probability of GP result (%) 
Qb 84 
Q3daymax 72 
Q11 56 
Rv 52 
Q3 39 
Q4 37 
F rate 36 
Q8 29 
Q7 26 
Hl 25 
Q30daymin 16 
2.4.3. Hierarchical Relationships (Families to Species) 
The analysis presented in this chapter so far is based on the fish community 
characteristics.  A reasonable question that might be asked is “Is the information content 
 
 
38
of analysis at the family-level, which is less dependent on field identification expertise, 
useful in ecohydrology?”  A community analysis at the family level aggregates data at a 
lower taxonomic level while still providing insight into flow effects.  Species vs. family 
comparisons can also provide a basis for assessing ecological information redundancy 
available from common aquatic community assessment procedures [Kaesler and Herricks, 
1979].  For some rivers, if the major concern is on a particular fish family or species, the 
analysis needs to be conducted for individual fish families or species.  As an example, 
GP was applied to one fish family (Centrarchidae)and two fish species, common carp 
(Cyprinus carpio) and goldfish (Carrasius auratus), respectively.  The fish family of 
Centrarchidae is recognized to be intolerant of polluted conditions, and the two species 
are omnivorous habitat generalists that are tolerant of polluted waters [Lerczak et al., 
1994]. 
  Only the fish abundance index (NI) is applicable for the family or individual 
species level.  The results from GP for the four cases, i.e., the total community, one 
family and two species are presented in Table 2.3.  Two common indicators were 
identified from all four cases, Qb and Frate, and they both have positive impact on the fish 
population.  Meanwhile, some indicators have opposite effects on different species.  
For example, Q90daymax has a positive effect on Centrarchidae and common carp 
(Cyprinus carpio), whereas, it has a negative effect on goldfish (Carrasius auratus).  
Thus, it is not surprising that Q90daymax does not appear in the selected ERHIs for the total 
fish population. 
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2.5. Discussion 
2.5.1. Comparison of the GP Results to PCA and AM 
The PCA presented by Olden and Poff [2003] was used with a minor modification 
for the same fish community data set applied to GP.  The first step was to run PCA for 
the entire set of IHAs over the 34 years.  The principal components (PCs) with 
eigenvalues greater than one were retained, which statistically means that the resulting 
components explain at least as much variance as one variable.  Following this concept, 
the first seven PCs were retained, and then the highest absolute loading indicators in PC1 
to PC7 were selected as the representatives of the natural flow regime.  According to the 
proportion principle, the cumulative variability from PC1 to PC7 was 83.3%, and the 
variability of PC1 is 31.8%.  Therefore, the four highest absolute loading indicators 
should be chosen for PC1 ( 4
%3.83
%8.3110 ≅× ).  By the same rule, the number of highest 
absolute loading indicators that were chosen from PC2 to PC7 are 3, 1, 1, 1, 1, and 1, 
respectively.  Compared to Olden and Poff [2003] who identified only one indicator 
(with the highest loading) under each PC, this chapter identified multiple indicators under 
PC1 and PC2.  In total, 12 principal hydrologic indicators were identified (Table 2.4).   
Some of the indicators selected under one PC are significantly correlated with one 
another.  For example, the correlation coefficients between Frate and Q3daymax, Frate and 
Rrate, and Q3daymin and Q7daymin were -0.716, -0.885, and 0.986, respectively.  This is 
understandable because the indicators selected under one PC are all associated with the 
same variance component of the flow regime represented by that PC.  Such high 
correlation between the selected metrics from PCA actually shows the limitation of using 
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PCA to reduce redundancy among the hydrologic metrics. 
Table 2.4 Hydrologic metrics with the highest absolute loading in different principal 
components of PCA 
Principal 
Components 
(eigenvalue) 
Hydrologic Indicators (loading) 
PC1 (10.19) Frate (-0.830), Rrate (0.891), Q3daymax (0.744), Rv (-.725)
PC2 (6.92) Q3daymin (0.694), Q7day min (0.699), Qb (0.787) 
PC3 (2.60) Dmin (-0.593) 
PC4 (2.53) Q1 (0.670) 
PC5 (1.92) Hl (0.471) 
PC6 (1.27) Q5 (-0.613) 
PC7 (1.22) Q2 (-0.600) 
The AM was developed for the study site using the 76 species collected from 
1962-2005.  A total of 188 environmental factors were available for each species (see 
Table S4).  Following the weight-of-evidence approach proposed by Suen and Herricks 
[2006], dominant environmental factors were first identified.  A weight of 60% was 
used as a threshold in this chapter, i.e., in the fish community, 60% of the species were 
related to the environmental factor.  Table 2.5 lists the seven environmental factors 
shared by 60% or more of the species: current, lotic substrate, preferred habitat unit, 
spawning nature, spawning period, lotic spawning substrate, and movement.  The 
second step conducted a cross-over check between Table 2.5 and the 
hydrologic-environmental connection table developed by Suen [2005].  The third 
column in Table 2.5 lists the 10 hydrologic indicators that can be related to the 7 
environmental factors.  In order to select the same or similar number of hydrologic 
metrics with each of the three approaches (PCA, AM and GP), a 60% threshold was used 
for the weight-of-evidence approach.  Pre-analysis results indicated that a 40% threshold 
identified more than 15 hydrologic indicators, while an 80% threshold ended with only 
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three hydrologic indicators.  
Table 2.5 Hydrologic metrics identified by AM, with 60% threshold of the weight of 
environmental factor. 
Autecology Matrix Category 
Weight of 
Environment 
Factor 
Relevant Hydrologic 
Indicators 
Preferred Habitat Unit (pool) 83.7% Q7daymin 
Spawning Period (Summer 5~6) 81.3% Q5, Q6 
Current (slow) 74.4% Rrate, Rv 
Movement (warm water) 69.7% Qb 
Lotic Spawning Substrate (gravel/rocks) 65.1% Q3daymax 
Spawning Nature (non migratory) 62.7% Dmax, Dmin 
Lotic Substrate (sand) 62.7% Q3daymax 
*Total 14 fish families, 76 different fish species were found during the sample period at the study area; the 
determination of the relevant hydrologic metrics follows the approach provided by Suen and Herricks [2006].  
 The results from each of the three approaches are compared with respect to both 
common and different hydrologic indicators identified from these approaches (Table 2.6).  
Although these three approaches used different principles and procedures, they resulted in 
six indicators in common: Dmin, Rrate, Rv, Q3daymax, Q7daymin, and Q5, which cover four of the 
five general flow regime characteristics identified by Poff et al. [1997].  As shown by the 
AM results, over 80 % of the local species have their spawning period in early summer 
(May or June); streamflow in May (Q5) is critical for the survival of eggs and juveniles.  
Q3daymax and Q7daymin represent the duration of two opposite extreme events, respectively.  
According to Suen [2005], exceptionally high flow represented by Q3daymax might wash 
out organisms and substrate material; the low flow duration represented by Q7daymin might 
affect habitat availability when water quality, or other conditions, is limiting.  Therefore, 
both Q3daymax and Q7daymin have a significant effect on general habitat conditions in the 
channel.  Dmin represents the timing of extreme low flow, which can be used with a 
general understanding of water quality or habitat availability to assess general limits to 
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fish populations.  Finally, Rrate and Rv represent the changing rate of streamflow.  A 
rapid change in streamflow (Rrate) may first threaten resident fish with removal if refuge 
habitat is not available; the change may also be related to substrate/habitat modification 
that affects specific life history needs such as spawning habitat availability [Suen, 2005].  
However, the GP results from this chapter show a positive influence of Rrate on fish 
diversity.  This counterintuitive result is explained later on in the extended analysis of 
GP results. 
Table 2.6 The comparison of the hydrologic indicators identified by PCA, AM, and GP.  
Approaches Hydrological Indicators 
PCA Frate, Rrate, Q3daymax, Rv, Q3daymin, Q7daymin,Qb, Dmin, Q1, Hl, Q5, Q2 
AM  Rrate, Rv, Q3daymax, Q7daymin, Qb, Dmax, Dmin, Q5, Q6,  
GP Q3, Q5, Q8, Q9,Q11, Q3daymin, Q7daymin, Q3daymax, Dmin, Rrate, Rv 
 In addition, the correlations between the six identified indicators are insignificant, 
except for Rrate and Rv (correlation coefficient is -0.711, Table 2.7).  These two indicators 
provide redundant information because they are related to the same characteristics of the 
flow regime and are also under the same variance component in the PCA analysis (PC1 in 
Table 2.4). 
Table 2.7 The correlations between the six identified EHRIs (values marked with a star 
represent a significant relationship between two indicators) 
 Dmin Rrate Rv Q3daymax Q7daymin Q5 
Dmin 1.000 0.085 -0.114 -0.038 0.058 -0.111 
Rrate  1.000 -0.711* 0.584 0.367 0.365 
Rv   1.000 -0.255 -0.463 -0.265 
Q3daymax    1.000 0.060 0.519 
Q7daymin     1.000 -0.099 
Q5      1.000 
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 Some metrics were identified by only two approaches, for example, baseflow (Qb) 
was identified by PCA and AM, and three-day minimum flow (Q3daymin) was identified by 
PCA and GP.  Baseflow sets a general expectation for habitat and the 3-day minimum 
flow establishes a duration value that is associated mainly with hydrologic statistics. 
 Finally, it is worthwhile to address the possible reasons why the three approaches 
converge on the six ERHIs.  PCA identifies indicators based only on hydrologic 
statistics and is dominated by the variance of the flow regime; AM identifies hydrological 
indicators related to community environmental requirements such as substrate materials, 
habitats and spawning periods.  Numerous previous studies showed that the variance of 
flow regime was related to health of fish communities (see Poff et al., [1997] for a 
comprehensive discussion).  Thus, logic suggests that PCA and AM should choose some 
of the same ERHIs.  The objective function of GP was based on the SI or NI which both 
provide insight into fish community conditions.  Therefore, it was reasonable to assume 
that GP would identify those indicators that represent both the major variance of the flow 
regime and the attributes of fish habitat.  This result was confirmed by the analysis of 
fish community sampling over 40 years, where the GP provided a good fit to condition 
indices calculated from fisheries collections.   
2.5.2. Extended Analysis of GP results: Indicator Impact Matrix (IIM) 
It is proposed that the six ERHIs, Dmin, Rrate, Rv, Q3daymax, Q7daymin, and Q5, identified 
by GP/PCA/AM represent the key hydrologic indicators for the fish community of the 
upper Illinois River.  The SI equation was used to create the Indicator Impact Matrix 
(IIM) among those selected indicators.  As an example, Table 2.8 shows the IIM that 
includes four selected indicators, Dmin, Rrate, Q3, and Q5.  These indicators are among the 
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hydrologic indicators identified by the GP with the higher probabilities, and Dmin, Rrate 
and Q5 are also included in the PCA and AM list of the selected ERHIs.  
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First the values of the selected indicators were calculated at various percentile 
levels (25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles) using the long-term streamflow record (1962-2005), 
as shown in Table 2.9.  Then the various sets of the indicator levels were applied to the 
SI equation to calculate the SI value in each of the sampling years.  For those indicators 
that appear in the SI equation but are not chosen for IIM analysis, the original values in 
the sampling years were used.  For example, for year 1962, the values of 25th percentile 
of Dmin, Rrate, Q5, and Q3 were substituted into eq. (2.3) and all other indicators appearing 
in eq. (2.3) used their original value for 1962.  This procedure was repeated for all years; 
finally the average SI over all those years was calculated and used as the element value of 
the IIM.  As shown in Table 2.8, each indicator has three different values, 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles, based on the historical data.  Thus, the table composes 81 scenarios (4 
indicators, each with 3 different values, 34= 81).  The number in each element represents 
the SI score of each scenario; the number in parentheses following the SI score is the 
change in percentage from the baseline SI score.  The baseline scenario was defined as 
the scenario under which all metrics took the 50th percentile of the historical data. 
Table 2.9 The percentile values (25th, 50th, and 75th) for selected indicators 
 Q3 Q5 Dmin Rrate 
25th  10768 9797 96 1489 
50th  13840 13920 294 1813 
75th 21910 18815 310 2167 
 cfs cfs J-day cfs 
The IIM clearly shows the influences of the selected indicators on fish diversity.  
First, Dmin and Rrate have a positive effect on the fish community and Q5 and Q3 have a 
negative effect.  Second, the effect of Dmin is larger when the value increases from 25th 
to 50th than from 50th to 75th.  It implies that if the timing of low flow does not occur in 
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the first quarter of the year, this may help improve the SI.  Third, the change of Rrate has 
a greater influence on SI than the change of other indicators.  Fourth, probably the most 
valuable information is the substitutional relationship among the four indicators.  As 
shown in Table 2.8, when either Dmin and Rrate takes a value at the 50th or 75th percentile 
level (highlighted in the shaded area of Table 2.8), the SI value can be above the baseline 
level (i.e., positive change percentage).  Different combinations of the four indicators 
may result in the same SI improvement, which implies some substitutional relationships 
among the indicators.  For example, to improve the SI by 4 to 5%, Table 2.8 presents 
eight alternative scenarios (as marked by a-h, respectively).  From an engineering 
perspective, scenarios a to f all involve increasing Rrate from 50th to 75th.  It seems easier 
to realize scenarios g and h, by which the Dmin should occur at 50th or 75th date of the year 
and the average discharge in March and May should be reduced from 50th to 25th.  This 
can be implemented by flow regulation such as reservoir operations.  Furthermore, 
reducing the discharge in March and May not only increases the fish diversity according 
to IIM, but also provides additional water available for human uses in these two months, 
if needed.  This implies a win-win solution for both human and natural systems.  
Similar substitutional relations can be identified as shown in Table 2.8. 
The information from autecology matrix can be used to explain the relationships 
presented in the IIM from an ecological perspective.  According to the historical data in 
the case study area, the timing of extreme low flow (Dmin) usually occurred in fall or 
winter (September to February).  In a few years, Dmin occurred in spring (March to May).  
Autecology matrix shows that more than 80% of fish species have their spawning period 
in spring to early summer.  Therefore, high flow during this period (March to May) may 
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wash out the eggs and juveniles and cause a negative effect on fish community.  This 
explains why the increase of mean flow in March (Q3) reduces both SI and NI.  
However, extremely low flow occurring in spring (i.e., Dmin at 25th level) may also result 
in negative impacts.  For example, low flow will reduce the potential for spawning in 
the floodplain, increase stream water temperature and possibly excess pollutant levels, 
and thus decrease spawning success.  As shown in Table 2.8, when Dmin takes a value at 
the 25th percentile level, the SI values under all conditions are lower than the baseline 
value under all conditions except for one scenario: Rrate at the 75th, Q5 at the 25th and Q3 
at 25th or 50th percentiles.  Furthermore, the negative effects from other conditions 
(increased Q3, Q5 and decreased Rrate) are aggravated when Dmin is at the 25th percentile 
level.  This implies that the timing of the extremely low flow has a control effect on the 
fish community as reflected by the diversity indicator (SI). 
Similarly, the control effect on SI is also found with the average flow rise rate (Rrate).  
When Rrate is at the 25th level, no matter what levels other indicators take, the SI value is 
below the baseline value.  When the level of Rrate increases from the 25th percentile to 
50th and further to 75th, SI increases as shown in Table 2.8.  This is counterintuitive 
since the high flow rise rate usually ends with wash-out and stranding of aquatic species 
and the failure of seedling establishment [Cushman 1985; Poff et al., 1997; Koel and 
Sparks, 2002], although flow rising is related to flow regime variability that is recognized 
as a favorable condition for fish species [e.g., Cushman 1985; Young et al., 2003].  It is 
argued that this irregular phenomenon exists with many rivers in Illinois including the case 
study river reach due to the special waterway control facilities in the area.  The problem 
with Illinois rivers has been the rapid fluctuation in stage (corresponding to the rapid 
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increase of flow discharge) that has a major consequence to the riparian vegetation; and 
there has been attention paid to better management that would allow completion of plant 
life cycles [Sparks, 1995].  With waterway control structures (a series of low head dams 
and locks, particularly for the Upper Illinois River), the influence of small storm events 
are eliminated by the pool volume.  Only when there is a large amount of water from the 
landscape can a stage rise occurs.  That is to say, a rising rate is only associated with 
large storm events.  This is shown in Figure 2.6 using the records during the past 44 
years.   As can be seen, in the dates with positive rise rates, extremely high daily flow 
occurred, which usually caused marginal riparian areas to be inundated.  Rapid rise rates 
associated with a longer inundation time might provide additional access time and habitat 
for the fish.  It might conclude that in the floodplains of Illinois River, new habitat 
becomes available due to the rapid rising rate, which leads to improved diversity.  
Similar conditions were described by Meffe [1984], who argued that long term species 
coexistence was aided by periodic flash flooding. 
 
Figure 2.6 The relationship between daily discharge and rise rate. 
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2.6. Conclusions 
Based on the Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs), GP generated a quantitative 
relationship between natural flow regime metrics (hydrology) and fish community indices 
(ecology).  The most ecologically relevant hydrologic indicators (ERHIs) were 
identified from the IHAs; and the equation of an ecological target index such as SI or NI 
was developed using the ERHIs as variables.  Robustness analysis showed that different 
GP runs ended with a similar set of identified hydrologic indicators; and each of the 
identified indicators had a consistent relationship with SI.  Thus GP may be used to 
establish a reasonable regression function to capture the fluctuation in an observed fish 
community indicator.  Furthermore, by comparing the GP results with those from 
principal component analysis (PCA) and autecology matrix (AM) using a common set of 
IHAs in the study area, the three approaches identified six common indicators, Dmin, Rrate, 
Rv, Q3daymax, Q7daymin and Q5, for the case study site, the upper Illinois River.  The finding 
of common indicators from the three different approaches provides confidence in using 
existing and new approaches and observational data to build solid quantitative 
relationships between hydrologic indicators and ecological target indices. 
The results from the GP analyses also provide some insight on the impact of flow 
regime on different aspects of the fish community.  For the case study river reach, the 
timing of low flow (Dmin) seems to be more relevant to the diversity of the fish 
community while the magnitude of the low flow (Qb) is more relevant to the fish 
abundance.  The occurrence of low flow in spring, the spawning period of most species 
may reduce fish diversity significantly; while there is little difference when the low flow 
occurs in fall or winter.  More importantly, counterintuitive results were found for the 
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influence of rising rate of stream flow on fish community diversity in the case study area, 
i.e., large rising rates result in a significant improvement of fish diversity.  This irregular 
phenomenon likely exists with rivers in Illinois due to the special waterway control 
facilities and periodic flash flooding with large storm events in the area.  The influence of 
rising rate on the fish community in the area is likely beyond the influence from regular 
flow regime variability. 
Using the common set of ERHIs identified from the three different approaches 
(GP/PCA/AM) and the quantitative relationship between a fish community index and the 
ERHIs, an Indicator Impact Matrix (IIM) was constructed.  The matrix presents the 
impact of combinations of multiple indicators at different statistical levels, which shows 
the inter-relationships among the ERHIs.  The substitutional relationships between the 
ERHIs are particularly useful for river restoration design and management since it is 
easier to control some indicators, such as the average flow in a month, than others such as 
flow rising rate or flow reversal.  The IIM has the potential to become a useful tool for 
flow regime management considering both hydrologic statistics and ecological objectives.  
Given the target value of a fish community index such as SI or NI, the IIM can provide 
information on how to manipulate the flow regime to achieve the target through optional 
ways. Engineering and financial considerations, as well as the interests and objectives of 
watershed managers, can be included to identify the most cost-effective option. 
 
The auxiliary material can be viewed and download at 
ftp://ftp.agu.org/apend/wr/2006wr005764 
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Appendix: Terminology 
Hydrologic 
metrics 
Detail description 
Q1 Mean discharge in January  
Q2 Mean discharge in February 
Q3 Mean discharge in March 
Q4 Mean discharge in April 
Q5 Mean discharge in May 
Q6 Mean discharge in June 
Q8 Mean discharge in August 
Q9 Mean discharge in September 
Q11 Mean discharge in November 
Q1daymin Annual 1-day minimum flow 
Q3daymin Annual 3-day minimum flow 
Q7daymin Annual 7-day minimum flow 
Q30daymin Annual 30-day minimum flow 
Q3daymax Annual 3-day maximum flow 
Dmin Julian date of annual minimum daily flow 
Dmax Julian date of annual maximum daily flow 
Qb Baseflow 
Hn Number of high pulses  
Hl Mean duration of high pulses 
Ln Mean duration of low pulses 
Frate Mean of all negative differences between consecutive daily flow 
Rrate Mean of all positive differences between consecutive daily flow 
Rv Number of hydrologic reversals 
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CHAPTER 3. RESERVOIR REOPERATION FOR FISH 
ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION USING DAILY INFLOWS – A CASE 
STUDY OF LAKE SHELBYVILLE  
 
Summary 
Ecosystem restoration calls for reservoir reoperation. Traditionally, a minimum water 
release is set as a constraint for downstream ecosystem flow requirement.  Recently, 
research has been conducted for the purpose of recovering natural flow regimes to a 
practical degree. This chapter examines the practicality of adding an ecological objective 
to the operation of Lake Shelbyville, a reservoir situated on the Kaskaskia River in 
east-central Illinois, which has been used mainly for flood control.  A multi-objective 
optimization model that minimizes flood damage and maximizes fish diversity for the 
downstream ecosystem is developed for daily operation of the reservoir.  The challenges 
addressed in this chapter include handling daily reservoir release for the ecological 
assessment and evaluating the practicality of changing the existing operation rules to 
include an ecological objective.  The results demonstrate the tradeoff between the two 
objectives.  The historical reservoir releases have a dominating priority for minimizing 
flood losses.  The optimal operations from the model result in higher fish diversity than 
the historical operation.  The ecological objective leads to the reduction of the maximum 
allowable water release to avoid extreme flooding events and an increase of the minimum 
water release.  Most importantly, it is found that adding an ecological objective to Lake 
Shelbyville’s operation can improve downstream fish habitat without jeopardizing its 
original flood control objective.  Furthermore, the effect of hydrologic variability on the 
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results is explored with Monte Carlo simulations of reservoir inflows.  The robustness 
analysis shows that the modified operation rules are sensitive to water levels and the 
biased representation of the role of water level in the reservoir release function can cause 
the bias of water release from its optimal value. 
3.1. Introduction 
Historically, most reservoirs have been primarily designed for water supply, flood 
control, hydropower generation and/or recreation.  Recently, environmental and 
ecological objectives have been called for reservoir reoperation [Bednarek and Hart, 2005; 
Suen and Eheart, 2006].  However, reoperating reservoirs to meet such objectives may 
jeopardize the original objectives of reservoirs.  Thus, a research question exists with 
regard to the tradeoff between the new (ecological) and original (economic) objectives 
and how to balance these two [California Department of Water Resources, 2005].  
Jager and Smith [2008] reviewed 29 journal articles about incorporating 
ecological benefits into reservoir operation.  Three methods of meeting ecological goals 
were discussed in most of these papers: 1) estimating flow requirements for restoring or 
maintaining fish habitat; 2) mimicking the natural flow regime; 3) determining a suitable 
flow regime based on fish community data.  The first method does not quantitatively 
relate flow to aquatic biota and only considers the abiotic environment.  Some water 
quantity and quality standards, e.g., desirable dissolved oxygen, temperature, flow depth 
and velocity, are set as constraints in reservoir operation.   For example, Harman and 
Stewardson [2005] used water quantity as an environmental flow requirement to optimize 
the total water release volume.  These authors also called for methods for estimating 
environmental flow requirements that are directly guided by biological indicators. 
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The second method applies the natural flow regime concept proposed by Poff et al. 
[1997], which tries to recreate the natural flow variability.  The hypothesis of this 
approach is that the flow variability present prior to the reservoir’s construction should be 
suitable for native fish species.  Following this hypothesis, reservoir reoperation may be 
designed to restore the natural flow variability [Richter et al., 1996; Richter et al., 2003].  
However, this method is based on hydrologic statistics with qualitative relevance to fish 
habitats. 
The third method uses a fish community model that reflects the change in fish 
structure with flow conditions and connected to the reservoir operation models.  In one 
of the earliest reservoir operation studies that incorporated an ecological objective, Sale 
et al. [1982] used the weighted usable area (WUA) method to evaluate the available 
habitat under different reservoir operation scenarios.  Cardwell et al. [1996] followed a 
similar approach to maximize the minimum WUA while simultaneously maintaining the 
maximum water supply.  Recently, Suen and Eheart [2006] used an ecological flow 
regime paradigm to establish complex management targets for operating a reservoir to 
satisfy a downstream aquatic ecosystem.  In Chapter 2, a method has been proposed to 
develop a quantitative relation between hydrological statistics, and fish diversity and 
abundance indicators.  This relationship can then be used to estimate fish community 
indices under different hydrologic conditions for which there are no available data, 
making it possible to quantify an ecological objective using hydrological statistics. Thus 
the method proposed in Chapter 2 does not need to include prior knowledge in the 
formulation of the ecological objective function while other methods, such as those used 
by Sale et al. [1982] and Suen and Eheart [2006], require additional knowledge (e. g. fish 
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habitat and fish membership function) to incorporate the fish data.  Sale et al. [1982] 
used empirical knowledge to estimate the weights for various types of suitable habitat 
areas.  Suen and Eheart [2006] used a membership function value based on fuzzy sets to 
estimate weights for different eco-hydrological indicators included in the ecological 
objective function.  These weighting factor estimates can introduce additional 
uncertainty and bias in the modeling analysis. 
This study follows Chapter 2 and incorporating ecological-hydrologic 
relationships into a multi-objective optimization model for reservoir operation.  In this 
chapter, I will focus on two major technical challenges associated with the extension of 
this model: (1) the requirement of a daily time interval and (2) the practicality of 
including an ecological objective in reservoir operation by a real-world case study. 
The first challenge arises from the requirement of using daily reservoir inflow 
time series.  Typical reservoir operation models use a monthly or a multi-day time step.  
For example, Sale et al. [1982], Cardwell et al. [1996], and Bednarek and Hart [2005] 
used a monthly step and Suen and Eheart [2006] used a ten-day step to analyze reservoir 
releases for ecological purposes.  However, operation rules based on a daily time 
interval often reflect the ecological objective more appropriately.  Harman and 
Stewardson [2005] examined optimal daily flow required for fish habitats.  Hughes et al. 
[1997] and Hughes and Ziervogel [1998] used historical flow series and operation 
regulations, along with empirical knowledge on instream flow requirements, to generate 
suitable daily water releases.  Although these studies used daily inflows, ecological 
water requirement assessments and decision-making are not explicitly based on the daily 
inflows.  The ecological-hydrologic relationship from Chapter 2 includes daily 
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hydrologic indicators, such as the date when the minimum flow occurs, as a variable for 
estimating the abundance or diversity index of a fish community.  Thus daily reservoir 
inflow and release must be simulated to compute daily hydrologic indicators. 
However, directly determining the optimal reservoir water release at a daily 
timescale is a very computationally intensive task because the optimization model must 
have a large number of decision variables (i.e. at least 365 release variables) and state 
variables (e.g., 365 storage variables).  Therefore, an indirect approach is suggested in 
the literature [e.g., Oliveira and Loucks, 1997; Tung et al., 2003; Momtahen and Dariane, 
2007].  The approach searches for optimal daily operation iteratively.   First, the model 
optimizes the reservoir operation rules, then it uses the optimized rules to generate daily 
reservoir storages and releases, before using the daily results to evaluate the objective(s) 
of the optimization model.  This study will use the same approach.  
The second challenge is how to implement changes, if any, to existing operation 
rules to include an ecological objective.  Existing operation rules have been used for 
decades for many reservoirs in the U.S. and around the world, and dramatic changes 
without considering the historical and current water demand and supply from an existing 
reservoir will not be acceptable.  This study will use the current operation curve of a 
case study reservoir as a baseline and explore modifications of the current reservoir 
operation within a certain bound for the objectives of human water use, flood control and 
aquatic ecosystem demands.  Moreover, any reasonable reservoir operation rules should 
consider the impact of hydrologic variability.  To obtain robust information on the 
modification of current operation rules, the Monte Carlo simulation technique is used to 
determine the probability distribution of the operation rule parameters by running a large 
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number (e.g., 100) of synthesized reservoir inflow scenarios. 
In the rest of this chapter, I first introduce the methodology, including the 
quantification of the ecological objective function, the incorporation of daily inflow and 
release into the existing operation context, and the treatment of hydrological variability.  
Next, I apply these methods to a case study reservoir, Lake Shelbyville, which is mainly 
used for flood control while considering other objectives such as recreation, water supply, 
navigation and fish conservation.  The reservoir is located in the Upper Kaskaskia River 
in east-central Illinois and managed by the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). 
3.2. Methodology 
The methodology, shown in Figure 3.1, includes three main components: (1) daily 
release generation, (2) multi-objective genetic algorithm and (3) Monte Carlo analysis.  
The release generation is based on synthetic daily inflows and a release function 
(Equation 3.1) that represents the reservoir operation rules during different time periods.  
The goal of this study is to identify new operation rules when an ecological objective is 
considered.  Thus the release generation starts with the existing rules.  The generated 
daily releases within one year, after passing the water balance check of reservoir routing, 
are forwarded to the multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) to evaluate the “fitness” 
of the various water releases using both economic and ecological objectives.  The 
MOGA then generates a number of new parameter sets for the release function and 
undertakes the fitness evaluation and solution generation iteratively.  These iterations 
will stop when the MOGA finds a set of non-inferior solutions of the water release 
functions. 
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Figure 3.1. Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) for optimal reservoir water 
release  
To consider the impact of annual climate variability on the robustness of the 
results, Monte Carlo simulations of the inflows are undertaken.  These simulations are 
then used to develop the probability density functions (PDF) of the parameters that 
characterize the modified reservoir operation rules are derived.  The details of these 
methods are presented in the following sections. 
 
 
60
3.2.1. Synthetic annual daily inflows  
Synthetic streamflow is very useful in water resources planning and management 
since it allows researchers to generate time series of any desired length based upon the 
statistical properties of the historical data [e.g., Xu et al., 2003].  Autoregressive moving 
average models (ARMA) have traditionally been used to generate synthetic monthly 
streamflow time series.  However, these models are incapable of catching the sudden 
increments of streamflow that often occur at the daily scale [Xu et al., 2003].  Shot noise 
models [e.g., Weiss, 1977; Murrone et al., 1997; Claps et al., 2005] are widely used to 
generate daily streamflow.  Markov chain-based modeling is one of the most popular 
shot noise models [Xu et al., 2003; Aksoy, 2003; Szilagyi et al, 2006]. 
In this study, the three-state Markov chain-based modeling that Aksoy [2003] 
proposed is applied to generate the daily streamflow based on the historical long-term 
inflow data.  Using the transition probability matrix, the model can address three 
different flow conditions separately: zero flow, ascension and recession. The increment of 
flow during the ascension period is computed with a gamma distribution and the 
recession period is calculated using an exponential decay function.  The details about 
the daily flow generation are given in Aksoy [2003]. 
Daily water release generator 
The synthetic streamflow data and the historical reservoir release regulations will 
be input into the water release generation module to create a time series of daily water 
releases.  However, these statistically generated daily water releases might violate the 
mass balance of the reservoir operation.  A reservoir routing module is applied to check 
the mass balance that results from each series of synthetic streamflow data.  When a 
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series passes this test, a rational daily water release series is produced by the generator.  
Detailed descriptions of the water release generation and reservoir routing modules are 
given in the following sections. 
3.2.2. Water release generate module 
Different operational purposes are considered for different seasons in reservoir 
operations.  Each season has its own target water levels.  These seasonal divisions and 
their respective target water levels create several “operation zones” in a year. The 
operation rules of each zone are optimized in this study.  It is assumed that the daily 
water release is decided based on 1) the current day’s inflow and 2) the water level at the 
end of the previous day.  Given this assumption, a linear function similar to the one used 
by Karamouz and Houck [1982] (which was developed for a monthly time step) is 
constructed for each zone. 
i
d
i
d
i
d cLbIaWR ++= −1**        (3.1) 
where WRd means d day’s water release, Id means d day’s inflow and Ld-1 means d-1 day’s 
water level.  The value of Ld-1 also determines in which operational zone the current day 
belongs. ai, bi and ci are three parameters in zone i which are used to determine the daily 
water release.  Meanwhile, the maximum water release (MaxWRi) is generally needed 
for each zone due to channel capacity, sediment control and other restrictions.  
Meanwhile, when the water level is lower than target level, the minimum water release 
(MinWRi) constraint is enforced.  Along with the synthetic streamflow data, these 
parameters, which serve as the decision variables in the MOGA procedure, govern the 
generation of each daily water release time series. 
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3.2.3. Reservoir routing module 
A simple mass balance equation, Equation (3.2), is used in the reservoir routing 
module to maintain the water balance. 
ddddd EWRISS −−+= −1        (3.2) 
where Sd and Sd-1 represent the reservoir storage available at the end of days d and d-1, 
respectively, and Ed consists of evapotranspiration and other water losses that occur on 
day, d. Using Equation (3.2), the daily reservoir storage can be computed with the daily 
inflow and water release.  A function that describes the relationship between storage and 
the water level in the reservoir is necessary to compute the daily water level as a function 
of the reservoir’s storage.  Equation (3.3) is applied to checking if the daily water level 
is higher than the top of the reservoir (MaxL) or lower than the dead storage level (MinL). 
MaxLLMinL d ≤≤         (3.3) 
Other constraints should also be considered in the reservoir routing module.  For 
example, the water release difference between two consecutive days cannot be greater 
than a certain value to avoid environmental damages that a sudden change in flow 
downstream can cause.  If the generated water release violates equation (3.3) or other 
constraints, the water release generator module randomly generates another set of water 
releases until one that does not violate these constraints is generated. 
3.2.4. Multi-objective genetic algorithm 
The multi-objective genetic algorithm used in this study is the Vector Evaluated 
Genetic Algorithm (VEGA) [Schaffer, 1985] combined with the elitism concept.  The 
creation of initial solutions for VEGA follows the same procedures as the single-objective 
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GA.  VEGA computes different objective values for each solution.  The elite solutions 
for each objective will be persevered to the next generation while the crossover pool will 
be constructed using the solutions with better fitness for each objective.  Finally, the 
new solution will be created from the crossover pool. 
In this study, initial population sets are randomly created while each set including 
decision parameters of operation rules for one year.  Using the daily water release 
generator, daily water releases are generated for that year.  These water releases are 
subsequently used to compute both economic and ecological objectives. 
3.2.5. Monte Carlo simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation is applied to handling the uncertainty involved in 
reservoir inflows.  Using one year of streamflow data, the MOGA procedure can 
optimize a set of parameters based on two objectives for that particular year only.  
However, the optimal parameters for this year might not be suitable for another year due 
to the climate variability that causes different streamflow conditions.  A Monte Carlo 
simulation analysis is applied to the study to overcome this problem and to provide more 
robust results.  I synthesize 100 years of daily streamflow, and it is assumed that the 
synthetic flow can represent most of the extreme flow conditions.  Using these 100-year 
series of daily inflow, MOGA is run 100 times.  An optimal parameter set will be 
created each year.  Therefore, I will have 100 optimal parameter sets which represent the 
optimal operation rules under 100 flow conditions. 
Since this is a multi-objective problem, 100 optimum parameter sets will have at 
least 100 Pareto optimum solutions.  Using these Pareto optimum solutions, the 
probability distribution of each parameter and objectives can be calculated. Statistical 
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analysis can be applied to the probability distribution and a summary value such as: 
expected value, mode value (the value with the maximum probability) and median value 
are used to represent the entire probability distribution.  The summary values of 
parameters are treated as the robust optimum operation rules.  
3.3. Study Area and Management Purpose 
3.3.1. Study area and operation rules 
Lake Shelbyville, a  reservoir located on the Kaskaskia River in east-central 
Illinois, USA (Figure 3.2) is used as a case study for testing the proposed method for 
optimizing reservoir management with economic and ecologic objectives.  Lake 
Shelbyville is a multi-purpose reservoir for flood damage control, recreation, navigation 
and fish conservation [USACE, 2008].  It is operated by the U. S. Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) and has a total storage of 1,035,900 acre-ft (AF).  The operation 
rules have been modified several times for different management purposes since it was 
entered into operation in August 1970 [Lee et al, 1992].  However, only twenty years of 
reservoir inflow and release data (1988 to 2007) obtained from the USACE were used in 
this study.  
The American Heritage Rivers program has identified the Kaskaskia River Basin 
as susceptible to future water use conflict [Taylor and Stemler, 2006].   The operation of 
Lake Shelbyville plays an important role in the management of water resources in this 
basin.  The current operation rule follows the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers Lake 
Shelbyville water control plan [USACE, 2008].  This plan divides the whole year into a 
growing season (May 1st to November 1st) and a dormant season.  During the growing 
season, the target water level is 599.7 feet and the water release rate depends on inflow, 
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water level, downstream flow and weather forecasts.  The maximum release rate is 
limited to at most to 1,800 cfs when water level is between 599.7 ft and 610.0 ft.  When 
the water level is between 610.0 and 626.5 ft, the maximum release rate can increase to 
4500 cfs.  During the dormant season, there are three different target water levels.  The 
reservoir is maintained at 599.7 ft from November 1st to December 15th, and reduced to 
594.0 ft from December 15th to April 1st for flood control.  From April 1st to May 1st, the 
target water level is raised to 596.0 ft for the coming growing season.  
 
Figure 3.2. The Kaskaskia River and Lake Shelbyville in Illinois, USA. 
 The maximum release rate is set at 4,500 cfs as long as the water level is above 
the target level.  The minimum release rate for the whole year is set at 10 cfs.  The 
water release difference between two days is limited to a maximum of 500 cfs (Equation 
3.4) by law [USACE, 2008].  There is no specific rule for the water release rate when 
water level is above 626.5 ft. 
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cfsWRWR dd 5001 ≤− −        (3.4) 
The operation zones during each seasonal division and target water levels are 
given in Figure 3.3.  In total, 19 parameters are identified to represent the operation 
rules for eight zones.  
 
Figure 3.3. The 19 parameters for optimal water release functions in different zones 
characterized by seasons 
3.3.2. Economic benefit objective 
The primary objectives of Lake Shelbyville have been reported as 1) enhancement 
of recreational opportunities and 2) reduction in flood-induced agricultural damage 
[Singh, 1978; Lee, 1987; Lee et al, 1992; Taylor and Stemler, 2006; USACE 2008].  
Therefore, objective functions related to each of these economic objectives are 
determined from previous studies.  
The first objective is to define the economic loss caused by the reduction in 
month 
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a4 
b4 
c4 
a1, b1, c1 
MaxWR3 
MaxWR 1 
MaxWR 2 
MinWR3 
MinWR2 MinWR1 
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a2, b2, c2 
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recreational services.  According to Singh et al. [1975], visitors go to Lake Shelbyville 
for five different activities: swimming, boating, skiing, fishing and hunting.  Singh et al. 
[1975] collected data on the total number of monthly visitors for each of these 
recreational activities.  It is assumed that the monthly visitors’ totals are evenly 
distributed within one month in this study.  Singh et al. [1975] also provided data on the 
percentage visitors lost per one-foot change in reservoir water level and defined the 
lowest and highest water levels that would cause these losses.  Therefore, following 
Singh et al [1975], Equation 3.5 can be used to compute the annual profit loss due to the 
reduction in recreational services: 
( ) ( )[ ]∑∑
= =
×Δ××=
365
1
5
1
$100/
d i
i
d
i
d
i LpDVRL       (3.5) 
RL is the annual profit lost due to the lack of recreational services,  DVid is the number 
of daily visitors for ith recreational activiity, pi is the percentage visitors lost per foot of 
change in water level, ΔLd is the difference between the daily water level and the damage 
level, $i, is the expenditure per person per day.  Table 3.1 provides the necessary data for 
computing DVid and $i while Table 3.2 provides the data for pi and ΔLd.  
The second objective is to quantify the economic losses in the agriculture sector 
that are due to floods.  USACE collected data from some historical floods and 
constructed a relationship between Lake Shelbyville’s water release and downstream 
flooded area.  A third-order regression function, with an R2 of 0.9976, is used to fit this 
curve.  
3155.79625.45485.00209.0 23 −+−= dddd WRWRWRFA    (3.6) 
where FAd is the daily flooded area and WRd is the daily water release.  Using Equation 
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(3.6), with a given water release, the downstream flooded area can be calculated.  In this 
study, to represent the economic losses in agriculture, the average crop damage per acre 
flooded is set to $130 per acre flooded [Lee et al., 1992].  An additional $0.30 per acre 
flooded is added per acre to represent the property lost [Lee et al., 1992]. The following 
equation can be defined from above information: 
[ ] ( ){ }∑
=
×=
365
1
)(
d
ddd TCDWRFAAL        (3.7) 
where AL is the annual agriculture profit lost due to floods.  FAd(WRd) is the daily 
flooded area due to different amounts of daily water releases (WRd).  TCDd is the daily 
total crop and property damage per acre flooded.  Property damage can occur at any 
time of the year while crop damage can only occur during the crop season (from May to 
October). 
Table 3.1. Percentage distribution of visitors in different recreational activity categories 
[after Singh et al, 1975 and Lee et al, 1992] 
Visitor Distribution (%) Month 
Swimming Boating Skiing Fishing Hunting 
January 0 0.25 0 0.67 0 
February 0 0.49 0 0.96 0 
March 0 1.83 0 3.14 0 
April 1.65 7.39 1.99 7.17 0 
May 16.39 15.14 20.53 15.48 0 
June 23.25 17.86 21.92 17.01 0 
July  25.47 19.01 20.53 17.16 0 
August 21.74 18.26 19.54 16.58 0 
September 11.50 13.25 13.35 12.97 0 
October 0 4.57 2.14 5.86 20.75 
November 0 1.45 0 1.99 58.76 
December 0 0.50 0 1.01 20.49 
Visitors 
(per year) 
400,000 300,000 60,000 350,000 35,000 
Expenditure 
(visitor/day) 
$1.50 $1.50 $1.50 $3.00 $3.00 
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Combining Equations (3.5) and (3.7), an objective function related to economic 
benefit can be written as: 
ALRLTL +=          (3.8) 
where TL is the total annual economic loss due to inappropriate reservoir operation, RL is 
the annual recreational loss and AL is the annual agricultural loss.  
 Table 3.2. Percentage of recreational loss per foot change in lake stage [after Singh et al, 
1975 and Lee et al, 1992] 
Activity Lowest stage (ft) 
Loss 
(%/ft)
Max 
loss (%) 
Highest 
stage (ft) 
Loss 
(%/ft) 
Max 
loss (%) 
Swimming 589 5 50 603 8.3 70 
Boating 585 25 100 610 8.3 39 
Skiing 585 25 100 610 8.3 39 
Fishing 585 15 75 610 5 75 
Hunting 589 10 100 602 3.5 95 
3.3.3. Ecological benefit objective 
Ecosystem preservation is also a management issue for Lake Shelbyville.  Sale 
et al. [1982] tried to optimize the regulation water level for different species using the 
weighted usable area (WUA) method using linear programming.  The ecological 
objective in this study is to maximize the fish diversity downstream of Lake Shelbyville.  
Since a long-term, detailed fish dataset is unavailable for Kaskaskia River, a quantitative 
relationship between fish diversity and hydrologic statistics that Chapter 2 derived for the 
Upper Illinois River is used as the objective function (equation 3.9) in this study.  I 
assume that 1) the communities of fish species in these two watersheds are similar since 
these watersheds possess similar climatic and geological characteristics; 2) the 
ecohydrological indicators that identified from the Upper Illinois River can represent a 
general ecohydrological flow condition with in the Illinois.  Equation (3.9) is 
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constructed using a data mining approach and establishes a quantitative link between 
flow and the condition of a river’s fish community.  
rate
dayday
day R
QQQQ
DQD
SI +⋅+++
+=
max3min353
minmin7min
2      (3.9) 
The left-hand side of Equation (3.9) is the Shannon Index, an annual fish diversity 
index [SI, Shannon and Weaver, 1949].  The right-hand side includes the most 
ecologically relevant hydrological indicators (ERHIs) defined in Chapter 2.  Q3 and Q5 
are the average discharges in March and May, respectively; Q3daymin and Q7daymin are the 
annual minimum average 3-day and 7-day discharges; Q3daymax is the annual maximum 
average 3-day flow, Dmin is the Julian date of annual minimum daily flow and Rrate is the 
mean of all positive differences between consecutive daily values.  All these indicators 
can be computed from a time series of daily water flow.   
In summary, equation (3.8) is used in the MOGA process as one objective 
function while equation (3.9) serves as the second objective function.  The daily water 
release can be directly used to compute RL, AL, and TL for the economic objective.  For 
the ecological objective, the daily water release is imported into the Indicators of 
Hydrological Alternative [Richter et al., 1996] software to compute the ERHIs, and then 
the ERHIs are used to calculate the SI value.  The fitness of each individual solution in 
the population in the MOGA procedure is recorded as both the SI and TL values.  The 
purpose of MOGA is to find the optimal 19 parameters that generate water release that 
maximize the SI and minimized the TL during a particular year. 
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3.4. Results  
First, we compare the synthetic daily streamflow time series to historical records.  
The synthesized flows are expected to preserve the statistical characteristics of historical 
streamflow.  The MOGA program is run for every year and produces 100 sets of optimal 
parameters (ai, bi, and ci in Equation 1, MaxWR and MinWR).  Under each set of the 
operational curve parameters, a number of non-inferior solutions exist between the 
ecological and economic loss objectives.   These solutions will be compared to the 
historical results.  Moreover, using these non-inferior solutions as samples, the 
probability distribution of the 19 parameters and objectives will be calculated.  The 
expected value, maximum probability value and the median values will be used to 
represent the probability distribution.   
3.4.1. Synthetic streamflow validation 
Following the procedures from Aksoy [2003], the transition probability matrix, 
the gamma distribution parameters, the exponential decay parameters and the mean 
monthly streamflow are calculated using 1988-2007 daily Lake Shelbyville inflow data 
(Table 3.3).  Those parameters are used to synthesize 100 years daily inflow samples.  
Although these data are not identical, Figure 3.4 shows that the mean monthly 
streamflow values generated from historical and synthetic data have a similar pattern and 
magnitude, with the only exception beinjg that the synthetic flow in December is slightly 
higher than the historical value.  Overall, the R2 value for monthly flow is 0.867.  The 
mean historical and synthetic daily flows are 857 and 853 cfs, with standard deviations of 
1647 and 1120 cfs, respectively.  Finally, the 100-year synthetic daily streamflow sets 
represent 100 different annual inflow series for Lake Shelbyville. 
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Table 3.3. Parameters for synthetic streamflow generation  
Month Paa Pra Prr Pzz alpha beta b1 b2 Qmean 
January 0.61 0.25 0.75 0.95 0.15 2252.38 0.21 0.17 1260.54
February 0.55 0.27 0.73 0.88 0.23 1169.32 0.19 0.17 1145.32
March 0.5 0.23 0.77 0 0.23 1451.61 0.19 0.14 1263.26
April 0.43 0.29 0.71 0 0.2 2130.47 0.22 0.17 1456.99
May 0.46 0.29 0.71 0 0.22 2678.9 0.28 0.18 1790.94
June 0.43 0.29 0.71 0 0.23 1781.49 0.27 0.23 1023.67
July  0.55 0.31 0.69 0 0.15 1096.21 0.37 0.32 370.73 
August 0.66 0.41 0.53 0.76 0.12 736.47 0.64 0.38 177.83 
September 0.67 0.34 0.53 0.89 0.11 656.86 0.41 0.36 208.26 
October 0.67 0.46 0.46 0.8 0.12 769.46 0.54 0.29 298.44 
November 0.68 0.42 0.52 0.84 0.21 970.16 0.34 0.28 612.03 
December 0.65 0.39 0.61 0.85 0.23 1664.76 0.24 0.19 705.33 
*Paa, Pra, Prr, Pzz are transition probability for ascension to ascension, rescission to ascension, rescission to 
recession and zero flow to zero flow; alpha and beta are parameters for gamma distribution; b1 and b2 are 
parameters for the exponential decay function; and Qmean is the mean monthly streamflow 
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Figure 3.4. Comparison of observed and synthetic streamflow 
3.4.2. Pareto optimum tradeoff analysis 
Figure 3.5 shows 347 non-inferior solutions under 100 annual inflow scenarios 
and different priorities assigned to economic and ecological objectives.  Figure 3.5 (a) 
shows the possible tradeoff between the two objectives under various flow conditions.  
The minimum economic loss is zero and the maximum fish diversity is 4.5.  Under the 
maximum fish diversity (SI=4.5), economic losses range from $0 to $1.83 million.  On 
 
 
73
the other hand, if the minimum economic loss is the goal (TL=0), the fish diversity ranges 
from 0 to 4.5.  The objective values in each year of the 20-year historical daily reservoir 
water release series are calculated and shown in Figure 3.5.  Most of the historical 
results are close to non-inferior solutions, except for a couple of years with large floods 
(i.e. 1996 and 2002), in which the historical releases result in much higher economic 
losses than the optimal releases based on the MOGA procedure.  Figure 3.5 (b) shows 
the solutions with total losses of less than $1 million within a year.  The results of two 
particular years which represent the optimums with the historical data in those years are 
shown with triangles.  Point A represents the solution of minimum economic loss and 
Point B represents the solution of maximum fish diversity over 20 years.  Both points A 
and B are close to the x-axis (with low economic losses), which shows that the historical 
operations were dominated by the economic objective. 
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Figure 3.5. (a) Tradeoff between economic loss and biodiversity (b) shows a closeup of 
the portion of (a) with the total economic loss (TL) ranging from 0 to 1.0  
3.4.3. Monte Carlo simulation 
Using the 347 non-inferior solutions as samples, the probability distributions of 
(a) (b) 
A. B
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the 19 parameters and objective values are computed.  (Some examples of these results 
are displayed in Figure 3.6.)  Figure 3.6(a) displays that the distributions are close to the 
normal distribution.  Figure 3.6(b) show the distributions that have high skewness 
values.  For example, the skewness for “MaxWR1” and “b1” are 1.64 and -0.92, 
respectively.  Finally, Figure 3.6(c) show irregular distributions.  The statistical values 
of all 19 parameters are given in Table 3.4, including the expected value, the mode and 
the median value, the standard deviations and the skewness coefficients.  The skewness 
coefficients of parameter b (b1 to b4) are relatively higher than the others.  The standard 
deviations of parameter c (c1 to c4) are also higher than others.  Figure 3.6(d) is the 
probability distribution of the two objectives (SI and TL) based on all non-inferior 
solutions from the 100 inflow scenarios.  The expected value of SI is 3.5 and TL is 0.167 
million. 
The statistics of the parameters as shown in Table 3.4 can be compared to the 
parameters of the historical operation rules.  MaxWR1 was set at 1800 cfs, MaxWR2 and 
MaxWR3 at 4500 cfs, and MinWR1 to MinWR4 at 10 cfs under current operation rules 
enforced by USACE.  The value of MaxWR1 determined by this study ranges from 
1794 to 1950 cfs, which are close to the historical value of 1800 cfs.  This implies that 
that the current maximum allowed water release for the crop growing season when water 
level is lower than 610 ft is close to the optimal setting when considering both economic 
and ecological objectives.  The values of MaxWR2 and MaxWR3 range from 2,620 to 
2,827 cfs and 1,962 to 2,621 cfs, respectively.  These values are at least 2000 cfs smaller 
than the historical values (4,500 cfs).  The decrease of MaxWR2 and MaxWR3 will 
directly decreases economic losses, and it can also enhance fish diversity.  The values of 
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minimum water release can be increased from 10 cfs to 107 cfs for MinWR4 (the 
maximum probability value) and to 675 cfs for MinWR1 (the median value).  The 
increase of minimum water releases has a direct influence on fish diversity.  Thus, if 
maximizing fish diversity is added as one of the reservoir operation objectives under the 
current operation rules, the maximum releases will be reduced and the minimum releases 
will be increased. 
Table 3.4. Statistical analysis for the 19 parameters 
 a1 b1 c1 MinWR1 MaxWR1 a2 b2 c2 MinWR2 MaxWR2
Expected 0.6 0.35 239 636 1950 0.46 -0.04 -1 431 2827 
Mode 0.65 0.7 467 675 1794 0.41 -0.16 -54 378 2620 
Median 0.65 0.47 315 675 1794 0.41 -0.16 -54 378 2620 
STDV 0.21 0.47 305 168 697 0.21 0.48 222 209 798 
SKEW -0.49 -0.92 -0.41 -1.24 1.64 0.10 0.29 0.02 0.05 -0.04 
 a3 b3 c3 MinWR3 MaxWR3 a4 b4 c4 MinWR4  
Expected 0.51 -0.04 28 434 2621 0.72 0.44 323 384  
Mode 0.68 -0.39 -33 383 1962 0.87 0.77 535 107  
Median 0.46 -0.16 -33 383 2399 0.77 0.54 391 329  
STDV 0.23 0.47 246 203 875 0.20 0.46 287 222  
SKEW -0.14 0.17 0.24 0.16 0.43 -1.17 -1.24 -1.09 0.24  
* Expected means expected value, Mode means the maximum probability value, Median 
means the median value, STDV means the standard deviation and SKEW means 
skewness   
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Figure 3.6. Probability distributions of six selected parameters and objective value from 
the Monte Carlo simulations. 
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3.5. Discussion 
Using the statistical values of the 19 parameters determined from this study as 
shown in Table 3.4, the model runs continuously from 1988-2007.  The optimal water 
releases and the objective function values (economic loss and fish diversity) in each year 
of the period are compared to the historical records.  This analysis is expected to provide 
additional information for the refinement of the current operational rules. 
3.5.1. Economic losses versus fish community diversity 
Figure 3.7 compares the results of fish diversity and economic losses from 
historical water releases and with those from the modified rules determined by the 
MOGA.  Since MOGA adds fish diversity as one of the objectives for reservoir 
operation, it is not surprising that the water release from the MOGA (considering three 
scenarios with the expected, mean and the mode of the parameter values, respectively) 
generates higher SI values for most of the years than the historical releases.  The mean 
SI from historical release, the optimal release with expected values and median values are 
1.95, 2.71 and 3.03, respectively.  The minimum SI during the 20-year period from the 
optimal release with the expected parameter values is lower than that from the historical 
releases (0.91 versus 1.27, both occurred in 2003).  Meanwhile, the fluctuations of 
annual SI are larger when using the optimal water releases.  The standard deviation of SI 
from the historical release and optimal releases with expected and median parameter 
values are 0.38, 0.84 and 0.70, respectively.  These tendencies occur because the SI 
values under historical releases stay at low values while those under the optimal releases 
vary with the annual hydrologic variability. 
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Figure 3.7. Comparison of objective values from 1988 to 2007 from the observed releases 
and the expected and medium optimal releases, respectively.    
The comparison of the economic loss objective also provides some implications 
for potential improvement of the operation rules for Lake Shelbyville.  The three 
scenarios with optimal release all result in lower economic losses than the historical 
release.  The mean economic loss from the historical release, the optimal release with 
expected parameter values and with the median parameter values are $3.19, $1.34 and 
$0.78 million, respectively, and the maximum economic loss from these scenarios are 
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$22.8, $5.12 and $3.2 million, respectively.  This implies the optimal releases can 
reduce the vulnerability of economic profit significantly.  The fluctuation of economic 
losses is smaller when using the optimal water releases.  The standard deviations of 
economic loss from the scenarios listed above are $6.99, $1.68 and $1.12 million, 
respectively.  In summary, the optimal water releases tend to eliminate the occurrence of 
extreme losses in flooding years, such as 1996 and 2002. However, a year-by-year 
comparison shows that the optimal water releases may increase the economic loss in 
normal years.   This implies that the reservoir may be operated in a multi-year context 
so that the losses registered during extreme years can be reduced at the cost of incurring 
some larger economic losses during normal years. 
3.5.2. Water releases and water levels 
Two years, 2002 and 2003, are selected to show the differences in water release 
and water level from the optimal and historical operations.  In 2002, the maximum daily 
inflow was above 30,000 cfs on May 12, 2002.  This flooding caused extensive 
agricultural losses in the Kaskaskia River Basin [Taylor and Stemler, 2006].  On the 
other hand, 2003 was a dry year with an average daily inflow of only half (430 cfs) the 
20-year average (860 cfs), and several zero flow days were recorded at the end of August 
2003. 
A comparison of historical and optimal daily water releases in 2002 is shown in 
Figure 3.8(a).  In April, the optimal water releases have a similar magnitude with the 
historical releases.  At the beginning of May, the historical release rose above 3,000 cfs 
because the inflow was higher than 10,000 cfs.  The historical water releases were 
maintained at this rate for the entire May.  Since the growing season begins in May, 
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large releases caused serious downstream flooding problems.  The floods that these 
large releases caused affected the crop planting, which resulted in the highest annual 
economic loss that occurred during the 1988-2007 period.  However, all three optimal 
water release scenarios have a maximum water release around 2,500 cfs, which results in 
a smaller flooded area and lower economic losses.  It should be noted that the modeled 
releases are subject to the assumption of a “perfect forecast” during the rest of the year.  
In the real world, such perfect forecasting does not exist and reservoir managers would 
rather choose a high release when the water level is high in order to reduce the risk of 
more severe flooding damage in the following time period.  It remains a challenge to 
include such a risk aversion component in the objective function of a reservoir 
optimization model. 
 Figure 3.8(b) shows the water releases results in 2003.  Since this was a dry 
year, the historical water releases were maintained at a lower level.  More than 150 days 
in 2003 had a daily water release of less than 20 cfs.  These low flow conditions resulted 
in the second lowest fish diversity in the 20 years (1988-2007). This phenomenon was 
discussed by Sale et al. [1982], who argued that the minimum water release resulted in 
low flow conditions downstream and potentially damaged the fish community.  The 
optimal water releases show diverse results.  The results from the scenario using the 
expected parameter values caused an even lower SI value than historical water release, 
while the results using the values under the maximum probability resulted in higher SI 
values.  This is probably due to the water release rising at the end of 2003. The scenario 
with the parameters of maximum probability reflects such an event while the scenario 
with the expected parameter values does not.  
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Figure 3.8. Comparison of observed and optimized daily water releases during 2002 and 
2003: expected values and the value with the maximum probability. 
The daily water levels in the reservoir are compared in Figure 3.9.  In the 
flooding year, the water level difference between the optimal values (from the three cases) 
and the historical releases is within 10 ft during the period of January to April.  The 
historical high inflow in May caused the water level to rise.  Since the historical 
operation allowed a maximum daily release of 4,500 cfs daily, the increase of water level 
is lower than that under the three optimal operations.  However, after the peak discharge, 
the decrease in water level in the historical operation is dramatic to fit the target water 
(a) 
(b) 
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levels at different seasons.  The historical operation caused a 24-ft difference in water 
level during the May-August period following the peak discharge.  However, the three 
optimal operations have smaller water level declines after the peak discharge because the 
maximum release is only about 2,500 cfs.  Therefore, under this scenario, more water 
has been stored in the reservoir, which causes a smaller water level drop (10 ft).  In the 
dry year, an opposite situation occurred.  The water levels fluctuated more significantly 
under the optimal operations than the historical release in 2003.  The historical operation 
results in an almost perfect fit of the target water level.  The water level fluctuation is 
less than 5 ft during that year.  However, since the ecological target has been added into 
the reoperation objectives, it drives a more suitable hydrological condition for the 
downstream ecosystem.  This, in turn, results in a more variable water level in the 
reservoir from April to September, while the historical water level was quite stable during 
that period. 
These results partially agree with those from Sale et al. [1982].  During high 
flow years, the optimal solutions suggest: 1) a revised rule which further limits changes 
in water levels, and 2) lower water levels and larger releases during the winter to sustain 
the low flows downstream during the ensuing spring [Sale et al., 1982].  For dry years, 
the optimal operation allows for falling pool elevations from July through October to 
supplement low flows downstream during that season [Sale et al., 1982].  
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Figure 3.9. Comparison of observed and optimized daily water levels during 2002 and 
2003, the expected, medium, and the values with the maximum probability.    
3.5.3. The impact of initial reservoir water level 
The MOGA model runs for a one-year time horizon and the initial water level is 
assumed to be a fixed level (599.7 ft).  The results of all scenarios in this study are 
subject to this condition.  To examine the possible impact of the initial water level, a 
sensitivity analysis is conducted to explore an initial water level range that will not affect 
the determined parameters as shown in Table 3.4.  We assume that violating the 
constraints under 10% of the scenarios, which means 40 days violation for equation (3.4).  
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Using the scenario with expected parameter values, the lowest and highest initial water 
level are 599.7 ft and 619.5 ft, respectively.  Using the parameters with the maximum 
probability, the lowest and highest initial water level are 591.5 ft and 620 ft, respectively.  
Employing the parameters with median values, the lowest and highest initial water level 
are 596.5 ft and 619.5 ft, respectively.  The scenario with the maximum probability 
shows the widest range of the initial water level, while the scenario with expected 
parameter values does not even permit a water level 0.1 ft lower than the original setting.  
Although more detailed research is needed, these results seem to imply that the reservoir 
manager can use a specific set of optimal parameters for different ranges of water levels 
observed at the beginning of the year. 
3.6. Conclusions 
Ecosystem restoration is one of the driving forces for reservoir reoperation.  This 
involves changing the operation rules to reestablish the natural flow regime to restore the 
local ecosystem to a practical degree.  An optimization model that considers both 
economic and ecological objectives is developed for daily operation and then applied to 
Lake Shelbyville in Illinois.  The primary management objective of this reservoir is to 
minimize the economic losses due to flooding.  An additional objective is added to 
maximize fish diversity in the downstream ecosystem.  A multi-objective genetic 
algorithm is used to determine the optimal operation rules under the two objectives.  
The challenges addressed in this chapter include handling daily reservoir inflows required 
for the ecological assessment and evaluating the practicality of changing the existing 
operation rules when including an ecological objective. 
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The results demonstrate the tradeoff between the two objectives.  The historical 
reservoir releases have a dominating priority for minimizing flooding loss whereas the 
optimal operations from the model result in higher fish diversity than the historical 
operation.  The optimal operations reduce extreme flooding events although they might 
slightly increase flooding losses incurred during less severe events.  The ecological 
objective leads to the reduction of the maximum allowable water release and the increase 
of the minimum water release.  In general, adding the ecological objective to Lake 
Shelbyville operation will not jeopardize the primary flooding control objective while 
also improving downstream fish habitats. 
The 100-year synthetic inflow scenarios further support the conclusion stated 
above, as shown by the comparison of three optimization cases, with expected, medium, 
and the mode of the parameters in the water release function, respectively, to the 
historical operation from 1988-2007 (Figure 3.7).  Furthermore, the Monte Carlo 
simulations result in the probability distribution of the 19 parameters that characterize the 
water release functions used in the operation rules.  The parameters with the inflow 
variable have a normal distribution but those with the water level variable have a biased 
distribution.  This indicates that the coefficients of the water level variable in the linear 
water release function are sensitive to particular inflow scenarios, and that the bias of 
water release from the optimal values is likely to be caused by these parameters.  
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CHAPTER 4. A DECENTRALIZED OPTIMIZATION 
ALGORITHM FOR MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM BASED 
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT  
 
Summary 
A watershed can be simulated as a multi-agent system (MAS) composed of spatially 
distributed land and water users (agents) within a common defined environment.  The 
watershed system is characterized by distributed decision processes at the agent level and 
a coordination mechanism is organizing the interactions among individual decision 
processes at the system level.  This chapter presents a decentralized optimization 
method known as constraint-based reasoning, which allows individual agents in an MAS 
to optimize their behaviors over various alternatives.  The method incorporates the 
optimization of all agents’ objectives through an interaction scheme, in which the ith agent 
optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration and forward the solution 
and consequences to all agents that interact with it.  Agents are allowed to determine 
how important their own objectives are in comparison to the constraints, using a local 
interest factor (βi).  A large βi value indicates a selfish agent who puts higher priority on 
its own benefit and ignores collaboration requirements.  This bottom-up 
problem-solving approach mimics real-world watershed management problems better 
than conventional “top-down” optimization methods in which it is assumed that 
individual agents will completely comply with any recommendations that the coordinator 
makes.  The method is applied to a steady state hypothetical watershed with three 
offstream human agents, one instream human agent (reservoir) and two ecological agents.  
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4.1. Introduction 
Nowadays, many watersheds can be considered as anthropogenically-stressed 
environmental systems with significant social and environmental problems [UNESCO, 
2003].  Traditional water resources management practices are often fragmented by 
production sectors, divided between land and water management and practices tend to 
focus on human needs without sufficient consideration of ecosystem requirements.  
Sustainable watershed management needs to treat watersheds as coupled natural-human 
systems [Liu et al., 2007].  Spatially distributed human activities are closely connected 
by the river stream network, and stakeholders share the common land and water resources 
within a basin.  Specific concerns for watershed management include the balance of 
offstream human needs with instream environmental needs, the regulation of water 
quantity, quality, and flow regimes, and where and what technology to put in the 
watershed context.  These are essentially relevant to all components of a watershed 
system characterized with spatial patterns and the environmental continuum [Steel and 
Weber, 2001].  Moreover, management of coupled natural-human systems such as 
watersheds will not be effective unless “scientific analysis is married with public 
participation, ensuring that decisions based on cultural values are informed decisions with 
respect to likely consequences and a clear understanding of who benefits and who pays” 
[NRC, 1999].  Both the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the U.S. 
National Research Council (NRC) recommended tools development to facilitate the 
transfer of modeling technology to provide information to stakeholders and managers for 
decision making [EPA, 1996; NRC, 1999].  Increasing stakeholder’ participation has 
been sparking a transition from traditional top-down water resources management to 
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bottom-up management.  This stakeholder-driven movement has also increased the use 
of locally developed knowledge [NRC, 1999; Chess et al., 2000; Parker and Tsur, 1997] 
and postulated new modeling techniques for watershed management that involves 
stakeholder participation [Wolf, 2007].   
 Conventional watershed management models use a centralized approach to explore 
the system-wide optimal solution, assuming that (1) there is a top-down management 
process in which all watershed stakeholders completely obey a “super brain,” (2) 
complete information exchange exists among the stakeholders in different locations and 
production sectors and (3) perfect economic efficiency is realized, i.e., the marginal 
welfare of water use is identical for all agents.  These assumptions are usually 
unsuitable in real-world watershed management situations.  Decentralized modeling 
approaches are at least partially free of those assumptions. Wallace et al. [2003] presented 
a decentralized, or distributed, optimization framework that addressed the heterogeneity 
involved in watershed management issues by dividing a watershed into interconnected 
subsystems and defining an objective for each of the subsystems.  Young et al. [2005] 
described a multidisciplinary approach of conflict management between biodiversity 
conservation and human activities.  The study showed the benefit of information 
exchange among stakeholders when stakeholders are involved in the modeling analysis.  
In this chapter, I present a decentralized optimization method that depicts a 
watershed as a Multi-Agent System (MAS), which is expected to support 
stakeholder-driven, bottom-up watershed management.  The theory of MAS has 
emerged from computer science theories associated with distributed artificial intelligence 
[Sycara, 1998].  An agent is an object that interacts with other agents and the 
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environment, and the interactions are characterized by behavioral rules of individual 
agents.  Several characteristics define agents: They are autonomous, (i.e., they have 
control over their actions), they have different and possibly conflicting goals, they share a 
common environment, and they each make decisions that impact the common 
environment [Dooley and Corman, 2002].   
 A watershed can be naturally described as an MAS.  Agents in a watershed MAS 
include offstream land and water users and instream or in-situ water “users,” such as 
riparian aquatic ecosystems.  The environment of the MAS is composed of static 
geomorphologic features (e.g., the natural drainage network) and temporally dynamic 
attributes such as flow regimes and water quality. Advances in water-related disciplines, 
including hydrology, ecology, biology and economics have paved the way for modeling 
the environment of watersheds.  In the MAS framework, agents are defined as 
autonomous computational units.  Stakeholder participation associates the 
computational units with human agents [Drougoul et al. 2003], including land owners and 
representatives for land and water use agents.  Reservoir managers are considered as 
instream agents, and government or citizen organizations as ecosystem agents.  In this 
context, a watershed is defined as a self-organizing system characterized by 
disaggregated but interactive decision processes at the agent level, with a coordination 
mechanism leading to the interactions among individual decision processes. 
MAS-based modeling has been applied to many studies for solving land use, 
water allocation and environmental and natural resource management problems. 
Barreteau et al [ 2004] studies the suitability of multi-agent simulation for irrigation 
systems.  Izquierdo et al. [2002] described a spatially-explicit agent-based model for 
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basin land and water management.  The modeling exercise demonstrated how 
distributed land managers (the agents) shared water spatially and temporally.  Results 
showed that the behavior of agents became more realistic if guided by the modeling 
outputs, as well as previous experiences.  Doran [2001] proposed an agent-based 
modeling approach for ecosystem management in a watershed context and concluded that 
the intervention strategies among agents should be related to ecosystem management 
policies.  Berger and Ringler [2002] defined farmers as agents who decide farm 
investment, land rental and water use in a watershed context.  A mixed integer linear 
programming model was used to support the agent decisions.  Berger et al. [2007] 
presented an application of MAS to evaluate the complexity of water and land use within 
sub-basins.  Results showed the impacts of technical change and informal rental markets 
on household income and water use efficiency.  They also demonstrated how the MAS 
model could capture collective action problems in water markets and in large and 
small-scale infrastructure provision. 
Despite the existing development and applications of MAS models, mathematical 
formulation and solution algorithms remain a great challenge for specific MAS problems, 
including watershed management.  This chapter develops a MAS model using the 
decentralized control theory to analyze the water allocation among the various water 
users.  Offstream and instream human agents and ecosystem agents are defined in the 
spatial domain of a watershed.  It is assumed that an economic benefit objective with 
more or less priority on collaboration with others drives the behavior of each agent.  The 
MAS modeling framework and solution algorithm is described in this chapter.  Through 
a hypothetical case study, I discuss the interactions among agents and illustrate how the 
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behaviors of individual agents affect the overall performance of the system.  Indicators 
of system performance will be derived from agents’ decisions and their consequences.  
In the rest of this chapter, the description of the methodology is first given, followed by 
the results of a case study, discussion of the proposed method and finally, conclusions. 
4.2. Methodology 
 Durfee [2001] summarized the methods that can be used to solve MAS problems.  
One category of these methods is decentralized optimization.  There are two reasons that 
conventional (centralized) modeling techniques, control design and optimization may be 
inappropriate for complex systems such as MAS.   First it is difficult to solve the 
optimization model numerically due to the so-called Bellman’s “curse of dimensionality.”  
Second, it is also difficult to implement policies derived from a perspective of central 
control when various compartments (subsystems) of the system are actually operated 
separately [Leitmann et al., 1987].  Examples of these systems include robust turbine 
control [Šiljak et al., 2002], unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) formulation [Stipanović et 
al., 2004], and power system management [Bunn and Oliveira, 2001].  Decentralized 
optimization methods have been demonstrated to be more effective to address system 
problems with a “well-organized complexity” [e.g., Šiljak, 1991; Boel et al., 1999; Cowie 
and Borrett, 2005]. 
Penalty-based optimization methods [Luenberger, 1984] provide a convenient 
way to solve a decentralized problem such as MAS.  Sylla [1995] and Mousavi and 
Ramamurthy [2000] applied penalty methods to reservoir operation research.  They 
formulated a mathematical problem in either linear or nonlinear format, and solved the 
multi-reservoir interconnection problem with minimum cost or maximum profit objective 
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function.  Penalty methods have also been used to optimize the operation of water 
distribution system pumping [Sakarya and Mays, 2000], groundwater pollution problems 
[Keshari and Datta, 2001] and water-level feedback controller issues [Clemmens and 
Schuurmans, 2004]. 
 A modified penalty-based decentralized method [İnalhan et al., 2002] is used in 
this study.  Each agent has its own decision framework that captures only the local 
dynamics and the interconnecting constraints associated with these dynamics.  The 
method achieves optimization among agents with a bargaining scheme, in which the ith 
agent optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration and sends the 
solution back to all other agents with which it interacts.  All agents do this 
simultaneously, and their solutions are evaluated together by a “central processor,” from 
which information, such as system cost and the degree of constraint violation, is available 
to all agents for the next round of bargaining.  The method is based on a formula that 
allows agents to deal with infeasible constraints which different subsystems impose.  
The method uses a two-step approach – first finding out a solution based on the choices 
of all individual agents, allowing the violation of some constraints defined with the 
optimization models for individual agents, and then trying to reduce the constraint 
violation at the system level.  This follows the bottom-up problem-solving procedures, 
in which individual agents make decisions and interact with other agents and then the 
coordinator resolves conflicts by balancing the decisions of different agents.  
4.2.1. Mathematical formulation of a MAS-based problem 
The notion of a neighborhood for a given agent i is first defined here.  For the ith 
agent, the neighborhood is defined as: 
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th th
i { :  agent has a direct connection with  agent }N j j i=    (4.1) 
a local vector, xi, used as a decision variable, is introduced in the optimization process 
and corresponds to agent i.  For each local vector, the objective function to the benefit of 
each agent i is defined as fi(xi), while the constraints are denoted as gi(xi).  In addition, 
{xj}i  is defined as the subset of variables that are related to agents in the neighborhood 
of agent i.  In mathematical terms, these relationships are expressed as: 
{ } {  }j j iix x j N⊆ ∈         (4.2) 
where “|” means the determination of xj is subject to given value of j which belong to Ni 
set. Detailed definition is given in İnalhan et al. [2002]. 
The mathematical formulation of the problem is given as follows: 
)(max iix xfi
           (4.3) 
{ } { }
( ) 0
subject to ( )
( ) 0
l i i
i i j i
gi i j i
g x
g x x
g x x
≤⎧⎪⎨ ≤⎪⎩
     (4.4) 
This optimization procedure has both local constraints gli(xi) and interconnecting 
constraints ggi(xi|{xj}i).  An interconnecting constraint specifies that agent i receives the 
value of {xj}i from agent j and needs to accept the value.  The penalty-based 
decentralized optimization method described in the next section is applied to solving the 
problem described above. 
4.2.2. Penalty-based decentralized optimization method  
 The minimization problem for agent i that İnalhan et al. [2002] formulated in the 
penalty-based format is stated below: 
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{ } { }{ })()(min),(min
ijiiiiiijiii
xxPxfxxF +⋅= ββ      (4.5) 
where Fi is the penalized objective function, βi>0 is the local penalty parameter, fi is the 
original objective function, and Pi is the penalty function that penalizes any violation of 
the constraints in the formulation of equation (4.5), i.e. Pi≥0 when xi is not located in 
feasible solution space, otherwise, Pi=0.   
 In this study, the objective of an agent is to maximize its benefit, fi(xi).  Equation 
(4.5) is rewritten: 
{ } { }{ })()(max),(max
ijiiiiiijiii
xxPxfxxF −⋅= ββ     (4.6) 
where βi>0 is no longer a penalty parameter but instead a local interest factor.  A larger 
βi will result in a larger fi.  According to the proof by İnalhan et al. [2002], a larger βi 
will also lead to a larger penalty item, Pi.  This scheme allows each agent to use local βi 
selection as a tool to search for a solution which increases agent’s benefit (fi) as much as 
possible while violating fewer constraints. 
Local optimization 
 For local optimization, individual agents attempt to maximize their benefit, subject 
to the interconnection with their neighborhood.  This optimization problem can be 
defined as: 
{ } ),(max
ijiiix
xxF
i
β          (4.7) 
and the optimized solution can be written as: 
{ }[ ] { } ),(maxarg,*
ijiiixijii
xxFxx
i
ββ =      (4.8) 
 
 
95
where “|” means the determination of xi is subject to given values of βi and {xj}i. 
Global optimization  
 In equation (4.6), the penalty function (Pi) includes all constraints in the system 
related to the local vector, xi.  It can be further decomposed into a local penalty function 
and an interconnecting penalty function: 
{ } { } )()()(
ijigilijii
xxPxPxxP
ii
+=       (4.9) 
where ∑ == i qii qq ilil xPxP 1 )()( ,  is the local penalty function that contains the constraints 
(using qi as an index) that only relate to xi and { } { }∑ == i sii ss ijigijig xxPxxP 1 )()( ,  is the 
interconnecting penalty function that contains the constraints (using si as the index) that 
relate to both xi and {xj}i.  Equation (4.9) serves as a common global constraint, which 
characterizes the interconnection between an agent and its neighbors and related the local 
optimization problem for each agent defined by {xj}i [İnalhan et al., 2002].  Under this 
setting, the overall objective function for the system can be represented as: 
{ } { }
,j i
1 1
( , {x ) ( ) ( ) ( )
i
i i s
sm
i i i l i g i j i
i s
F x f x P x P x xβ β
= =
⎡ ⎤} = ⋅ − −⎣ ⎦∑ ∑    (4.10) 
where m is the index for agents’ number and s is the number of interconnecting 
constraints.  The value of the overall function will become a guideline for agents in 
deciding βi, the essential part of the procedure.  This scheme allows the ith agent to 
optimize equation (4.10) by using a local search for βi.  The result of the ith agent will 
then be sent to neighboring agents (i. e., all agents defined by the set of Ni).  The global 
performance of the entire system is treated as public information that is accessible to all 
agents.  İnalhan et al. [2002] suggested that the sum of the objective function (ftotal) and 
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the system violation (Ptotal) could serve as a global performance metric.  While the 
selection of βi gives each agent a tool for bargaining.  With a large value of βi, the 
solution ends with a better objective function [fi(xi)] but a larger constraint violation than 
it would with a small βi.  
The first-order necessary conditions and second-order sufficient conditions are 
used to solve this problem as İnalhan et al. [2002] suggested.  The first-order necessary 
conditions are: 
{ } 0),( *** =∂∂ ijiiii xxFx β  { }mi ,.....,1=∀      (4.11) 
and the second-order sufficient conditions are: 
{ } 0),( ***22 pijiii
i
xxF
x
β∂
∂  { }mi ,.....,1=∀      (4.12) 
where 0p  means that the matrix is negative definite.   
Differentiable inexact penalty format 
 Since the differential method is used to solve the problem, a differentiable 
formulation has to be provided.  When equation (4.6) is substituted into (4.11), the 
equation may be expressed as: 
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An inexact differentiable format is used here.  The penalty function Pi is defined 
as: 
{ } { }∑ == ikk ijiiijii xxgxxP 1 )(,0max()( γ       (4.14) 
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 where 2≥γ  is assumed to ensure second-order differentiability.  The number of 
constraints corresponding to the ith agent is ki.  Substituting the inexact differentiable 
format of Pi into the right hand side of equation (4.13) yields: 
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Substituting equation (4.15) into equation (4.13), the final differential equation is: 
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Although the method is theoretically sound, its application to complex systems, 
such as watersheds, is challenging.  Difficulties arise due to the complex interconnecting 
constraints involved in the watershed MAS model, which prevents a closed-form 
analytical solution.  These constraints include those among agents and ones between 
agents and the environment with interacting variables, such as water diversions and 
return flows.  A designed case study to demonstrate the practicality of this method is 
given in the following section. 
4.3. Case Study  
Applying the decentralized optimization algorithm, both analytical and numerical 
results are presented for a hypothetical watershed management problem. 
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4.3.1. Hypothetical example  
The MAS framework was applied to solving a hypothetical watershed as in Figure 
4.1(a).  A “Y-shape” river system with one mainstream and one tributary is considered.  
A city located on the upper mainstream withdraws water for municipal and industrial use.  
The rest of the water flows downstream into a reservoir for hydropower generation.  
Farms divert water for irrigation from both the lower mainstream and the tributary.  The 
river reaches below the irrigation diversions are both identified as primary fish habitats.  
Six agents are defined in the system.  There are three offstream human agents, OHA1 for 
the city, and OHA2 and OHA3 for the farms.  The dam on the upper mainstream is 
defined as an instream human agent (IHA1).  The fish habitats located at the tributary 
and the lower mainstream are defined as ecosystem agents, EA1 and EA2, respectively.  
A diagram of agents and the interconnections among them is provided in Figure 4.1(b).  
Different forms of the objective functions are assigned to the defined agents in the 
model (Table 4.1).  In this study, quadratic concave equations are used for all objective 
functions to test the algorithm in a simple manner without losing the nonlinear 
characteristics of some more realistic objective functions.  More detailed descriptions of 
the real world objective functions for human agents are provided by Cai et al. [2003], 
Loucks et al. [2005] and Cai et al. [2006].  Other forms of ecological objectives are 
discussed in Ringler and Cai [2006], Yang and Cai [2007] and Yang et al. [2008]. 
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Figure 4.1. (a) Sketch of a hypothetical watershed system and (b) network of agents. 
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Table 4.1. Formulation of agent models 
Offstream Human Agent 
OHA1 111
2
11111
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st. 
⎩⎨
⎧
≤+−
≤−
0
0
112
11
xQ
x
α
α
 
Objective function: 11
2
1)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The benefit from municipal and industrial 
water use) 
x1: water withdraw for municipal and 
industrial water use 
Q1: the monthly main stream inflow 
α1: the minimum water demand for the city 
α2: the minimum flow requirement for the 
dam inflow 
OHA2 444
2
44444
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st.
⎩⎨
⎧
≤+−
≤−
0
0
424
43
xQ
x
α
α
 
Objective function: 44
2
4)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The benefit from irrigated water use) 
x4: water withdraw for irrigation 
Q2: the monthly inflow from the tributary 
α3: the minimum water demand for the farm  
α4: the instream flow requirement for the 
tributary 
OHA3 666
2
66666
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st.
⎩⎨
⎧
≤+−−
≤−
0
0
6326
65
xxx
x
α
α
 
Objective function: 66
2
6)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The benefit from irrigated water use) 
x6: water withdraw for irrigation 
α5: the minimum water demand for the farm  
α6: the instream flow requirement for the main 
stream 
Instream Human Agent 
IHA1 222
2
22222
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st. 0112 ≤+−− xQSx  
Objective function: 22
2
2)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The benefit from hydropower generation) 
x2: water release 
S: dam storage 
Ecosystem Agent 
Reactive 
333
2
33333
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
where 423 xQx −=  
Objective function: 33
2
3)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The economic value of biodiversity) 
x3: water flow through the tributary 
 
EA1 
Active 
333
2
33333
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st. 
⎩⎨
⎧
≤−
−=
034
423
x
xQx
α  
 
Reactive 
555
2
55555
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
where 6325 xxxx −+=  
Objective function: 
55
2
5)( cxbxaxf ++=  
(The economic value of biodiversity) 
x5: water flow through the lower mainstream 
EA2 
Active 
555
2
55555
)(max cxbxaxf
x
++=  
st. 
⎩⎨
⎧
≤−
−+=
056
6325
x
xxxx
α  
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A conventional model formulation that can be used to support top-down water 
allocation decision making among agents in a watershed context is given as below: 
    ∑
=
=
6,1
)(max)(
i
ii xfxF    (4.18) 
    subject to 
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    (4.19) 
In the context of MAS model, different agents have different decisions with 
respect to their own objectives.  The offstream human agents, OHA1, OHA2 and OHA3, 
decide how much water should be diverted from the stream to fulfill their water demands, 
i.e., x1, x4 and x6, respectively.  The instream human agent, IHA1, decides how much 
water should be released (x2) for hydropower generation.  Thus the MAS method 
presents individual decision models to individual agents, as shown in Table 4.1.  
However, all the agent models are inter-connected by water and land management 
institution and upstream – downstream water sharing relationships.  When one agent 
seeks its optimal solution, it might violate the constraints and result in a worse solution 
for others.  This happens in the real world when upstream users overuse water and 
downstream users suffer water shortage. 
The determination of decision variables for ecosystem agents is less clear.  Poff 
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et al. [1997] proposed that the whole “flow regime” should be reserved for the riparian 
ecosystem.  Yang et al. [2008] developed quantitative relationships between a fish 
ecosystem index, such as fish diversity and abundance, and the most ecologically relevant 
hydrological indicators, such as minimum flow date, baseflow and hydrological revises 
(i.e., streamflows change from the ascension to recession stage and vice versa).  
However, the selection of decision variables for ecosystem agents is beyond the scope of 
this chapter.  I simply used the amount of water (x3 and x5) within the river reach to 
represent the “decisions” made by EAs.  Two different scenarios are tested in this 
chapter regarding the “decisions” of EAs.  The first scenario treats EAs as “reactive 
agents,” which means that, although EA1 and EA2 have their own objective functions, 
their decision variables, x3 and x5, are actually the result of the decisions made by 
upstream human agents (in this case, OHA2 and OHA3).  The scenario represents a 
situation similar to current watershed management practice, in which only human agents 
determine water allocation in a watershed.  The second scenario assumes some people 
or groups stand for EAs so that EA1 and EA2 become “active agents” just as human 
agents.  
There are three major assumptions underlying the hypothetical case study.  First, 
agents may violate not only soft constraints (related to policies or rules. e.g. minimum 
water requirements) but also hard (physical) constraints (e.g., water balance).  The 
violation of physical constraints is impossible in the real world, however, such a setting 
in the modeling analysis allows evaluating how much additional water is needed if the 
requirements from all agents are meant to be satisfied.  The hard constraint violation 
may then be treated as an infrastructure investment indicator or a management target (i.e., 
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minimizing the violation) if current water supply capacity has to be maintained.  The 
second assumption is that downstream local information (e. g. water demand and 
constraints of downstream agents) does not flow "upstream." This implies when upstream 
agents make a decision, it is rare for them to consider the downstream situation unless 
some global information and regulation is provided.  In addition, to simplify the 
problem but without losing the effectiveness for testing the proposed algorithm, I assume 
a static situation for the modeling analysis, i.e., the hypothetical case consists of only one 
time step, and thus does not consider time variations of water availability and water 
demand neither within a year nor over a longer time period.   
4.3.2. Analytical results  
The impact of the local interest factors (βi) on the decisions of various agents is 
demonstrated with the following analysis.  The objective function and the constraints for 
each agent are given in Table 4.1.  Using OHA1 as an example of the offstream human 
agents, the optimization problem for the agent can be rewritten as: 
[ ])()(max)( 1111111
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( ) ( ){ }21122111112111 ]0,[max]0,[max)(max
1
xQxcxbxa
x
+−−−−++⋅= ααβ
 (4.20) 
 Applying the first-order necessary condition ( 011 =∂∂ xF ), the solution is obtained 
under four different conditions: 
If 011 ≤− xα  and 0112 ≤+− xQα then 
1
1
1 2a
bx −=     (4.21) 
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If 011 ≤− xα  and 0112 >+− xQα  then 22
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If 011 >− xα  and 0112 >+− xQα  then 42
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βαα  (4.24) 
The solution of equation (4.21) satisfies both constraints.  The solutions of 
equation (4.22) and (4.23) violate one of the constraints (underlined) while the solution of 
equation (4.24) violates both constraints.  The solutions in equations (4.22) through 
(4.24) depend on β1.  If β1 approaches zero, equations (4.22) through (4.24) will 
converge to equations (4.25) through (4.27), respectively, as follows: 
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Equations (4.25) through (4.27) represent the solution that can exactly satisfy the violated 
constraint(s).  This result indicates that if β1 is set at zero, the solution will be located in 
the feasible space if it exists [see Figure 4.2(a)].  On the other hand, if β1 approaches 
infinity, equations (4.22) through (4.24) will result in:  
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This result indicates that if β1 approaches infinity, the solution will converge to the 
optimum solution of the individual agents disregarding the interconnecting constraints, as 
can be seen from Figure 4.2(b). 
 The same solution as shown above for OHA1 can be derived for instream human 
agent (IHA1) and active ecosystem agents.  However, if the ecosystem agents are treated 
as “reactive agents,” their solution will depend on the decisions of human agents.  For 
example, when OHA2 makes the decision on x4, x3 is determined simultaneously by 
x3=Q2-x4. 
 
Figure 4.2. A graphical explanation that shows the impact of the local interest factors on 
the objective value of an agent. The gray area represents the feasible region of the 
solutions. (a) when βi is small or equal to zero, the agent’s optimal solution is at 
point I, which is lower than the peak value defined by the agent objective function 
(point II) but is located in the feasible region (gray area); (b) when βi is large, the 
solution may move to point II but is out of the feasible region and some 
constraints are violated. 
With a given small value of βi, agents will search a local optimal solution inside 
the feasible region of the solution space.  When βi is set at zero, all possible solutions 
(agent decisions) will be located within the feasible region, if it exists.  Under this 
situation, the violation of the constraints will be minimal (the violation will be zero if the 
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feasible region exists).  When βi is greater than zero, agents may explore solutions in the 
infeasible solution space.  The value of βi indicates how far the exploration can go in the 
whole solution space.  When βi approaches infinity, the exploration can be extended to 
the entire space, which allows the agent to find its optimum solution without considering 
any interconnecting constraints.  However, since the optimum solution is in the 
infeasible region, the violation of the constraints caused by the solution may be large.  
4.3.3. Numerical results  
Three flow scenarios, high, medium and low flow, are set up to test the proposed 
modeling framework, as given in Table 4.2.  A high flow scenario means the inflows to 
the mainstream and tributary can satisfy all the constraints and can allow each agent to 
achieve the optimum solution without any violation.  It is assumed that the reservoir 
storage is relatively large and no spill will occur.  A medium flow scenario means the 
inflows can satisfy the constraints for each agent but constraint violations may occur if 
some or all agents want to achieve their optimum solution.  Under the low flow scenario, 
the water supply is insufficient to satisfy the constraints for all agents.  
Table 4.2. Inflow and dam storage under three different flow conditions 
Flow scenarios Q1 Q2 S* 
High Flow 80 35 10 
Medium Flow 40 20 8 
Low Flow  15 8 3 
*In this steady state case, the unit of Qi and S are the same and set as volume [L3]. 
The specification of the objective and the constraint equations are given in Table 
4.3.  Note that water diversion or instream flow (xi) and inflow (Qi) should have a unit 
of flow rate [L3/T], but the time dimension is ignored since this a static case; αi, the 
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parameter used in the constraints has the unit of volume too.  The objective variables 
represent the economic value of water utilization.  Different values of βi are tested to 
examine the performance of the framework. 
Table 4.3. Values of the parameters defining agent benefit functions and constraints (The 
definition is given in Table 4.1). 
Paraemters Value Paraemters Value Paraemters Value Parameters Value
a1* -0.20 b1 6 c1 -5 α1 12 
a2 -0.06 b2 2.5 c2 0 α2 10 
a3 -0.29 b3 6.28 c3 -3 α3 8 
a4 -0.13 b4 6 c4 -6 α4 6 
a5 -0.056 b5 3.74 c5 -23 α5 15 
a6 -0.15 b6 7.6 c6 -15 α6 10 
  *Coefficients: ai, bi and ci are dimensionless. The unit of parameters: αi is volume [L3]. 
First, a uniform value of βi is established and the EAs are set as “reactive agents.”  
The left column of Figure 4.3 shows the benefits of individual agents with an increasing 
βi from 0 to 20.  The right column summarizes the system benefit and system violation 
for the entire watershed.  The value of βi has no effect on the agents’ benefits under the 
high flow scenario (Figure 4.3a).  The human agents’ benefits are all at the optimum 
value under any of the βi values.  Since the benefits of individual agents do not change 
with βi, the system benefit will not change either, and the system violation is zero. 
The influence of βi values can be seen in the medium flow scenario (Figure 4.3b).  
When βi increases, the benefits for OHA1 and IHA1 remain constant because the inflow in 
the mainstream is sufficient for the two agents to achieve their optimums.  The benefits 
for OHA2 and OHA3 increase with βi, indicating that these two OHAs are withdrawing an 
increasingly greater volume of water.  The benefits will increase to optimum value when 
βi increases to a certain level, which is consistent with the analytical result [equations 
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(4.28) through (4.30)].  Consequently, the benefits for the ecosystem agents (EA1 and 
EA2) decrease when OHAs withdraw more water from the river.  Note that changing βi 
has no effect on reactive ecosystem agents, because the benefits of EAs fully depend on 
the upstream connected OHAs.  The system benefit under this situation decreases with 
βi, which means that gains for the OHAs are less than the losses from the EAs when βi 
increases.  The system violation is zero when βi equals zero and the violation increases 
as βi increases. When OHA2 and OHA3 achieve their optimums and βi reaches a certain 
level, both the system benefit and violation become constant. 
Under the low flow scenario, all human agents’ benefits increase with βi.  Note 
that these are hypothetical benefits.  When agents are allowed to violate the hard 
constraints such as water balance, water that is unavailable in the current physical system 
is taken into account for the benefit increase.  When human agents are aggressive, the 
benefits of EAs decrease dramatically as in Figure 4.3c.  The benefits of EA1 and EA2 
settle at a negative value due to the excessive water withdrawal by OHA2 and OHA3.  
The system-wide figure shows a similar pattern as the medium flow scenario.  However, 
one difference is that even if βi is equal to zero, constraint violations still exist because 
there is insufficient water for the system.  Another difference is that both system 
violation increases and system benefit decreases are faster with the low flow scenario 
than the medium flow scenario.  Thus, under the low flow scenario, any aggressive 
action by a human agent will cause greater damage to the system. 
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Figure 4.3. Agent benefit versus βi when βi is uniform for all agents and ecosystem agents 
are reactive: (a) high flow, (b) medium flow, and (c) low flow 
Figure 4.4 shows the results that occur if EAs are treated as “active agents.”  The 
major difference from the results discussed above is that the system benefit and violations 
continue to increase with βi under all of the flow scenarios.  This occurs because EAs are 
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assumed to act like human agents and they may use water as much as desired.  However, 
the system violation is much higher than the case in which EAs are treated as “reactive 
agents.”  With the increase of βi, the water balance (inflow=outflow) will be violated 
and the deficit becomes increasingly larger. Most of the violations result from the water 
balance constraints of EA1 and EA2.  Under the high flow scenario, the benefits of 
OHA1 and OHA2 always stay at the optimum level.  The benefit of OHA3 fluctuates 
slightly with βi because the value is affected by the upstream agents (IHA1 and EA1, not 
OHA2 in this scenario). 
The medium flow scenario produced similar results as the high flow scenario.  
However, when βi is small (e.g., βi ≤ 10), human agents gain some benefits from the 
increasing βi till they reach the optimum.  This shows that these agents need to be more 
“aggressive” (with larger βi) to reach their individual optima when water is limited.  
This tendency is even greater under the low flow scenario.  Although Figure 4.4(b) does 
not show that the benefits for EAs reach the optimum, they are supposed to do that when 
βi reaches a sufficiently large value. 
Under the low flow scenario, the benefits of all agents increase when βi ≤ 20.  
Again, these are hypothetical benefits.  Consequently, the increasing of system violation 
is contributed from all types of constraint violations, such as the water balance constraints 
of the ecosystem agents and the downstream water requirement constraints set for the 
human agents.  The magnitude of the system violation is the largest among the three 
flow scenarios. 
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Figure 4.4. Agent benefit versus βi when βi is uniform for all agents and ecosystem agents 
are active: (a) high flow, (b) medium flow, and (c) low flow 
In this numerical model, flows are treated as incoming resources, and the relative 
self-interest (aggression) of an agent’s behavior is represented by βi.  It is expected that 
agent behavior will differ when different amounts of water are available, resulting in 
differences in the overall system’s performance.  A three-dimensional figure given in 
Figure 4.5 shows a complete picture of the reciprocal effect of βi and inflow on system 
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benefit and violation.  Figures 4.5(a) and (b) reflect the change in human agent benefit 
and system violations with βi and inflow.  Note that the axis orders are different in 
Figure 4.5(a) and (b) to clearly show the shapes of two “surfaces.”  As can be seen in 
Figure 4.5(a), the value of βi affects the rate of change of human benefits with inflow.  
When βi=0, the benefit increases with inflow, while the system violation is zero when 
inflow is greater than 45 while it becomes increasingly greater as inflow decreases below 
45.  It can also be seen that when inflow is greater than 110, the change in βi does not 
affect the benefit or the violation, since all human agents can achieve their individual 
optima. 
The two “surfaces” shown in Figure 4.5 represent the benefits and violations 
under all different agents’ behavior and available resources (which is system-wide 
incoming streamflow in this case).  Using these two “surfaces,” one can identify 
different levels of human agent benefit and system violation under different combinations 
of βi and inflows.  For example, when inflow is between 40 and 60 units, a βi value 
greater than 15 will no longer affect the system benefit;  the system benefit is sensitive 
to βi when the value is between 0 and 20 under all inflow levels (as shown by the steep 
slope).  Thus, using this figure one can examine the various agent behaviors and the 
corresponding system’s performance under different levels water availability, as 
discussed further in the following section. 
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Figure 4.5.  The reciprocal effect of agents’ behavior, water availability and the local 
interest factor (βi): (a) benefit of human agents; (b) violation with human 
agents. 
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4.4. Discussions  
The results from the MAS model are compared to the conventional optimization 
model described in equations (4.18) and (4.19). The upstream and downstream 
interactions addressed with various βi values for different agents will also be discussed to 
illustrate their effects on both particular agents and the entire system. 
4.4.1. Comparison between the centralized and decentralized optimization 
models  
Although a feasible solution of the centralized optimization model meets all of the 
constraints while the decentralized optimization solution allows constraint violation, the 
system benefit for all agents using the centralized model is higher than the one obtained 
from the decentralized model under the high and medium flow scenarios (note that the 
centralized model ends with an infeasible solution for the low flow scenario).  Figure 
4.6 compares the difference of agents’ and system benefit between the centralized 
optimization results and the closest results from the decentralized model.  Both models 
take a medium flow scenario, and the decentralized model assumes active ecosystem 
agents. 
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Figure 4.6. Comparison of benefits obtained from the centralized solution and 
decentralized solution (βi=3). The system benefits from the centralized and 
decentralized solution are both 239.5 but the decentralized solution is 
subject to constraint violation. 
The differences of centralized and decentralized results can be explained as 
follows.  First of all, there is a set of βi values which, in theory, will make the MAS 
solution identical to the solution from the centralized model, although I could not 
identified that set of βi from the numerical example, which makes the two solution 
exactly identical.  Actually the centralized model solution represents an ideal, global 
optimization solution, which assumes complete information exchange among the agents 
and a consistent behavior to maximize the system benefit rather than itself.  While the 
decentralized model solution can be understood as a local one and the solutions reflect 
the behaviors of individual agents and the consequences.  For example, the benefit of 
upstream agent OHA2 is greater using the decentralized solution than it is with the 
centralized solution, while the results are opposite for downstream agents EA1 and EA2.  
The centralized optimal solution must have an equal marginal benefit for all agents, while 
the decentralized optimal solution must have lower marginal values for upstream agents 
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and higher marginal values for downstream agents.  Information exchange among 
agents and some regulations on the upstream-downstream relationships will change the 
solution from the decentralized model and can make it closer to that from the centralized 
model.  In real world watershed management, the mechanism to convey such 
information usually needs to be improved and more appropriate regulations are the 
targets for both policy and research communities.  
4.4.2. Agent behavior analysis by local interest factor 
A uniform value of βi is set for all agents in the previous analysis.  In this section, 
different values of βi are applied to individual agents located upstream and downstream 
of the watershed.  Using different values of βi can illustrate how the various individual 
agents’ behaviors affect the entire system. The analysis is limited to one flow scenario: 
Q1=25, Q2=18 and S=8, which represents a minor water shortage situation.  Several 
cases are discussed regarding the ways in which aggressive agents can affect other agents 
and the entire system.  In this analysis, positive values of βi are assigned to selected 
agents and while values of zero are assigned to the remaining agents.   
An additional metric, demand violation for OHAs, is defined here as the sum of 
the violations from the “minimum water demand” constraints established with only 
OHAs.  Note that the system violation is the sum of the violations of all constraints in 
the system.  In other words, the demand violation represents the impact of agent 
behaviors (by βi) on human society while the system violation on the entire watershed 
system includes violations from both human society and ecosystems. 
For the “reactive ecosystem agents” scenario, two different situations are 
discussed.   Under the first situation, as shown in Figure 4.7(a), the upstream OHAs 
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(OHA1 and OHA2) are aggressive and a positive value of β1 and β4 are assigned to these 
two agents.  OHA1’s benefit always stays at the optimum and OHA2’s benefit increases 
with β4 and, as a result, withdraws an increasingly greater volume of water.  However, 
the aggressive behavior reduces the amount of water flow downstream and causes a 
decrease of available water for the downstream OHA.  Therefore, OHA3’s benefit 
decreases.  OHA2’s benefit eventually reaches the optimum value when β4 is sufficiently 
large, and then all agents’ benefits stay constant.  The human benefit, as shown in Figure 
4.7(a), fluctuates due to the gain and loss of OHA2 and OHA3, and achieves its maximum 
value when βi = 5.  The demand violation continues to increase because OHA3 cannot 
withdraw enough water to satisfy its demand.  The second situation assumes the 
downstream OHA (OHA3) is aggressive, which is associated with increasing values of β6.  
As shown in Figure 4.7(b), when β6 increases, the benefit of OHA3 increases, and all 
upstream agents were unaffected because the system demonstrated here was an open-loop 
system and no feedback is provided from downstream agents to upstream agents.  The 
human benefit increases and the demand violation approaches zero when β6 =3. 
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Figure 4.7. The results from the scenarios with the various βi for (a) upstream OHAs and 
(b) downstream OHAs, assuming reactive ecosystem agents for all the 
scenarios 
Three different situations are discussed for the “active ecosystem agents” scenario.  
The benefits are aggregated by human agents, ecosystem agents and the entire system as 
shown in Figure 4.8.  The first situation presumes all human agents behave aggressively, 
as shown in Figure 4.8(a).  Thus, it is obvious that the benefits for human agents 
increase with βi and EA benefits decreases (the value of βi for EAs is zero).  The system 
benefit slightly increases and then asymptotes at a constant.  Demand violation 
approaches zero because sufficient water can be withdrawn to satisfy the demand 
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constraints, but system violation continues to increase due to the flow requirement of EAs 
and the water balance with IHA1 are violated.   
 
Figure 4.8. The results from the scenarios with the various βi for (a) all human agents, (b) 
all ecosystem agents and (c) instream human agents, assuming active 
ecosystem agents for all the scenarios 
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In the second situation, the two EAs are aggressive and possess increasing values 
of βi.  Figure 4.8(b) shows that the benefits of the EAs increase as predicted, and that the 
human agent benefits also increase.  This occurs because when the availability of water 
for instream uses is greater for EA1, there is a larger release of water downstream and an 
increased volume of water available for both OHA3 and EA2.  The magnitude of system 
violation is smaller than it is with the first hypothetical situation because water balance 
violations occur only with EAs, while all other constraints are satisfied.  In this 
particular case, the active behaviors of ecosystem agents are even beneficial to the entire 
system. 
The third situation, illustrated in Figure 4.8(c), establishes IHA1 as an aggressive 
agent.  When IHA1 releases more water to downstream, both OHA3 and EA2 benefit 
from the release.  Therefore, both human and ecosystem benefits slightly increase.  On 
the other hand, the demand violation (resulting from OHA3) decreases.  The change in 
the system violation is worthy of attention, as it decreases first and then increases with β2. 
With the adjusted scale of the violation, the results are shown in Figure 4.9.  
When β2 increases to β*(β*=9 for this example), the system violation decreases.  This 
change occurs because, when IHA1 requires a release of a volume that exceeds what is 
available, the water balance violation with IHA1 increases. However, if the IHA1 
requirement is achieved, OHA3 and EA2 can obtain more water from upstream, which 
will decrease their demand violation.  These increases and decreases of violations result 
in the decrease of the system violation until β2 reaches β*.  After that, OHA3 and EA2 
reach their optimal solutions and their demand violation stays at zero.  However, the 
water balance violation of IHA1 continues to increase, which increases the system 
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violation when β2 > β*.  This can be seen in Figure 4.10 where IHA1 has a continuous 
increasing violation and OHA3 and EA2 have a decreasing violation, which results in a 
“V” shape of the system violation. 
 
Figure 4.9. System violation with the various βi for: (a) IHA1 and (b) IHA1 and EA1, 
assuming active ecosystem agents 
 
Figure 4.10. System violation and constraint violation of upstream IHA1and downstream 
EA2 and OHA, with changing βi for IHA1 
Thus, the value of β* represents a minimum level of system violation.  The value 
of β* depends on the amount of water released to the downstream.  Figure 4.9(b) shows 
an additional case in which IHA1 and EA1 increase β values, which increases the amount 
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of water both agents release downstream.  As shown in Figure 4.9, the value of β* under 
this situation is only 2 as compared to 9 in the previous one.  This is intuitive since, if 
upland instream agents release relatively large amount of water, there will be more 
opportunities for downstream agents to obtain more water.  It should be noted that the 
upstream and downstream relationships are also affected by the seasonal timing of water 
demands in the real world.  For example, upstream reservoirs release water in winter for 
hydropower generation but this release will not be useful for downstream irrigators unless 
it is stored in another reservoir downstream.  In this analysis, I do not consider the 
complexity of the timing of water uses. 
In multi-objective analyses, different weights are usually used to represents the 
preference of different objectives.  The local interest factor (βi) and weights can be 
easily confused.  Actually, βi can be understood as the preferences that reflect how 
individual agents consider the system preferences when they approach the optimum at the 
local level.  The following section provides a further discussion that interprets of 
socioeconomic significance of different βi values.  
4.4.3. Socioeconomic meanings for local interest factor and violation 
From the mathematical perspective, the local interest factor (βi) indicates “how 
far” the agents can explore their solutions within the infeasible region (Figure 4.2).  In 
this section, I discuss some social and economic implications of this parameter and the 
constraint violation with reference to real world watershed management problems.  First, 
as previously stated, βi is a measurement of an agent’s behavior.  An agent with a large 
βi value is selfish, which means it puts a high priority on the agent’s benefit and ignores 
the requirements of other agents while an agent is altruistic if its βi value approaches zero, 
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which means it will satisfy the constraints as much as possible. 
Given values of βi that represent the behavior of individual agents, the 
decentralized optimization as presented in this chapter starts from the local optimal 
solution and then assesses the system violation as an indicator of the system performance.  
Assuming that some entity is interested in evaluating the quality of a watershed’s overall 
management, the system performance indicator is useful information.  Thus, 
decentralized optimization may be used to analyze bottom-up watershed management, 
which allows agents to bargain at the local scale with one another to achieve their own 
optimum while centralized optimization usually supports the top-down management.  
Theoretically, the system performance (for example the system benefit accrued by all 
agents) from the centralized optimization will be superior to that from the decentralized 
optimization since the former assumes full information exchange among all agents in the 
system and perfect realization of economic efficiency (i.e., all agents have the same 
marginal benefit). 
However, the penalty-based modeling framework allows the existence of 
constraint violations so that individual agents can approach optimum in the infeasible 
solution space.  Thus, the system benefit can extend beyond the benefit obtained using 
centralized optimization, i.e., the ideal benefit subject to all constraints.  Of course, 
constraint violations will occur for this to be achieved.  The sources of the violation are 
a major concern.  As discussed earlier, the constraints are classified as hard constraints 
and soft constraints.  Hard constraints consist of physically unobtainable values, dealing 
with matters such as water balance, reservoir storage and the capacity of pumps used to 
withdraw water, while soft constraints are related to policies or rules, such as the 
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minimum water demand for a particular agent.  The violation of hard constraints means 
the amount of water demand over water availability within a watershed may be 
accomplished through trans-boundary transfers and water supply capacity can be 
enlarged by new investments in infrastructure.  With high βi values, aggressive agents 
try to achieve the optimum assuming that sufficient water is available, which can end 
with both large system benefits and large system violations.  Using the flow setting 
defined in Section 4.2 (Q1=25, Q2=15, S=8), the results of two scenarios are compared in 
Figure 4.11, i.e., only soft constraints being violated (Figure 4.11a) vs. both hard and soft 
constraints being violated (Figure 4.11b).   For the upstream agents (OHA1 and OHA2), 
who first access the water, their benefits are the same from the two scenarios, while for 
the downstream agents (IHA1 and EA1), differences exist between the two scenarios.  
For the scenario that allows the violation of soft constraints only, the downstream agents 
act more like reactive agents.  This is the reason why when instream agents IHA1 and 
EA1 increase βi, there is no effect on the system.  OHA3, a downstream human agent, 
will also be affected by OHA1 and OHA2.  As can be seen, OHA3, has to be more 
aggressive to reach its optimum (i.e., using larger βi, βi=10 in Figure 4.11a vs. βi< 10 in 
Figure 4.11b).  EA2 suffers the largest change between the two scenarios because it is 
located in the most downstream part of the hypothetical watershed.  Therefore, the 
scenario that allows the violation of hard constraints represents a more active role for 
downstream agents and can then provide a broader policy options for watershed 
management, as discussed earlier. 
Different βi values result in different system violations which can be useful in 
several aspects.  First, watershed coordinators can use these findings to recommend or 
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require agents to adjust their behavior (by changing βi values) to achieve a minimize 
system violations.  This is demonstrated in Figure 4.9 in which the value of βi (β*) at 
which the minimal system violation occurs is identified.  An ideal situation occurs when 
different values of βi are identified for different agents so that the system violation is 
reduced to zero while all agents are satisfied with their own behavior.  To make such a 
situation possible, local scale bargaining among agents as well as system-wide 
coordination is needed.  Nonetheless, it can be realistic for watershed coordinators to 
use the system violation, together with the expected behavior of all agents, as a tool for 
the coordination and negotiation of watershed-wide water allocations. 
 
Figure 4.11. The difference of constraint violations under two scenarios (a) only soft 
constraints can be violated; (b) both hard and soft constraints can be 
violated. 
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Second, for planning purposes, the hard constraints violation can be interpreted as 
the amount of water imported into the system.  For short-term management purposes, 
however, it is necessary to distinguish hard and soft constraints since hard constraints 
must be satisfied.  The violation of soft constraints can either be explained as the 
additional water needed to realize the expected agent benefits, or as an indicator of agent 
behavior adjustment (to make the violation zero).  İnalhan et al. [2002] considered a 
concept of “ε-optimality” and proved that when βi approaches β*, the distance between 
the decision (xi) and the optimal decision (xi*) is less than a magnitude of ε.  In other 
words, the decision can be modified by only a magnitude of ε in order to satisfy all the 
constraints.  The socioeconomic meaning for ε>0 refers to the level of tolerance of the 
violation.  The decision makers need to set the value of ε to indicate the constraint 
violation that the system can tolerate. 
4.4.4. Demonstration of a bargaining process  
I extend the decentralized framework to incorporate a bargaining process that 
simulates the interactions among agents.  Some pre-defined rules are set up first for the 
bargaining process. Two driving forces are identified for agents’ behaviors, which are 
reflected by the choice of β values in this study, 1) agent’s own benefit and 2) other 
agents’ behaviors.  Correspondingly, two rules are defined to simulate how the ith agent 
will react if the change of βi can improve its own benefit (Rule 1) and if the jth agent 
changes its βj value (Rule 2).  I also assume that all agents put higher priority on Rule 1 
than Rule 2, i.e., when the ith agent realizes that increasing βi can improve its own benefit, 
it may not pay much attention on other agents’ behaviors.  Based on the two rules, a 
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pseudocode is given in Figure 4.12 (a).  Actions used in the pseudocode are agents’ 
choices on the value of β under the different rules. 
  The rules and actions can be defined in various forms based on various knowledge 
of agent behaviors.  Watershed management regulations can be defined as rules if 
appropriate.  Here   I test one set of rules and actions for the demonstration purpose.  
It is assumed that agents try to pursue optimum under a constraint violation threshold, 
e.g., ε = 1% of total inflow; and the agent behaviors follow the concept of "equivalent 
retaliation" ("tit for tat"), i.e., agents using this strategy will respond in kind to an 
opponent's previous action.  Following these assumptions, the pseudocode can be 
specified as shown in Figure 4.12 (b). 
According to Figure 4.12 (b), when the ith agent realizes an increase of βi can 
increase fi and the system violation has not yet reached the tolerance (ε), it will increase βi 
with a given increment (Δβ); otherwise, it will check if the β values of all other agents are 
changed since the past iteration.  If all others use the same β value, ith agent will adopt 
the value; otherwise, it will match the maximum β value over other agents.  The 
computation will converge when no agent can or want to change β values.  Figure 4.13 
presents the results of the bargaining process under the medium flow condition used in 
Section 3 (Q1=35, Q2=20 and S=8).  Figure 4.13(a) shows the change of β values for 
each agent at each iteration.  The result indicates that OHA1 stops increasing β at 
iteration 4 and IHA1 does that at iteration 5 by following Rule 1, i.e., further increasing β 
does not lead to the increase of their benefits any more.  However, OHA1 and IHA1 
continually increase their β values by Rule 2 because other agents try to increase β values 
up to iteration 14, where the system violation is larger than 1% of the total inflow.  The 
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final equilibrium result is achieved at iteration 13, where all agents adopt the same value 
of β (β =0.11).  The result follows the principle of Nash bargaining solution, 
representing a widely accepted mechanism for agents to share resources in a negotiation 
context [Nash, 1950].  Figure 4.13(b) displays the corresponding agents’ benefits at each 
iteration.  All agents’ benefits increase with increasing β values, and system benefit and 
violation increase along the iterations (Figure 4.13c).  This example implies that under 
the given rules, agents try to achieve local benefits equally, which may end with equal 
contribution to the system violation, i.e., all agents end with the same local interest factor 
(β).  
 The bargaining processes that are more complex than the simple demonstration can 
be implemented by the so-called role-playing games (RPGs) applied together with 
computerized agent-based models (CABMs) [Bousquet et al., 2002].  Some ABMs 
conduct the analysis using computer tools, which are often perceived by stakeholders as 
black boxes. Thus the issue of legitimacy and acceptability was raised [Barreteau and 
Abrami, 2007].  RPGs are supposed to resolve the issue by involving the stakeholders in 
the modeling processes, supporting collective decision processes and training agents.  
RPGs are labor-intensive to design, and repetition of experiments are, at the least, 
difficult with a control of parameters [Piveteau, 1995 cited from Barreteau and Abrami, 
2007].  The joint use of RPGs and ABMs can be beneficial to each other by utilizing 
RPGs to make the modeling analysis more apparent to stakeholders, and ABMs to 
simulate and repeat the numerous game sessions [Barreteau et al., 2001].  Agent-based 
computational modeling or CABM will provide computational support for the integration 
of RPGs and ABMs including algorithm, software, and man-machine interface.  
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Figure 4.12. The pseudocode with pre-defined rules and actions (a) a general form, (b) an 
example for the demonstration of the bargaining process 
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Figure 4.13. The bargaining process demonstration, the trajectory of (a) β values, (b) 
agents benefits, and (c) system benefits and violations. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
Developing better decision-support tools for allocating water between human 
society and ecosystems has become an important task for water resources researchers and 
managers.  Due to the spatial complexity involved with this task, dividing the watershed 
into interconnected subsystems (agents) should be a more realistic approach for analyzing 
watershed management problems.  Under the MAS framework, both individual agents’ 
objectives and the interconnection among these objectives would guide the resource 
allocation.  
A penalty-based method proposed by İnalhan et al. [2002] was used to solve the 
mathematical problem of the agents.  By introducing the local interest factor (βi), this 
method allows agents to search for the solution in the infeasible solution space when 
system-wide constraints are violated.  The value of βi reflects “how far” this search can 
extend inside the infeasible region.  The use of βi values enables the analysis of a water 
resource management problem to include the impact of the various agent behaviors that 
the βi values reflect.  Aggressive agents with large βi values affect other agents, 
particularly the reactive ecosystem agents, and even the entire system.  In general, the 
system benefit and violation increases with increasing βi.  Moreover, treating the 
ecological agents as active or reactive agents will largely affect the agents’ benefits and 
the system performance such as system benefit and system violation.  Future research is 
needed to understand information exchange among agents and between agents and the 
entire system. 
It should be noted that a solution with a certain level of system violation does not 
necessarily represent an infeasible solution in the real world.  On the contrary, the 
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solution may imply reasonable or necessary changes to the constraints that represent 
either policies or physical settings of a watershed management problem.  System 
violation may be used as an indicator that guides agents’ behavioral adjustments.  
Therefore, this proposed approach can represent a real world watershed management 
problem that usually needs to balance the requests from multiple agents, particularly in 
the context of bottom-up problem-solving. 
The computerized bargaining procedure presented in the discussion section 
demonstrates how the interactions among agents can be incorporated into the 
decentralized modeling framework.  Through the choice of βi, information exchange and 
coordination among agents regarding benefits and penalties is implemented with the 
hypothetical case study.   
Appendix: Terminology  
Benefit 
Agent’s benefit – the economic profit that agent can acquire 
Agent’s optimum – the maximal economic profit that agent can acquire 
Human agent benefit – the sum of human agents’ benefit 
Eco agent benefit – the sum of ecosystem agents’ benefit 
System benefit – the sum of all agents’ benefit 
Violation 
Constraint violation – the magnitude of violation with individual constraints  
Demand Violation – the sum of constraint violation from offstream human agents’ 
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water demand constraints.  
System violation – the sum of constraint violation from all agents 
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CHAPTER 5. A MULTI-AGENT SYSTEM MODEL FOR WATER 
ALLOCATION MANAGEMENT IN THE YELLOW RIVER BASIN  
Summary 
The management of large river basins such as the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China is 
complicated by distributed, local decision processes, as well as mechanisms that 
coordinate individual decisions and manage basin-level issues.  The Yellow River 
Conservancy Commission (YRCC) has implemented a water allocation management plan, 
namely Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR), since 1998, as a centralized controlling 
mechanism that enforces an upper limit of water withdrawals (water permits) for eight 
provinces located in the basin.  The realization of UWFR has maintained a prescribed 
minimum flow in the downstream channel and avoided the flow cut off events occurring 
every year during 1972-1998.   In the context of the regulation plan, this study attempts 
to explore the socioeconomic and environmental consequences of the regulation, 
understand the behaviors of the water users, and test alternative management plans to 
improve water allocation management in the basin.  To address these objectives, a 
multi-agent system (MAS) based model is developed for the YRB by defining water 
users, reservoirs and downstream ecological zones as agents.  The MAS model depicts 
agents’ autonomy in water use decisions and interactions among the agents in the context 
of a water right and market system.  A decentralized optimization algorithm was 
extended to determine local water prices as an incentive to influence agents’ decision 
toward the basin-level policy targets. The proposed water market scenario shows possible 
improvements of the UWFR with respect to social (equity), economic and environmental 
objectives.  
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5.1. Introduction 
Human activities have heavily affected the ecological integrity in most river 
basins in the world.  To identify a proper water allocation management plan between 
human and nature, as well as between upstream and downstream users, in a basin context 
is one of the issues for integrated water resource management (IWRM).  Both 
off-stream human water uses (e.g., irrigation and water supply) and instream water uses 
(e.g., hydropower generation and recreation) affect the temporal and spatial flow 
characteristics that are important to maintain ecosystem habitats.  The basin context 
presents spatial heterogeneity in water availability, water demand, and water use 
efficiency along the main channel and the tributaries, and over different management 
zones such as irrigation districts, urban water systems, wetlands, costal zones, etc.  The 
spatial heterogeneity in conjunction with the temporal hydro-climatic variability 
complicates the water allocation issues, which requires an effective model to support 
water allocation decisions in heavily developed river basins. 
Centralized and decentralized models have been used to analyze water allocation 
management.  Centralized models usually assume a top-down management process, 
complete information exchange among the stakeholders and perfect economic efficiency 
is realized.  These assumptions are usually unsuitable in real-world watershed 
management situations.  Decentralized modeling approaches are at least partially free of 
those assumptions.  Nowadays, there is an increasing attention on root-level benefits in 
the context of IWRM.  Scott and Banister [2008] suggested that a social dialogue 
process to communicate with water users.  Ryu et al. [2009] called for a negotiation 
procedure by which alternative solutions can be identified and evaluated with 
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participation of all stakeholders.  Decentralized models simulate and analyze bottom-up 
management activities by depicting a more realistic institution framework and providing 
more realistic solutions for policy making [Yang et al., 2009]. 
Besides the traditional top-down intuitional setting, previous data collection and 
model solution techniques also make centralized methods more popular  For example, 
water use data have been collected and aggregated at the county or state level or province 
level; regulations on water allocation are specified at the same level.  On the side of 
modeling techniques, the widely used mathematical programming models such as 
linear/nonlinear programming are easy to optimize a single or multiple objectives 
aggregated at the system level, while it is difficult to explicitly formulate the interactions 
between sub-systems.  The real-world water management system can be better described 
as an integrated top-down and bottom-up structure, which forms a complex system that 
requires the depiction of interactions between the various entities.  As argued by Perry 
and Easter [2004], a conflicting paradigm seems to exist: on one hand, data and 
traditional optimization approaches are suitable for analyzing centralized institutions; on 
the other hand, the real-world decision making processes tend to be localized and 
site-specific.  Perry and Easter (2004) then proposed new institutional arrangements to 
supportt effective decentralized watershed management.  Surridge and Harris [2007] 
also discussed to what extent science and mathematical methods can support the 
implementation of water allocation management with the consideration of local interests  
It is also worthwhile to note that solutions from centralized models are often ideal but not 
realistic.   Yang et al. [2009] compared a centralized and a decentralized model applied 
to water allocation issues in a hypothetical watershed.  The solution from the 
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decentralized model is as good as that from the centralized model if and only if some 
constraints interconnecting different users are violated. 
This study extends the management modeling framework provided by Yang et al. 
[2009] from a hypothetical watershed to a real-world river basin.  A watershed or basin 
is modeled as a multiple agent system (MAS).  Local water users with different interests 
are defined as agents that include offstream water users and instream water “users,” such 
as reservoirs and riparian aquatic ecosystems.  Stakeholders participation connects the 
computational units with human agents [Drougoul et al. 2003], including land owners, 
facility managers and representatives for land and water use agents.  In this context, a 
river basin is formulated as a self-organizing system characterized by disaggregated but 
interactive decision processes at the agent level, with a coordination mechanism leading 
to the interactions among individual decision processes.   
The MAS modeling framework is applied to the Yellow River Basin (YRB) in 
China, which is of the utmost importance for China in terms of food production, natural 
resources management, and socioeconomic development.  Water withdrawals for 
agriculture, industry and households in the past decade have seriously depleted 
environmental and ecological water requirements in the basin.  In recent years, the 
government of China has been promoting the coordination among stakeholders over the 
whole basin, particularly between water users in the upstream region and those in the 
middle and downstream regions, and between human communities and ecosystems.  A 
MAS-based basin model will be useful for not only understanding the socioeconomic and 
environmental consequences of existing water allocation policies and but also exploring 
new policy options, such as local water price setting and water trade. 
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 Moreover, from the methodology perspective, this paper will extend the 
decentralized optimization algorithm provided by Yang et al. [2009].  The algorithm 
coordinates the optimization of all agents’ objectives based on agents’ selected local 
interest factors, which in general reflects the priority to agents’ objectives in comparison 
to system level feasibility.  In the current study, the MAS simulates the interactions 
among agents underlying a market mechanism, and the general concept of local interest 
factors employed in the objective function of individual agents will be specified by 
heterogeneous local water prices to be derived from the market equilibrium solution.  
Thus, economic incentives will be used to guide individual decision making toward basin 
-level social and environmental targets. 
In the rest of this chapter, the methodology that applied in this study will be 
described in section 2, the background information of the YRB and agents definition are 
given in section 3.  Different management policies are defined as scenarios in section 4.  
Modeling results, discussion and conclusion are given in section 5, 6 and 7, respectively. 
5.2. Methodology 
 Traditionally, water resources allocation analysis has treated the entire watershed 
as a single system and water uses for all users (agents) are defined as a decision variable 
in a consistent mathematical programming model.  As mentioned above, the results 
obtained from such a model might be far away from the reality when water uses with 
different users are actually determined by individual agents rather than a central authority.  
From the perspective of model solution, the centralized model can be difficult to solve if 
the number of decision variables is large and particularly when the model involves 
nonlinear relationships.  In the following section, an MAS modeling framework is 
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applied to simulating the water user system of a river basin.  Following that, the 
extension of the decentralized optimization algorithm [Yang et al., 2009] is described as a 
tool to solve the MAS.  
5.2.1. Multi-Agent System Modeling Framework 
The theory of MAS has emerged from computer science theories associated with 
distributed artificial intelligence [Sycara, 1998].  An agent is defined as an autonomous 
unit within a system that interacts with others and characterized by behavioral rules.  In 
a watershed MAS, water users are defined as agents.  This utilization of water for the ith 
agent is affected by the behaviors of its connected neighbors and also limited by physical 
conditions and political regulations.  The MAS model depicts the water management 
institution more realistically than a conventional centralized model which assumes a 
“super hand” controlling not only system-level decisions but also the decisions of 
individual water users or stakeholders. 
Following the originally development of İnalhan et al. [2002], Yang et al. [2009] 
presented a decentralized optimization algorithm to implement the MAS model for basin 
water allocation management.  The formulation of the agent model is given as:  
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where xi, is the decision variable, fi(xi) is the benefit, gli(xi) is the local constraint and  
ggi(xi|{xj}i) is the interconnecting constraint of agent i.  An interconnecting constraint 
specifies that agent i receives the value of {xj}i from its neighbor (agent j) and needs to 
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accept the value.  In the watershed MAS framework, both physical and political 
restraints can be defined as local and interconnecting constraints.   
For water allocation management, Yang et al. [2009] modified the original model 
(Equations 1 and 2) to: 
{ } { }{ })()(max),(max
ijiiiiiijiii
xxVxfxxF −⋅= ββ    (5.3) 
where βi>0 is a local interest factor.  A larger βi will result in a larger fi.  According to 
the proof by İnalhan et al. [2002], a larger βi will also lead to a larger penalty item, Vi.  
This scheme allows each agent to use βi selection as a tool to search for a solution which 
increases agent’s benefit (fi) as much as possible while violating fewer interconnecting 
constraints. 
This algorithm allows each agent to maintain its own decision framework that 
captures only the local benefits and the interconnecting constraints associated with these 
benefits.  The method achieves optimization among agents with a bargaining scheme, in 
which the ith agent optimizes its objective with a selected priority for collaboration (the 
value of βi) and sends the solution back to all other agents with which it interacts.  All 
agents do this simultaneously, and their solutions are evaluated together by a “central 
processor,” from which information, such as system cost and the degree of constraint 
violation, is available to all agents for the next round of bargaining.  The method is 
based on a formula that allows agents to deal with infeasible constraints which are 
imposed by different subsystems.  The method uses a two-step approach – first finding 
out a solution based on the choices of all individual agents, allowing the violation of 
some constraints defined with the optimization models for individual agents, and then 
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trying to reduce the constraint violation at the system level.  This follows the bottom-up 
problem-solving procedures, in which individual agents make decisions and interact with 
other agents, and different management mechanisms can be tested to coordinate the 
decisions of different agents.  Details on this algorithm refer to Yang et al. [2009]. 
5.2.2. Extension of the Distributed Optimization Algorithm  
 In this study we reformulate the agent model in the context of water right and 
water market [Zhao et al., 2010] assuming that water rights for agents are established and 
a market exists for water trade.  Equation 5.3 is rewritten as:  
{ })()(max),(max iiiiiiiii wxpxfwpxF −−=     (5.4) 
where pi > 0 is defined as the local water price used by agent i and wi as the water right or 
water use permit for agent i.  Under this setting, when xi-wi≠0, the amount of water right 
exchange for agent i, is analogy to the violation of local constraint (Equation 5.3); when 
xi < wi, “- pi (xi-wi)” is positive, which means agent i uses less water than it is entitled.  
Therefore, “- pi (xi-wi)” represents the benefit of water selling; when xi > wi, “- pi (xi-wi),” 
is negative and can be interpolated as the cost of water buying for agent i.  Applying the 
first-order condition to Equation 5.4, we have: 
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By Equation (5.5), conceptually every agent attempts to make its marginal value with 
respect to water equal to the water price established to the agent.  The relationship 
between xi and pi, which is the demand function of water, can be plotted as shown in the 
right-hand side of Figure 1.  The solution algorithm starts from a uniform, high water 
price (pinitial in Figure 5.1) for all agents. This price is not realistic since 
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)()( iiiii xfwxp ≥−−  and all agents will choose to sell water and end with xi = 0 for all 
agents.  When price is high, Σxi<Σwi at system level.  On the other hand, when price is 
too low, agents may choose to buy water rather than selling water, which may cause the 
violation of the physical constraint , i.e., Σxi>Σwi.  This is not realistic either.   In the 
real world, it is expected that the amount of water sold equals the amount of water bought, 
i.e., the sum of the final water uses equals to the sum of the total water rights, Σxi=Σwi.  
Thus we use Σxi=Σwi as a criterion to search for an equilibrium price.   Starting from a 
high price, the algorithm reduces the price gradually till Σxi=Σwi. 
This process is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  When the equilibrium water price (pi* in 
Figure 5.1 left-hand side) is reached for agent i, if the corresponding water use (xi*) is 
lower than the water permit (wi), agent i is a water seller in the system (as displayed in 
Figure 5.1 right-hand side, the water selling case); while if xi*>wi, agent i is a water buyer 
in the system (Figure 1, right-hand side, the water buying case).  Such an equilibrium 
price is found for each agent, at which the agent’s marginal benefit equals to the price.  
It should be noted that the equilibrium prices are heterogeneous over agents and over 
time periods, which is due to the spatiotemporal heterogeneity of natural conditions such 
as climate and soil and anthropogenic conditions such as engineering facilities and 
institutions. As suggested by Perry and Easter [2004], the local water price, as an 
economic incentive can be constructed to guide decentralized water resources 
management, which is expected to “give local decision makers, community organization 
and user group incentives to take into account the external downstream impact of their 
decision.” [Perry and Easter 2004]. 
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Figure 5.1. The convergence of local water price and the consequent agents’ water 
consumption.  
Actually the definition of local water price (pi) in Equation 5.4 can be related to 
the local interest factor (βi) defined in Equation 5.3. Comparing the two equations, we 
have pi~1/βi.  A large pi means that water is insufficient in an area and the marginal 
benefit is high; correspondingly βi is small, implying that the constraints on agents’ 
decisions are tight, i.e., there is limited space to seek local interests by individual agents.  
With a low water price, agents should have some space to achieve high a local benefit 
with a large local interest factor (βi).  Under this condition, agents buy water from the 
market and their water uses are higher than water use entitlements, which is analogy to 
the constraint violation situation under Equation 5.3. 
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5.3. Study Area and Agent Definition  
5.3.1. Water Allocation Management in Yellow River Basin  
The management of the YRB is critical for China’s agricultural production, natural 
resource reservation, and socioeconomic development.  The cultivated area in the basin 
is about 13% of the total in China, but the basin holds only 3% of the country’s water 
resources.  Over 50 cities located within the basin with a population over 60 million 
consume a significant amount of water for industrial and municipal purpose in the middle 
and lower reaches of the basin [Cai and Rosegrant, 2004].  The heterogeneous water 
demands and uneven spatial and temporal distribution of precipitation have been 
recognized as the causes of water stress in Northern China, where the YBR is located.   
The uneven distribution of rainfall results in the notorious flooding problem in the YRB 
for more than one thousand years.  Therefore, the water issues were historically treated 
as a physical problem focusing on flooding control.  When the economy in China was 
transferred to a market orientation after the 1980s, the focus has shifted to water 
resources management and allocation issues driven by economic development [Barnett et 
al., 2006]. 
More recently many studies have addressed water management in the YRB from 
an economic perspective, such as those on water rights [Wang et al., 2008; Shao et al., 
2009; Zhao et al., 2009] and on water prices [Huang et al., 2006; Wang et al., 2008].  An 
outstanding problem is the transfer of agricultural water uses in the middle stream areas 
such as the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region to 
municipal and industrial (M&I), which is located more in the downstream areas.   The 
irrigation districts in the middle stream use a large fraction of water with low water use 
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efficiency.  Water transfer becomes a critical issue for the economic development in the 
region [Cai, 2008].  Moreover, the environmental and ecological concerns such as waste 
dilution, water storage and sediment flashing have become the major focus recently.  
Researchers in China employed different methods to assess environmental flow 
requirements at ecologically sensitive locations along the River [Ni et al., 2002; Sun et al., 
2007; Yang et al., 2009; Cui et al., 2009 and Liu et al., 2009].  How to deal with the 
conflict between human water uses, particularly the agricultural water use, and 
environmental flow requirements has become a critical question for water allocation 
management in the YRB.  Cai and Rosegrant [2004] studied the tradeoff between 
environmental flow requirement and agricultural water use in the YRB.  Barnett et al. 
[2006] summarized ten key questions related to the balance of human and natural water 
needs in the YRB, such as, what is the best governance regime? What policy instruments 
should be used? What is the appropriate water price?  Using the MAS modeling 
framework, this study will address these questions.  A market-based water allocation 
scenario will be compared to the existing practice under a government regulation.   
5.3.2. Definition of Water Use Agents  
Using the border of provinces and the boundary of natural sub-basins, Zhao et al 
[2009] decomposed the entire YRB into a number of hydro-economic “units” as shown in 
Figure 5.2(a).  Each of these units is defined as an agent in this study, and totally 52 
water use agents are defined, as shown in Figure 5.2(b).  The attributes for the agents 
are described as follows.   The total available water for a unit includes three 
components, local surface water, groundwater (which was treated as a local “reservoir”) 
and upstream inflow.  Two sectors of water use, agricultural and municipal and 
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industrial (M&I) are differentiated.  The actual water use data for each sector and the 
corresponding gross domestic product (GDP) data were used to estimate the agent benefit 
function for the two sectors by month.  The benefit function uses monthly GDP as the 
dependent variable and monthly water consumption as the independent variable.  
Several assumptions are involved in the construction of the benefit functions, as stated in 
the following: 
1) All the benefits functions take a concave, quadratic form.   
2) The annual GDPM&I are evenly distributed into every month and the annual 
GDPAG are distributed into each month based on the monthly distribution of 
agricultural water use.  
3) M&I water use is given a higher priority than agricultural water use, which 
follows the general water use regulation in most regions of China.  
4) A time variable (T) is incorporated into the M&I benefit function to reflect the 
technology change over years (Cai and Rosegrant, 2002).  
5) Monthly precipitation (P) is an input in the agricultural benefit function.   
6) Groundwater will be used only if surface available water (local surface water plus 
upstream inflow) is insufficient to supply M&I water consumption. 
The format of M&I benefit function is given below with the constraints for agent 
i: 
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where xi is the water consumption, Li is local surface water, Ij is the inflow from upstream 
agent j and Gi is groundwater available for use.  The plus and minus sign means that 
groundwater could be pumped for use or be recharged from surface water surplus to 
groundwater (when surface available water is larger than M&I water consumption).  T is 
the technology index and year 2000 is set as the baseline year with T=100, MImax is the 
maximal M&I water consumption; A1i, B1i, C1i, and D1i are the coefficients for the 
quadratic format.  The non-linear regression method - least squares error method is used 
to estimate these four coefficients.  Since only seven years of water consumption and 
GDP data (1997 to 2003) are available for each agent, a calibration procedure is 
undertaken to adjust the value of A1i, B1i, C1i, and D1i to match the result of the baseline 
year. 
The agricultural benefit function of agent i is formulated as follows with the 
constraints: 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]iiiiiiAG PMIxBPMIxAGDP +−++−= max22max2   (5.8) 
 st. 
⎩⎨
⎧
≤+−
≤±−−
maxmax
0
AGPMIx
GILx
ii
ijii  
where AGmax is the maximal agriculture water requirement , xi-MImax is water left 
from M&I for agriculture, Pi is the rainfall available for agriculture, and A2i and B2i are 
the coefficients which are also subject to calibration.  By Equation 5.8, if no water 
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(either irrigation or rainfall) is available, GDPAG=0.The total benefit of a water use agent 
is the sum of GDPM&I and GDPAG.  These benefit functions remain unchanged for all 
scenarios tested in this study. 
 
Figure 5.2. (a) The unit of the Yellow River Basin; (b) Agent map of the Yellow River 
Basin- 52 general agents, 5 reservoir agents and 3 ecosystem agents.   
5.3.3. The Definition of Reservoir Agents  
There are more than three thousand reservoirs located in the Yellow River Basin.  
The total storage is up to 70 km3, which exceeds the total annual runoff, 58 km3 [Cai and 
(b) 
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Rosegrant, 2004].  In this study five key reservoirs from upstream to downstream, 
Longyangxia, Liujiaxia, Wanjiazhai, Sanmenxia and Xiaolangdi, are selected as reservoir 
agents.  The sum up storage for these key reservoirs is about 51 km3.  All these 
reservoirs have multiple purposes in reality such as water supply, flooding control and 
hydropower generation.  The actual operation for any of these reservoirs is very 
complex. To simplify the model without losing significance, the reservoir agents are 
defined based on two behavior rules, 1) following the pre-determined operation curve, 
and 2) maximizing hydropower generation.  Correspondingly, two objectives are 
defined for the reservoir agents: 
2)()(min iiiix Yxxfi
−=        (5.9)  
)()(max iiiix xHxxfi
Δ×=        (5.10)  
st. 
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xx
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     (5.11) 
where xi is the water release from reservoir agent i, Yi is the targeted water release 
specified bythe basin management agency.  ΔH(xi) is the difference of water head during 
this month, which is affected by storage change and water release; xMax is the water 
release capacity, SMax is the storage capacity, Ij is the inflow from an upstream agent  and 
Ei is the evaporation from the reservoir.  The two objectives expressed by Equations 5.9 
and 5.10, respectively, may not be consistent.  Following the current reservoir operation 
practices, the reservoir agent model tries to match the pre-determined operation curve by 
minimizing the objective function (Equation 9). When no regulation exists, the reservoir 
agents maximize the objective for hydropower generation (Equation 10). 
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5.3.4. The Definition of Ecosystem Agents  
Three ecosystem agents are defined near the delta area to address the ecological 
and environmental concerns.  Ecological and environmental flow requirements have 
been assessed by local scientists [e.g., Ni et al., 2002, Yang et al., 2009, Cui et al., 2009 
and Liu et al., 2009].  These studies considered different environmental functions of the 
streamflow and defined the requirement of environmental streamflow for flooding (July 
to October) and non-flooding period (November to June).  Yang et al. [2009] estimated 
the baseflow of different regions for these two periods.  In this study, the assessments 
from Ni et al. [2002] and Yang et al. [2009] are used to define the targeting flow for two 
ecosystem agents, Huayuankou and Gaocun.  For Lijin, which is close to the mouth of 
the river, the targeting flows follow the assessments of Cui et al. [2009] and Liu et al. 
[2009].  Cui et al. [2009] separated “fish breeding period” (April to June) from 
non-flooding period.  Liu et al. [2009] defined total ecological water requirement with 
consideration of wetland plants, freshwater fish community and bayou ecosystem.  The 
targeting flows for all the ecosystem agents in different time periods are provided in 
Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1. Targeting instream flow for ecosystem agents at different periods 
Agents Normal flow period(November-March) 
Fish breeding period 
(April-June) 
Flooding period 
(July-October) 
EA1(Huayuankou) 0.341 0.341 0.455 
EA2 (Gaocun) 0.277 0.277 0.397 
EA3 (Lijin) 0.363 2.581 0.850 
* unit: billion m3/month 
The benefit function and the constraint for ecosystem agents are given by 
Equation 5.12.  
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2)()(min iiiix EcoTxxfi
−=       (5.12)  
st. 0=− ji Ix  
where xi is the streamflow for agent i, EcoTi is ecological targeting flow and Ij is 
the water release from an upstream agent (j).  Thus ecosystem agents under this 
formulation will act as reactive agents in the system, i.e., water available to an ecosystem 
agent depends on upstream water users and ecosystem agents only react to the decisions 
of water use agents [Yang et al., 2009].   
5.4. Scenario Definitions  
Three scenarios are employed in this study to evaluate the consequences of 
different management mechanisms for the YRB: the de facto water allocation plan 
(baseline), a scenario without basin-wide regulation, and a scenario based on water 
market described in section 5.2.  Table 5.2 presents the agent model formulations for the 
three scenarios. 
Table 5.2. The different agent settings between three scenarios 
 UWFR Unmanaged Water Price 
General 
agents 
Water consumption 
is limited by physical 
constraint and water 
rights. 
Water consumption is 
only limited by 
physical constraint. 
Water consumption is 
limited by physical 
constraint but can 
greater than water 
rights. 
Reservoir 
agents 
Minimizing the 
difference between 
actual and targeting 
water release  
Maximizing the water 
release times water 
head difference 
Inactive 
Ecosystem 
agents Inactive Inactive 
Inactive, but using 
UWFR results as flow 
requirement 
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5.4.1. Current Water Allocation Plan  
The streamflow was cutoff at the lower reach of Yellow River every year during 
1972 to 1998, which caused serious socioeconomic and environmental problems to the 
downstream areas.  Starting from the end of 1990’s, the Yellow River Conservancy 
Commission (YRCC), authorized by State Council of China, implemented the Unified 
Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) in the YRB.  This is a water allocation agreement 
among all provinces and water use permits are specified for each province.  The 
absolute annual water use permits are given in Table 5.3 [Zhao et al., 2009], which 
presents the long term average values, assuming that the total annual water available for 
use in the YRB is 37 billion m3 when the total runoff is 58 billion m3.  However, these 
numbers need further interpolation for the use of this study.  First, the values need to be 
scaled down temporally from annual to monthly and spatially from provinces to agents.  
The temporal distribution uses the same “water usage ratio” as that used in the GDPAG 
benefit function.  This procedure assumes that the water use permits are distributed to 
each month based on the monthly water demand.  The spatial distribution is made by 
using the ratio of water consumption of agent i over water consumption of all agents in 
the province where agent i is located (Equation 5.13).  
∑= iii WC
WCWCRatio        (5.13) 
where WCi is the water consumption for agent i.  
Meanwhile, the absolute water use permits adapted from the concept of centralized 
control need to be transferred into a relative value such as percentage, because the 
absolute values of water permit could be physically impossible in some dry years.  
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Changing the absolute values into percentages means that agents can use a proportion of 
available water, which will maintain water balance.  We define this water consumption 
proportion as water rights ratio (WRi) for each agent, where WRi ≦ 1.  WRi is calculated 
as absolute consumption entitlement divided by total available water from upstream.  
With the definition of WRi, the agent’s optimization problem is formulated as.  
AGIMiix
GDPGDPxf
i
+= &)(max      (5.14) 
s.t. 
( )
⎩⎨
⎧
≤−+−
≤±+×−
0
0
maxmax AGPMIx
GILWRx
ii
ijiii       
where WRi*(Li+Ij+Gi)= wi as described by Equation 5.4. 
Table 5.3. Water consumption agreement for every province (Zhao et al. [2009]) 
Province 
Agreement 
Consumption
(billion m3) 
Province 
Agreement 
Consumption 
(billion m3) 
Qinghai 1.41 Shaanxi 3.80 
Sichuan 0.04 Shanxi 4.31 
Gansu 3.04 Henan 5.54 
Ningxia 4.00 Shandong 7.00 
Inner-Mongolia 5.86 Tianjin 2.00 
Under the UWFR, YRCC issues targeting water releases to each reservoir every 
month, considering the current reservoir storage, the future weather forecast and the 
downstream water demand.  This study assumes that the objective for reservoir is to fit 
the suggested release issued by YRCC under the UWFR (Equation 5.9).  The actual 
monthly water release in year 2000 is used as the target release in the calibration process.  
However, it should be noted that the operations of the reservoirs in the YRB are very 
complex because those reservoirs have multiple purposes and sometimes the reservoir 
managers may not exactly follow the instructions from YRCC.   
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5.4.2. Scenario without Regulation 
The scenario without regulation assumes no management regulation, under which 
agents are free of using what is available to match their demand.  The only constraint 
that will affect their decision is the physical limitation of water availability.  An obvious 
result from this scenario is that upstream water users will take advantage of using water 
and downstream water users can only utilize whatever left from the upstream.  
Meanwhile, the objectives of reservoir agents are no longer constrained by the prescribed 
release targets under UWFR. Instead, reservoir agents try to maximize hydropower 
generation (Equation 5.10).  
5.4.3. Water Price Scenario 
The water price scenario assumes that the water use by agents can be less or more 
than the water right specified by the UWFR.  This scenario mimics the free market 
mechanism which allows agents to trade water in the entire system.  As mentioned in 
the methodology section, the general converging criterion is that total water use equals to 
total water rights (in consumption).  However, a physical converging criterion is also 
necessary in the real world case study as illustrated in Figure 5.3.  Whenever the 
outflow from an agent i becomes negative, the water price will stop decreasing for agent i, 
which means additional trade is physically impossible although it is desired by agents.  
If we put this constraint (Ii ≥ Ii**, Ii**=0 in our setting) on Figure 5.3, it will act as an 
additional constraint for water consumption.  Due to this constraint, the water price 
cannot decline to the level determined by the market (pi* in Figure 5.3), but is limited at a 
new equilibrium price (pi**); meanwhile, the water price decrease for all agents above 
agent i will terminate at this point.  Physically possible water transaction from upstream 
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to downstream is allowed, but whenever an upstream agent wants to buy water from a 
downstream agent, the status becomes infeasible and the water price will converge.  
Furthermore, this study assumes that only agricultural water is allowed for trade; the 
M&I water requirement is treated as the basic water need for all agents and are not 
allowed for reallocation. 
 
Figure 5.3. The convergence of local water price and the consequent agents’ water 
consumption with local streamflow (physical) constraint. 
Corresponding to the equilibrium prices, the maximum amount of water trade is 
determined under both the market incentive and the physical constraint.  As shown in 
Figure 3 the equilibrium prices under the physical constraint (pi**) is higher than that 
underlying the market incentive solely (pi*).  It should be noted that the physical 
constraints may violate the market-based equilibrium condition.   Since water price 
maintains at a level higher than pi* , the total water sold can be larger than total water 
bought, and some water sold will be left in the stream for environmental requirement as 
to be discussed in the following. 
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To simplify the water trade analysis, the reservoir agents are supposed to match 
the targeting storage only.  Beyond this objective, the reservoir agents will not affect 
water trade in the basin, i.e., when the inflow from an upstream agent to the reservoir 
increases, reservoir release will increase, and vice versa. 
Ecosystem agents are set as reactive agents under the UWFR scenario.  However, 
under the water market scenario, one can expect that the benefit of ecosystem will be 
sacrificed if no other constraints exist, since the water trading process does not consider 
water requirement for ecosystems.  To avoid this deficit, a special constraint is set to 
those agents located right upper to the ecosystem agents.  These agents are numbered as 
49, 51 and 52 in Figure 5.1 and each of them is defined as a controlling agent for the 
downstream ecosystem agent. 
  When the outflows from the three controlling agents are less than those under 
UWFR, the water price decreasing process will stop to maintain a certain amount of 
water for ecosystem agents; the water prices for all upstream agents will also converge.  
In other words, the values of Ii** in Figure 5.3 for the three controlling agents represent 
the minimum outflows specified by UWFR.  The stop criterion for the three controlling 
agents will affect all upstream agents, and the responsibility to maintain the targeting 
streamflow for ecosystems will then be shared by all upstream agents.  
5.5. Results 
5.5.1. UWFR Baseline Scenario 
Year 2000 is selected as the baseline year and the MAS model is calibrated to 
UWFR in that year.  Three calibration objectives are matched: 1) the annual water 
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consumption of all water use agents; 2) the monthly reservoir storage of all reservoir 
agents; 3) the monthly streamflow at several important gages along the main channel and 
the major tributaries.   
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Figure 5.4. The calibration result (a) agent’s annual water consumption; (b) reservoir 
storage (unit: billion m3) 
A trial-and-error procedure is conducted to adjust the values of the benefit 
function coefficients (A1i to D1i, A2i and B2i) and the water rights ratio (WRi).  The results 
of water consumption and the reservoir storage are given in Figure 5.4.  Figure 5.4(a) 
plots the observed agent water consumption versus the modeled results.  The observed 
annual total water consumption is 35.7 billion m3, compared to the modeled result 34.5 
billion m3, with the root mean squared error (RMSE) as 0.106 billion m3.  Figure 5.4(b) 
(a) 
(b) 
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compares the modeled and observed reservoir storage.  The RMSEs for the five 
reservoirs, Longyangxia, Liujiaxia, Wanjiazhai, Sanmenxia and Xiaolangdi, are 0.169, 
0.175, 0.055, 0.033 and 0.448 billion m3, respectively. 
Modeled streamflow is also compared to the observed in Figure 5.5 (a b, c).  
Although a slight underestimate of the streamflow after June existing with the middle and 
downstream stations, the intra-year flow pattern matches well between the modeled and 
the observed.  The RMSEs for these three stations, Tangnaigai, Toudaoguai and Lijin, 
are 0.003, 0.282 and 0.160 billion m3, respectively. 
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Figure 5.5. The calibration result of streamflow (unit: billion m3) (a) gage stations 
locations; (b) upstream result-Tangnaigai station; (c) middle stream 
result-Toudaoguai Station; (c) downstream result-Lijin Station  
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5.5.2. Results of Scenario without Regulation 
The scenario without regulation mimics the situation before UWFR.   The 
results are plotted in Figure 5.6.  As can be seen from Figure 5.6 (a), the system water 
consumption will increase during the flooding period (July to October) and decrease in 
the non-flooding period.  This is understandable since more water is available during the 
flooding period.  GDP in the whole basin shows a similar changing tendency but 
different magnitude as water consumption changes (Figure 5.6b).  The water 
consumption decreases by about 2 billion m3 per month from February to June and causes 
the decrease of GDP of 40 billion RMB per month.  On the other hand, the water 
consumption increases from July to October, only resulting in slight increase in GDP.  
Finally, the annual water consumption under the scenario without regulation is 38.3 
billion m3, 11% higher than 34.5 billion m3 under the UWFR scenario, but the basin-wide 
GDP is 1123.26 billion RMB, 10% less than 1246.68 billion RMB from the UWFR 
scenario. 
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Figure 5.6. System-wide comparisons between UWFR scenario (baseline) and scenario 
without regulation (a) monthly water consumption (billion m3); (b) monthly 
GDP (billion RMB)  
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Figure 5.7. Ecosystem agents comparisons between the UWFR scenario (baseline) and 
the scenario without regulation (a) ecosystem agents’ locations; (b) EA1- 
Huayuankou; (c) EA2- Gaocun; (d) EA3-Lijin (unit: billion m3) 
The downstream ecosystem is affected as shown in Figure 5.7.  Figure 5.7(a) 
indicates the locations of three ecosystem agents.  Figure 5.7(b) is the result of 
ecosystem agent 1 (EA1), identified at Huayuankou.  The flow cutoff events occur from 
February to June.  The average monthly flow under the scenario without regulation and 
the UWFR scenarios are 0.389 and 0.972 billion m3, respectively.  The difference 
increases to further downstream EAs.  Figure 5.7(c) shows the result at Gaocun station, 
where ecosystem agent 2 (EA2) is located.  Flow cutoff events occur in the same period 
and the monthly streamflow declines from 1.016 billion m3 under the baseline scenario to 
0.350 billion m3.  The largest effect is found with the most downstream ecosystem agent 
(a) 
b. 
c. 
d. 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
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3 (EA3) at the delta area (Figure 5.7d).  Flow cutoff events occur in February and 
continue throughout the entire year.  This is similar to what happened from 1972 to 1998, 
when no UWFR was enforced [Zhao et al, 2009].  The monthly average streamflow at 
EA3 under the scenario without regulation and the UWFR scenarios are 0.051 and 0.358 
billion m3, respectively. 
5.5.3. Water Price Scenario Results 
The water price scenario starts from an initial water price, which is determined as 
$27 RMB/m3 by a trial-and-error test (pinitial in Figure 5.3).  If the local water price is 
above this value, all agents will only use water for M&I and sell the rest of water 
entitlement.  This implies that the maximum marginal benefit of agricultural water use 
over the whole basin is 27 RMB/m3. 
Figure 5.8. The equilibrium water prices for different agents in different months. (a) 
January; (b) June; (c) August; (d) September 
(c) (d) 
(a) (b) 
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Starting from the initial water price, the model ends with equilibrium water prices 
by agent in each month. Results for some typical months are shown in Figure 5.8.  
Generally, the water prices in the tributaries will be higher than those in the mainstream 
because the amount of water that can be transacted is less in the tributaries.  January is 
an example that shows relatively uniform water prices for agents along the mainstream 
and the major tributaries.  Only some agents located at some small tributaries of the 
downstream area have higher water prices (Figure 5.8a).  Moreover, since January is 
usually the month with lowest flow, the average water price for the entire system is 
relatively higher than those in other months. 
In general the water prices in high flow months are lower than those in low flow 
months (see Figures 5.8 (b), (c) and (d) for the water prices in June, August and 
September, respectively.)  However, the spatial heterogeneity exists in the high flow 
season.  The water prices in tributaries, particularly the source areas of tributaries, are 
higher than those in other places.  This is because water transaction from mainstream 
toward tributaries or from downstream toward upstream is impossible without 
engineering facility.  The marginal benefit of water in those areas will be higher than 
others under the water trade setting. 
The results of system-wide water consumption and GDP are given in Figure 5.9, 
with comparison to the baseline scenario.  The total water consumption in the water 
price scenario is 33.80 billion m3 compared to 34.52 billion m3 under UWFR; while the 
total GDP with agents is higher than those under UWFR (Figure 5.9b).  The monthly 
values have significant increases during the flooding period (July to October).  This is 
because more water is available for trading in this period.  The annual GDP from the 
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water price scenario is 1270.1 billion RMB, compared to 1246.7 billion RMB under 
UWFR.  The GDP for all individual agents are greater or equal to that under UWFR. 
This is because water trading will only occur when water seller and buyer can both 
benefit from water trade. 
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Figure 5.9. System-wide comparisons between UWFR scenario (baseline) and water 
price scenario (a) monthly water consumption (billion m3); (b) monthly GDP 
(billion RMB) 
Table 5.4. The differences of water consumption and GDP for upstream and 
mid/downstream agents between water price and UWFR (billion m3 and RMB). 
Water Consumption difference GDP difference 
Month Upstream 
(A1-A22) 
Mid and 
downstream 
(A23-A52) 
Upstream 
(A1-A22) 
Mid and 
downstream 
(A23-A52) 
1 -0.058 -0.022 0.299 0.162 
2 0.001 -0.011 0.088 0.100 
3 -0.047 0.021 0.102 0.213 
4 -0.086 -0.004 0.089 0.040 
5 -0.056 0.070 0.306 0.191 
6 -0.100 0.044 0.150 0.073 
7 -0.568 0.380 0.904 3.193 
8 -0.420 0.262 0.849 1.988 
9 -1.137 1.082 1.563 5.924 
10 -0.721 0.678 1.076 5.308 
11 -0.030 0.005 0.149 0.150 
12 -0.054 0.046 0.072 0.461 
Sum -3.276 2.551 5.648 17.805 
(a) (b) 
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Table 5.4 presents a summary of the differences of water consumption and GDP 
between the water price scenario and the baseline (UWFR) for agents over the basin.  
As expected, the upstream agents (Agent 1 to Agent 22) use less water than that under 
UWFR (about 3.27 billion m3 annually); while the midstream and downstream agents 
(Agent 23 to Agent 52) use more (2.55 billion m3 annually.)  This shows that upstream 
agents tend to sell water to gain revenue and downstream agents tend to buy water for 
greater water use benefit.  The GDP increase is 5.64 billion RMB for upstream agents 
and 17.8 billion RMB for midstream and downstream agents, with a total annual GDP 
increase of 23.45 billion RMB and more than 88% of the GDP increase (77% for 
upstream and 92% for mid-stream/downstream) in the flooding period.  The results 
indicate that some agents, especially in mid- and downstream areas, require more water 
during the flooding season, which provides a potential economic value of flood water.  It 
should be clarified that the difference of water consumption in Table 5.4 does not mean 
the actual amount of water transaction.  Because the actual water consumptions in the 
UWFR are less than or equal to the water rights, the results in Table 5.4 are only the 
comparison between two water consumption values under different management 
mechanisms. 
Table 5.5 presents the actual water bought and sold for up-, mid-, down-stream, 
and the entire system.  Water bought is larger by the mid- and downstream agents and 
water sold is larger from the upstream agents.  Meanwhile, water sold is always larger 
than water bought in all months at the system level.  The remaining amount of water 
from water sold is actually used for matching ecosystem flow requirements.  This 
implies that government has to buy this amount of water to maintain downstream 
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ecosystem flow given the established ecological flow targets.  The monthly and annual 
total transaction costs (the sum of the water price multiplied by the amount of actual 
water transaction over all agents) are presented in Table 5.5.  The annual value, 2.95 
billion RMB, can be interpolated as a maintenance cost that government has to pay to 
prevent the flow cutoff events possibly occurring at the downstream channel.  It should 
be noted that the total GDP increase under the price scenario (23.45 billion RMB), is far 
higher than the maintenance cost.  Thus the plan is economically efficient. 
Table 5.5. The actual water trading and the economic benefit of water trading (billion m3 
and RMB). 
Month 
A1-A22 
water 
buying 
A23-A52 
water  
buying 
A1-A22 
water 
selling 
A23-A52
water  
selling 
Total 
water 
buying 
Total 
water 
selling 
difference Costs 
1 0.0004 0.0001 0.0674 0.0405 0.0005 0.11 0.11 0.56 
2 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.05 0.02 
3 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.12 0.06 0.06 
4 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.06 
5 0.09 0.09 0.47 0.04 0.18 0.51 0.32 0.06 
6 0.04 0.07 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.24 0.13 0.02 
7 0.08 0.79 0.93 0.66 0.88 1.58 0.71 0.81 
8 0.12 0.44 0.99 0.42 0.56 1.41 0.86 0.54 
9 0.09 1.41 1.54 0.44 1.50 1.98 0.48 0.42 
10 0.06 0.69 0.87 0.09 0.75 0.96 0.21 0.28 
11 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.07 
12 0.0005 0.0908 0.0564 0.0610 0.0914 0.12 0.03 0.05 
Sum 0.53 3.72 5.50 2.01 4.25 7.51 3.26 2.95 
5.6. Discussions 
Here the analysis of the water price scenario is extended to test the effect of 
different ecosystem flow requirements suggested by different studies from China.  The 
values of instream flow requirement in Table 5.1 are used as the converging criterion (Ii**) 
for the three controlling agents (Agent 49, 51 and 52).  In this alternative analysis the 
flow requirements for the three EAs locations assessed by other studies are set as the 
targeting flows for the EAs, respectively.  The targeting flow EA3 is particularly high in 
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order to sustain the fish breeding period at the bayou area in April, May and June, which 
need significantly higher flows than other months.  The initial water prices and the 
setting of reservoir agents remain the same as discussed above. 
Table 5.6 presents the results of system-wide water trading, and shows that the 
total water buying in January, April and June is zero, which means no one is buying water 
in the system and all agents consume as much as the M&I water need (the basic need and 
the minimum water use of an agent).  Water selling occurs and all water is left in the 
stream.  However, the instream flows requirement still cannot be satisfied (January need 
0.36 billion m3 and April and June need 2.58 billion m3 of water).  Thus it is physically 
impossible to satisfy the suggested ecosystem requirements in those months if no other 
actions such as reservoir reoperation are undertaken.  The costs for government (Table 
5.6) for those three months are computed using an initial water price of $27 RMB/m3.  
Table 5.6. The system-wide water trading using suggested ecosystem flow requirement 
(billion m3 and RMB). 
Month Total water buying Total water selling difference Costs for government 
1 0.00 0.29 0.29 7.88 
2 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.49 
3 0.01 0.35 0.35 1.12 
4 0.00 1.82 1.82 49.18 
5 0.03 2.73 2.70 5.39 
6 0.00 2.39 2.39 64.46 
7 0.92 1.58 0.65 0.35 
8 0.56 1.81 1.25 0.75 
9 1.20 2.37 1.17 2.09 
10 0.80 1.10 0.30 0.33 
11 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 
12 0.09 0.10 0.01 0.01 
Sum 3.76 14.89 11.13 132.05 
The annual average water prices for different ecosystem flow requirement setting 
are computed and the results are given in Figure 5.10.  Since January, April and June use 
the initial water price due to the physical limitation, these three months are excluded from 
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the annual average water price computation.  Figure 5.10 (a) shows that the average 
water prices in the mainstream is $1.16 RMB/m3 when using UWFR as instream flow 
targets.  The water prices at the tributaries are higher than mainstream, which is 
expected.  The average water prices in the mainstream increases to $1.62 RMB/m3 when 
ecosystem flow requirement change to the suggested high values, as shown in Figure 
5.10 (b).  The spatial pattern of Figure 5.10 (a) and (b) is very similar, but water prices 
increase by 30% almost everywhere.  This indicates that the marginal benefits of all 
agents will increase since more water is needed to match higher ecological flow targets, 
which reduce the water available for water use agents. 
 
 
Figure 5.10. The annual average water prices under different ecosystem flow requirement. 
(a) using UWFR results as target; (b) using suggested value from previous 
studies 
(a) 
(b) 
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The comparison of the streamflow for the three ecosystem agents is given in 
Figure 5.11, which shows the effect of different management mechanisms on the 
ecosystem.  The UWFR and water price scenario ends with similar intra-year flow 
distribution.  The higher required ecological flow in EA3 results in higher flow for other 
two ecosystem agents when the suggested flow requirements from previous studies are 
used.  Although the model tries to match the ecological targets for EA3 as much as 
possible, due to the physical limitation, the requirements cannot be satisfied in January, 
April and June. 
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Figure 5.11. Ecosystem agents comparisons between the all scenarios (a) ecosystem 
agents’ locations; (b) result of EA1; (c) result of EA2; (d) result of EA3 (unit: 
billion m3) 
(a) 
b. 
c. 
d. 
(b) 
(c) (d) 
 
 
169
5.7. Conclusions 
This paper addresses basin-wide water allocation considering both human and 
natural water demands using a multiple agent system (MAS) model.  The MAS 
modeling framework defines water users and reservoirs as active agents and ecological 
zones as reactive agents, and addresses the decision making complexity with individual 
water users due to spatial heterogeneity, temporal variability and political constraints. A 
decentralized optimization algorithm is extended to determine local water prices as an 
incentive to influence agents’ decision toward the basin-level policy targets.  
The Yellow River Basin (YRB) in China, a basin with a long-term history of 
basin-wide water resources management practices, is used as case study area.  The MAS 
model is formulated and run for three scenarios.  The baseline scenario reveals the 
current practice with UWFR.  Two additional scenarios, the scenario without regulation 
and the water price scenario, are evaluated regarding the impact of different management 
mechanisms.  The scenario without regulation shows higher system water consumption 
but lower system GDP compared to the baseline; flow cutoff may occur at the 
downstream area.  Under UWFR, although some upstream agents have to compromise 
with their benefits (GDP in upstream decreases by about 2.5 billion RMB annually), the 
benefit of entire system is increased.  The most significant improvement is the water 
reservation for downstream ecosystem agents.  The annual average streamflow for 
ecosystem agents increases by 3 to 6 times.  This result matches the real world 
observation - no flow cutoff events have been observed since 1999 when the UWFR is 
enforced. 
Assuming a water market mechanism to be implemented in the YRB, the water 
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price scenario shows that the total water consumption decreases and the total GDP 
increases compared to UWFR baseline scenario.  The monthly local water prices 
determined by market equilibrium vary spatially over agents and temporally over months, 
which reflects heterogeneity of water availability and water use conditions.  Moreover, 
the results also provide information about how much money government should provide 
to maintain the ecosystem flow requirement.  Since the fund request to the government, 
which can be understood as the maintenance cost, is less than the total GDP increase, the 
net social welfare increases. The proposed water market scenario shows possible 
improvements of the UWFR with respect to social (equity), economic and environmental 
objectives.An extended analysis shows the consequences of higher ecosystem flow 
requirements as suggested by some studies from China, including the impact on the local 
water prices and the entire system behavior.  The results indicate that it is physically 
impossible to match the suggested environmental flow requirements in some months of 
year 2000 if no other actions such as reservoir reoperation are undertaken. 
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CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSIONS  
The focus of this research is modeling the water resources allocation between 
humans and ecosystem in a watershed context under environmental heterogeneity with 
multi-agent based system framework.  Particularly, the construction of quantitative 
ecology-hydrology connection, development of a decentralized optimization algorithm 
and application of both to real world case studies are conducted. 
6.1.  Research Findings 
The research findings are summarized around these aspects, i.e. 1) incorporating 
the ecological concern into the watershed planning, 2) addressing the different 
characteristics of water users and 3) searching for the harmonic balance between these 
ecosystem and human water users.  Three major challenges for integrated river basin 
management have been addressed.  
This thesis addresses the first challenge by using a data-mining approach: genetic 
programming (GP) as presented in Chapter 2.  To incorporate the ecological concern, one 
needs to know how the ecosystem responses to different environmental conditions.   
Using the Indicators of Hydrologic Alteration (IHAs) to represent the environmental 
condition, the genetic programming generates a quantitative relationship (equation) 
between natural flow regime metrics (hydrology) and fish community indices (ecology).    
The robustness test demonstrate that all of the identified hydrological metrics had 
consistent relationships with the ecological index.  This equation is proved to be the 
direct linkage between hydrology and ecology.  Furthermore, by comparing the GP 
results with those from principal component analysis (PCA) and autecology matrix (AM) 
using a common set of IHAs in the study area, the three approaches identified six 
common indicators, Dmin, Rrate, Rv, Q3daymax, Q7daymin and Q5, for the case study site.  The 
finding of common indicators from the three different approaches provides confidence in 
using existing and new approaches and observational data to build solid quantitative 
relationships between hydrologic indicators and ecological indices.  Meanwhile, the 
Indicator Impact Matrix (IIM) presents the impact of combinations of multiple indicators 
at different statistical levels.  The substitutional relationships between the most 
ecologically relevant hydrologic indicators (ERHIs) are particularly useful for river 
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restoration design and management since it is easier to control some indicators, such as 
the average flow in a month, than others such as flow rising rate or flow reversal.  The 
IIM has the potential to become a useful tool for flow regime management considering 
both hydrologic statistics and ecological objectives.   
To apply the methodology developed in Chapter 2 to a real world problem, a case 
study of using reservoir operation for the purpose of ecosystem restoration is 
demonstrated in Chapter 3.  Changing the reservoir operation rules and reestablishing the 
natural flow regime to restore the local ecosystem to a practical degree is a difficult task 
since the objective of ecosystem restoration is not easy to quantify.  However, following 
the results of GP in Chapter 2, an optimization model that considers both economic and 
ecological objectives is developed for daily reservoir operation and then applied to a case 
study reservoir in Illinois, USA.  A multi-objective genetic algorithm is applied to 
determining the optimal operation rules under these two objectives.  The reservoir water 
release following the optimal rules incorporates the downstream fish community 
condition into consideration.  The results demonstrate the tradeoff between the human 
and ecosystem objectives.  In general, adding the ecological objective to the case study 
reservoir operation will not jeopardize the original objective, which is the major concern 
of current reservoir operation.  Meanwhile, the procedure can also improve the 
downstream fish habitats by providing a flow regime that similar to the natural condition. 
The quantification of ecosystem is one of the essential parts of this thesis to 
answer the second challenge.  Base on the results of Chapter 2 and 3, the differenet water 
use characteristics are evaluated by the multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework 
in Chapter 4 of this thesis.  Due to the spatial heterogeneity involved with this task, 
dividing the watershed into interconnected subsystems (agents) should be a more realistic 
approach for analyzing watershed management problems.  Since the definition of agent is 
very flexible, one can use any appropriate format to characterize agents.  Normally, 
agents in the watershed are different types of water users that include offstream human 
land and water users and instream water “users,” such as riparian aquatic ecosystems.  
Under the MAS framework, both individual agents’ objectives and the interaction among 
those objectives would drive the resource allocation.  A penalty-based decentralized 
optimization algorithm is used to address the third challenge as demonstrated in Chapter 
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4.  By introducing the local interest factor (βi), this method allows agents to search for 
the solution in the infeasible solution space when system-wide constraints are violated.  
The value of βi reflects “how far” this search can extend inside the infeasible region.  The 
use of βi values enables the analysis of a water resource management problem to include 
the impact of the various agent behaviors that the βi values reflect.  Aggressive agents 
with large βi values affect other agents, particularly the reactive ecosystem agents, and 
even the entire system.  In general, the system benefit and violation increases with 
increasing βi.  The computerized bargaining procedure presented in Chapter 4 
demonstrates how the interactions among agents can be incorporated into the 
decentralized modeling framework.  Through the choice of βi, information exchange and 
coordination among agents regarding benefits and penalties is implemented with the 
hypothetical case study.   
 The methodology developed in Chapter 4 is applied to a real world watershed to 
evaluate the practicability as shown in Chapter 5. The Yellow River Basin (YRB) in 
China is used as the case study area since it is an important water supply for northern 
China and has a long-term history of water resources management.  In this real world 
case, a local water price (pi) is used to substitute the local interest factor (βi) as an 
institutional arrangement.  This water price is used to guide the convergence of the 
decentralized management.  Three scenarios have been demonstrated in Chapter 5.  The 
Unified Water Flow Regulation (UWFR) currently enforced by the Yellow River 
Conservancy Commission is the baseline scenario and is calibrated using year 2000.  The 
calibration results show a reasonable match between MAS modeling and observation of 
water consumption and streamflow.  The unmanaged scenario, a situation without any 
regulation shows higher system water consumption but lower system GDP.  Meanwhile, 
the flow cutoff will occur at the downstream area which implies that UWFR is necessary.  
Finally, the water price scenario results show that if water trading is allowed in the 
system, the total water consumption will decrease and the total GDP will increase.  
Meanwhile, the government has to provide some subsidies to maintain the ecosystem 
flow requirement, but the subsidies is less than the total GDP increase which means the 
social welfare is increasing.  The impact of different ecosystem flow requirements on the 
water prices is also shown in Chapter 5.  The results indicate some physical conflicts 
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occur between human and ecosystem water needs in some months which imply that the 
satisfaction of ecosystem flow requirement should include the concept of frequency, 
because the complete satisfaction of ecosystem might be impossible for some dry years if 
no other management action exists. 
Summary of key contribution of this thesis: 
• Developing a reliable relationship between hydrologic metrics and ecosystem indices 
• Demonstrating the usage of ecological-hydrologic relationship on reservoir 
reoperation 
• Quantitatively defining different water users as agents including ecosystem 
• Formulating the MAS framework in the watershed context and solve the problem with 
a decentralized optimization algorithm 
• Introducing the concept of βi to address the agent bargaining issues and define the 
economic meaning as the local water price 
• Demonstrating the practicality of the proposed MAS approach by using a complex 
real world basin: the Yellow River Basin 
• Comparing the decentralized results with the centralized results in the YRB and 
proving the efficiency of “MAS-decentralized method” 
6.2. Limitations and Future Research 
This thesis demonstrates a novel approach to modeling the water resources 
allocation between human and ecosystem.  Ecosystem services can be quantified by 
genetic programming (GP) and can be further defined as agents in the multi-agent system 
(MAS) modeling framework.  Penalty-based decentralized optimization provides an 
explicit way to solve the MAS modeling framework.  Both of these results can serve as 
guidelines in watershed management decision making as presented in case studies.  
However, much more work is still needed to build on the accomplished tasks in this 
thesis.  The proposed methods and applications have some assumptions and limitations 
that can be improved or released with further studies. 
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Although the GP application to the Upper Illinois River in Chapter 2 provides 
reasonable results, the algorithm can be improved by incorporating prior knowledge to 
take advantage of the characteristics of specific applications.  In particular, if linkages 
between the fish community and hydrologic indicators are known a priori, the GP can 
incorporate the knowledge in the solution process.  For example, based on the outcomes 
of PCA or AM, SI is sensitive to the change of several IHAs: Dmin, Rrate, Q3daymax, etc. 
which can be imposed as constraints in the GP to enforce all optional solutions generated 
by the GP to include these indicators.  Constraints may also be established for the 
selection of arithmetic and mathematical operators if relevant knowledge (e.g., positive or 
negative impact on the dependent variable) is available.  For example, if it is known that 
Rrate has a positive effect on SI, there could be a way to enforce GP to create alternative 
equations that express the prior knowledge.   
Water quality and geomorphology condition will also affect the fish community 
in the river.  As indicated by Lerczak et al. [1994], the fish population fluctuation from 
1957 to 1994 in the Illinois River was related to changes in water quality.  The change of 
geomorphology will affect micro habitat conditions.  Therefore, future research may be 
conducted to extend current analysis in Chapter 2 to include the role of water quality and 
geomorphology in fish community assessment. 
Long-term field sampled fish data is the largest limitation for riverine ecosystem 
studies.   The fundamental assumption of Chapter 3 is that the GP result developed in 
Chapter 2 is applicable in nearby areas with similar climatic and geological 
characteristics.  If detailed fish data becomes available for the Kaskaskia River, a SI-
equation based on the local fish community can be constructed.  This would likely affect 
the results in Chapter 3.  Meanwhile the economic objective function in Chapter 3 might 
not be truly consistent with the real reservoir operation rules.  This can be the reason for a 
significant reduction of the flooding losses in the optimal operational rules as compared 
to the historical operations.  Some of the unrealistic objective function values obtained in 
Chapter 3 could indicate that there are additional constraints (by law or by empirical 
experiences) that have not been included in the optimization model.  Moreover, the initial 
reservoir level can affect the modeling results in Chapter 3.  The sensitive analysis can be 
further conducted to improve the results of optimal water release in that chapter. 
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Multi-Agent System (MAS) modeling framework shows a promising result of 
formulating the watershed management problem into mathematic format in Chapter 4.  
The MAS format allows researchers to define the utility function for individual agents.  
However, the accuracy of the utility function becomes a critical issue in these studies.  
Both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 used the simplest concave quadratic format to represent 
agent’s utility, which is an assumption based on microeconomic theory.  The assumption 
is acceptable for a theoretical study such as the one demonstrated in Chapter 4.  However, 
for a real world watershed, the actual utility function for an agent must be more complex 
and should be constructed with many data items.  However, due to the data limitation, 
Chapter 5 used only several years of observation to perform the task.  This is a reason 
why the coefficients in the MAS model need to be calibrated. 
The decision variables of individual agents should be more than one in the 
decision process.  In both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, I considered the water consumption 
as the only decision variable.  This might be inappropriate for the real world case such as 
the Yellow River Basin.  The water quality issues, always accompanying with the 
quantity issues, are also a major concern in watershed management, especially in the 
urban area.  The solution algorithm, penalty-based decentralized optimization, actually 
allows increasing multi-variables.  Future studies can follow this direction and test the 
crossover effect of multiple decision variables.  Meanwhile, the behavior rules that guide 
agents’ negotiation used in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 can be improved with a more 
realistic one after the actual communication platform has been created with the local 
stakeholders. 
Finally, the decisions of agents in both Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 do not consider 
any forecast information.  In other words, the results presented in these two chapters are 
using perfect information.  Further studies should incorporate the uncertainty of rainfall 
and runoff into the analysis.  The decision process of agents will then become dynamics, 
such as the example demonstrated by Schluter and Pahl-Wostl [2007] and Schluter et al 
[2009].   They also showed how to consider agent’s memory into the decision process.  
The memory setting can be treated as the temporal interaction between an agent and itself, 
which is one of the important aspects in MAS studies.   
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APPENDIX A.  MATLAB CODE FOR CHAPTER 3 
All the coding work for chapter 3 of this thesis is performed in MATLAB 
(version 7).  This appendix provides an outline of the codes of daily streamflow 
generator, the multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) for reservoir reoperation and 
the result summary.  Firstly, the list of codes used is summarized in Table A1. 
Table A1.  List of MATLAB codes used in this thesis pertaining to streamflow generator 
and MOGA reservoir reoperation 
MATLAB File Name Description 
HFC.m Using the historical daily flow data to compute the daily flow 
characteristics. 
DFG.m Using the result from HFC.m to general daily streamflow  
ISDamRelease.m Using the generated streamflow with other economic variables 
to determine the optimal parameter sets by MOGA 
AnnualSITL.m Using the results of ISDamRelease.m to create the summary of 
annual report. 
 
A.1 Streamflow Generator 
 The three-state Markov chain-based modeling that Aksoy (2003) proposed is 
applied to generate the daily streamflow based on the historical long-term inflow data.  
The HFC.m code requires the historical daily streamflow as input data.  In this thesis, I 
used 20 years inflow data from Lake Shelbyville.  The data is a matrix format with 
columns as different years and rows as different days.  The HFC.m code will create an 
output named “HisPara.txt,” which is the flow characteristics such as ascension and 
recession probability, ascension and recession coefficient, and mean flow for different 
month (Figure A1.).  
 
Figure A1.  Flowchart of MATLAB codes to calculate the historcal flow characteristics 
 
HFC.m Inflow.xls HisPara.txt 
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 The results from the HFC.m code will become the input for the DFG.m code.  The 
users have to use an excel file and put every flow characteristic in different sheet and also 
input the length of year that she want to generate.  The DFG.m code will then create an 
output file named: “GenInflow.txt,” which is the result daily streamflow with the length 
that users specified. It is also a matrix format with columns as different years and rows as 
different days (Figure A2). 
 
Figure A2.  Flowchart of MATLAB codes to generate the daily streamflow time series 
base on the result of HFC.m 
 
A.2 Multi-Objective Genetic Algorithm (MOGA) for reservoir reoperation 
 The generated streamflow is one of the major input for the ISDamRelease.m code, 
which is the main code for multi-objective genetic algorithm.  The other economic 
variables such as the daily profit for different catogories, the recreational parameters and 
the total crops damage is also put together in different sheets of an excel file: 
“InputData100y.xls.”  The ISDamRelease.m code will then search the optimal parameter 
sets which can maximize the fish diversity index (SI) and minimize the flooding damage 
(TL) at the same time for every years. Each year two files will be created: 
”MOGA_SIresultX.txt” and “MOGA_TLresultX.txt.” The “X” in the output files 
represent the year (Figure A3).   
 
Figure A3.  Flowchart of MATLAB codes to estimate the optimal parameter sets for 
every year base on MOGA 
ISDamRelease.m 
InputData100y.
xls 
1. MOGA_SIresultX.txt 
2. MOGA_TLresultX.txt 
DFG.m HisPara.xls GenInflow.txt 
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 The user then have to manual search for the pareto optimal solutions in each 
”MOGA_SIresultX.txt” and “MOGA_TLresultX.txt.” An excel file is suggested to list all 
the pareto optimal solutions and then the statistical analysis can be conducted. The user 
can compute the mean, the mode and the middle value of the optimal parameter set. This 
calculation will result in the final parameter sets (19 parameters) whch is the input for the 
AnnualSITL.m code. Meanwhile, the historical inflow and other economic variables is 
also necessary inout. There will be three output from the AnnualSITL.m code: 
“Annual_SI&TL.txt.” “WaterLevel.txt,” and “WaterRelease.txt.”  The  
“Annual_SI&TL.txt” shows the annual SI and TL value for the historical years if the 
optimal parameter set have ben applied.   The “WaterLevel.txt” shows the daily water 
level in the reservoir if the optimal parameter set have ben applied.  The 
“WaterRelease.txt” shows the daily water release from the reservoir if the optimal 
parameter set have ben applied (Figure A4). 
 
Figure A4.  Flowchart of MATLAB codes to output the summary base on MOGA results 
AnnualSITL.m 
1. Annual_SI&TL.txt 
2. WaterLevel.txt 
3. WaterRelease.txt 
1. Summary of MOGA Result 
2. Historical streamflow  
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APPENDIX B.  MATLAB CODE FOR CHAPTER 5 
All the coding work for chapter 5 of this thesis is performed in MATLAB 
(version 7). This appendix provides an outline of the codes for three different scenarios of 
multi-agent system (MAS) modeling framework in the Yellow River Basin.   Firstly, the 
list of codes used is summarized in Table B1. 
Table B1.  List of MATLAB codes used in this thesis for the multi-agent system 
modeling framework simulation in the Yellow River Basin 
MATLAB File Name Description 
YRBMASuu.m The main MAS code for the baseline and unmanaged scenario 
YRBMASpw.m The main MAS code for the water price scenario 
YA1.m to YA52.m The code for each general agent’s local optimization in the baseline and unmanaged scenario 
YA53.m to YA57.m The code for each reservoir agent’s local optimization in the baseline and unmanaged scenario 
pYA1.m to pYA52.m The code for each general agent’s local optimization in the water price scenario 
 
B.1 Baseline Scenario 
The main code for baseline scenario and unmanaged scenario is the same as: 
YRBMASuu.m. The difference between these two scenarios is the input parameters and 
the setting for reservoir agents.  Most of the input parameters is actually the same for all 
scenarios and they are put together in one excel file: “YRBMASinput.xls,” but in 
separate sheets. These parameters are: 1) the coefficient for general agent’s utility 
function (A1 to D1, A2 to B2); 2) Maximum agriculture water consumption (AG); 3) 
Maximum M&I water consumption (MI); 4) return flow rate (Re); 5) effective rainfall 
(P); 6) local surface inflow(L); 7) ground water storage (G); 8) maximum water release 
for reservoir (KX); 9) maximum water storage for reservoir (KS); 10) initial water 
storage (Si); 11) dead water storage (Sd) and 12) evaporation from reservoir (ET). The 
special setting for baseline scenario is: 1) initial water right ratio (WR) are set base on the 
method described in chapter 5 and 2) water release targets (Y) are enforced for reservoir 
agents. The code YA53.m to YA57.m have to be modified to active the utility function 
using “minimize the difference between actual and target release” as objective function.  
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The output form this scenario has 7 files. “YRBMAS_Decision.txt” is the actual 
decision for each agent. “YRBMAS_Benefit.txt” is the actual benefit for each agent. 
“YRBMAS_violation.txt” is the violation for each agent. “YRBMAS_downflow.txt” is 
the actual downflow from each agent.  “YRBMAS_GRecharge.txt” is the groundwater 
recharge from each agent. “YRBMAS_ GDischarge.txt” is the groundwater pumping 
from each agent. “YRBMAS_ System.txt” is the system-wide benefit and violation for 
each month (Figure B1). 
 
 
Figure B1. Flowchart of MATLAB codes to YRBMAS: baseline and unmanaged 
scenario 
 
B.2 Unmanaged Scenario 
 Most of the settings and the modeling procedure are the same in the unmanaged 
scenario than in the baseline scenario. The different setting are listed as followed: 1) 
initial water right ratio (WR) are set at “1” for all general agent; 2) the coefficients to 
compute water head from reservoir storage are enforced (H); The code YA53.m to 
YA57.m have to be modified to active the utility function using “maximize the product of 
water release times water head” as objective function. The output files are the same as 
baseline scenario (Figure B1). 
 
YRBMASuu.m 
YRBMASinput.
xls 
1. YRBMAS_Decision.txt 
2. YRBMAS_Benefit.txt 
3. YRBMAS_violation.txt 
4. YRBMAS_downflow.txt 
5. YRBMAS_GRecharge.txt 
6. YRBMAS_GDischarge.txt 
7. YRBMAS_System.txt 
YA1.m YA2.m YA57.m…
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B.3 Water Price Scenario 
The main code for water price scenario: YRBMASpw.m. It has a special loop for 
water price convergence. The codes for general agents are also different. The water right 
that computed from the baseline scenario (UWFRWR) will be used in each agent’s local 
optimization problem. This parameter is also put in a separate sheet of input file: 
“YRBMASinput.xls.” Meanwhile, several additional parameters are also need for this 
scenario: 1) the target flow for ecosystem agents (UWFREA); 2) the reservoir storage 
change from baseline scenario (delS); 3) a matrix that indicates the up-downstream 
relationship between general agents (UpLink); and 4) a column shows how many 
upstream agents exist for each agent (UpNum).  
The outputs form this scenario are almost the same as previous two. One 
additional output file: “YRBMAS_Price.txt” is created, which shows the water price for 
each agent in each numerical loop (Figure B2). 
 
 
Figure B2. Flowchart of MATLAB codes to YRBMAS: water price scenario 
 
YRBMASpw.m 
YRBMASinput.
xls 
1. YRBMAS_Decision.txt 
2. YRBMAS_Benefit.txt 
3. YRBMAS_violation.txt 
4. YRBMAS_downflow.txt 
5. YRBMAS_GRecharge.txt 
6. YRBMAS_GDischarge.txt 
7. YRBMAS_System.txt 
8. YRBMAS Price.txt 
pYA1.m pYA2.m pYA52.m…
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